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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

IRAQ

PART 7

January to December 1953

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING IRAQ—PART 7

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

EQ 1011/1

No. 1

IRAQ: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1952

Sir J. Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received 30th January)

(No. 12. Confidential) *Bagdad,*
Sir, *23rd January, 1953.*

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a review of events in Iraq during the year 1952. I am indebted to Mr. R. W. Munro for the section on economic affairs, and for the rest of the report to Mr. Donald Maitland.

2. In 1951 Iraq was the model child of the Middle East. This was obviously too good to last and at the end of 1952 Iraq, too, had her disturbances. These are described in the report. They may serve either as a warning or as a curtain-raiser, depending on how the next Government conducts affairs of State. The opportunity is there to be grasped. All the money needed for development is assured. The Western Powers and the United Nations have poured in their experts and more are coming in every month. The question is whether the Iraqis themselves will have the drive, ability and honesty of purpose to play their own essential part. The issue is doubtful and the general feeling at the end of the year was one of frustration rather than confidence. The modern Iraqi is looking for quick results. He wants to run before he can walk. The only certain thing is that any falls and failures—and there will inevitably be some—will be laid at the door of the British.

3. By and large, Anglo-Iraqi relations showed little change during the year. Personal relations with the Regent, with the great majority of Iraqi politicians and with officials, both military and civil, continued excellent, and any Britisher may be assured of a warm welcome throughout the countryside. The press on the other hand remained as consistently hostile as ever. To the man in the streets of Bagdad and the other larger towns, for whom the press caters, we are still the imperialists and oppressors, and Iraqis of every social stratum are convinced that their country is controlled by this embassy. This is not wholly surprising seeing that, as was shown during the November

riots, even a deeply suspicious Iraqi Prime Minister will still turn instinctively to the embassy for advice and support when he is in difficulties.

4. In international affairs the Iraqis have continued to think more about particular Arab problems, such as Palestine and the oppressed Arabs of North Africa, than about the larger problems which are rocking the world. But the unrest in Persia has brought it home to them that the Communist empire is not very far from Iraq's frontiers. The leaders would like to co-operate with the West to avert the menace. Their difficulty is to convince the ill-informed who have been fed for so long on anti-Western slogans. Hence the timidity of even Nuri Pasha on such practical issues as the Middle East Defence Organisation and the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch and its enclosure to Her Majesty's Representatives at Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Jedda, Tel Aviv and Ankara, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Head of the British Middle East Office, Fayid, Her Majesty's Consular Officers in Iraq and the Air Officer Commanding in Iraq.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

Enclosure in No. 1

General

Although there were grave disturbances in Iraq in the autumn of 1952, no far-reaching change in the form of government took place. Criticism of the "old guard" politicians by the educated middle-class became more outspoken, and popular discontent with social conditions which have scarcely changed for centuries became more articulate. Relations between the two leading politicians, Nuri Said and Saleh Jabr, deteriorated seriously throughout the year.

2. The agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company, which will provide the funds to finance Iraq's economic development, was ratified by the Iraqi Parliament. A start was made with implementing the Development Board's programme.

3. The prestige of the Regent, which had declined steadily, rose sharply towards the end of the year. Nevertheless he remains a generally unpopular figure in the country.

Domestic Affairs

4. At the beginning of the year Nuri Said's Government, which was sixteen months old, seemed to have consumed its energy and it was expected that, when the budget and the agreements with the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Rafidain Oil Company had been dealt with, Parliament would be dissolved and a new Government would be formed to conduct the elections. Nuri Said's position was secure, since the leaders of the United Popular Front had fallen out and Saleh Jabr was sulkily nursing his grievances, but a student demonstration on the anniversary of the Portsmouth Treaty riots in 1948 served as a reminder that there were still forces capable of disturbing the peace for political purposes. Although he had an invincible majority in Parliament, Nuri Said had therefore to keep one eye on the street when, in February, he presented the oil agreements to the Chamber of Deputies for ratification. He relied on speed to confuse the Opposition. A surprised Chamber found its time-table altered and consideration of the Bills advanced to the head of the agenda. Saleh Jabr's supporters tabled a large number of amendments, but Nuri regretfully insisted that there was no time to consider this "encyclopædia of oil." The Istiqlal Party Deputies and Saleh Jabr's supporters walked out of the Chamber and the agreements were passed by 89 votes to 7. The Istiqlalis later resigned their seats. Similar tactics were adopted in the Senate. Saleh Jabr's supporters again walked out and the agreements were passed by 17 votes to 1 on 17th February. The Istiqlal and National Democratic Parties and the United Popular Front called for a peaceful strike on 19th February in protest against the Government's high-handed treatment of Parliament, but the Regent signed the Bills on the 18th and no demonstrations of consequence occurred. The Government emerged from the debate with renewed strength and Nuri soon began to show signs of wishing to remain in power.

5. The effectiveness of the Opposition was all but destroyed by the Government's victory and, in the following weeks, Parliament dealt with a large amount of legislation. Two laws were passed providing for the setting-up of Ministries of Agriculture and Health and, soon after, Abdul Majid Mahmud and Muhammed Hassan Kubba were appointed respectively Acting Ministers of Agriculture and Health. At the end of March the Regent and the Prime Minister left Iraq and work in Parliament and in the Ministries came to a standstill. As is usual in such circumstances, criticism of the handling of the country's affairs was soon being heard in every quarter. The Regent and the Prime Minister were taken to task for gallivanting abroad when there was urgent work at home, and scandalous rumours were spread about the disreputable private life of certain Ministers and senior officials. The Regent and Prime Minister returned to Iraq towards the end of May and Parliament was prorogued on 30th June, after a session which had been characterised by a series of resounding victories for Nuri Pasha. One of Parliament's final acts was to pass an amendment to the Electoral Law, one of the most important provisions of which was the substitution of the Municipal Council for the *mukhtar* and local notables as the agency for choosing the Committee of Inspection which supervises the elections. Saleh Jabr's supporters vigorously opposed this measure which, they feared, would make it easier than before for Nuri to manipulate the elections.

6. By the beginning of the summer Nuri Pasha was badly in need of a rest. For more than twenty months he had held Iraq on a steady course whilst tumultuous events had occurred in Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Persia and he had negotiated and passed through Parliament an agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company which, at one stroke, made Iraq potentially one of the most prosperous countries of the Middle East. He resigned on 10th July and two days later the formation of a Cabinet of Independents under Mustafa al Umari (who himself held the portfolio of the Interior) was announced; the main task of this Cabinet was to hold the parliamentary elections. As it was well known that Nuri, before resigning, had approved the composition of the Cabinet, it was not expected that it would conduct the elections in a manner inimical to his interests. Having thus left the house in order and handed over charge to the servant, Nuri set off for his summer holiday.

7. No sooner had Nuri left the country than things began to go wrong. It was generally felt that, since it would legislate during the first few years of the young King's reign, the balance of power in the new Majlis should be held by adherents of the Palace. But exactly how this was to be achieved soon began to cause Mustafa al Umari anxiety. There was no sign of a rapprochement between the supporters of Nuri and Saleh Jabr; on the contrary they seemed to be drifting further apart, and there was talk in Saleh Jabr's party of boycotting the elections unless the Electoral Law were amended to provide for direct elections. The violent changes of Government in Egypt and Lebanon encouraged the middle and lower classes to believe that deliverance from oppression and corruption was at hand. Evidence of increased Communist activity in the Shia Holy Places added to Mustafa al Umari's difficulties. The Opposition parties, perceiving a combination of circumstances which favoured them, set about embarrassing the Government by aggravating existing discontents, such as the high cost of living, corruption in high places and the alleged inactivity of the Government and the Development Board. When Nuri returned to Iraq in September, Kamil Chaderchi, the leader of the National Democratic Party, was trying to persuade the other Opposition leaders to join him in organising a strike on the return of the Regent from the United States and the United Kingdom, which would coincide with the submission to the Regent of a petition in the name of all the Opposition parties calling for various reforms, including amendment of the Electoral Law.

8. All but the extreme politicians were alarmed at the extent of popular discontent and they believed that the situation could only be saved if the Regent made some dramatic gesture on his return.

9. The Regent arrived in Bagdad on 26th October. The same evening the Cabinet discussed the internal situation with him and, on the following day, by the issue of an Iradah dissolving Parliament, the initiative was seized from the Opposition parties. None the less, on 28th October the Istiqlal and National Democratic Parties and the United Popular Front submitted their petitions to the Regent. The memoranda of the first two parties had many similarities in that they both called for the limitation of the authority of the Head of State, the amendment of the Electoral Law to provide for direct elections, the rooting out of corrup-

tion and the abolition of tribal law. The United Popular Front also demanded amendments to the Constitution and to the Electoral Law. On the same day, Saleh Jabr addressed a letter to the Prime Minister in which he threatened that his party would boycott the elections unless they took place on the direct system.

10. To the surprise and delight of moderate opinion, the Head of the Royal Diwan replied in forceful terms to the three petitions. He stated that the Regent agreed that certain reforms were necessary, but he thought they should be effected by Parliament as provided for in the Constitution. This resolute answer removed the immediate danger of disorders. But, when the three Opposition parties declared that in view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply they would boycott the elections, it was clear that they were in a defiant mood.

11. In an effort to reconcile the views of the Government and the Opposition parties the Regent called the political leaders to a meeting at the Palace on 3rd November. This meeting broke up in confusion and, with the failure of Mustafa al Umari's attempts to persuade Saleh Jabr to come to terms, the situation began to deteriorate rapidly. The morale of some members of the Cabinet, and of Jamal Baban and Ibrahim Shabandar in particular, wavered and the latter resigned on 15th November. Ali Mahmud Sheikh Ali replaced him and at the same time Husam al Din Juma'a, the Minister of Defence, took over the Ministry of the Interior in an acting capacity; control of the police and the armed forces was thus placed in the hands of one man. Two days later the Government made what proved to be its final attempt to meet the Opposition. In a communiqué they disclosed that a committee had been set up to draft an amendment to the Electoral Law which would be submitted to the new Parliament and would provide for direct elections; they invited representatives of all the political parties to take part in the committee's work. They added that the date for the beginning of the elections would soon be made public. During the next two days the Istiqlal, National Democratic and Popular Socialist Parties and the United Popular Front announced their refusal to co-operate with the committee. These parties also reaffirmed their decision to boycott the elections and reiterated their threat to make sure that the elections could not be held. Only Nuri Pasha's party nominated a representative to work with the committee.

12. The situation in the middle of November was serious. The Government had to choose between carrying out the elections or capitulating to the Opposition parties' demands for electoral reform. While Mustafa al Umari made one last effort to move Saleh Jabr from the position he had taken up alongside the Extreme Opposition, it suddenly became known that the Regent had asked Hikmat Sulaiman, behind Mustafa's back, to become Prime Minister. Mustafa's position was fatally weakened and it was no surprise when, on the morning of 22nd November, while the Cabinet was meeting to decide when to begin the elections, demonstrations began in the streets of Bagdad.

13. The immediate cause of the disorders was a student strike which the Partisans of Peace and other Left-wing elements exploited. In some parts of Bagdad the demonstrators shot at the police who had orders not to fire. One demonstrator was killed and thirty police were injured. In the middle of the afternoon Mustafa al Umari submitted his Cabinet's resignation to the Regent, thus bringing to an end at the most inopportune moment one of the least distinguished Ministries in Iraq's history. Jamil Madfai tried and failed to form a Government, the Regent rejected an offer by Nuri Pasha to try his hand, and twenty-seven hours passed before effective Government was re-established when General Nuruddin Mahmud, the Chief of the General Staff, was entrusted with the formation of a Government. During that time mobs, which on 23rd November included members of the four Opposition parties in addition to Communists, had attacked and damaged the offices of the United States Information Service, British Overseas Airways Corporation and the *Iraq Times* and had burnt down a police station and murdered some of the occupants. Martial law was declared in Bagdad Liwa on the evening of 23rd November—the army gradually taking over control from the police—all the political parties were dissolved, seventeen newspapers, including all the party organs, were suppressed and many political leaders, Partisans of Peace and other Communists were arrested.

14. Demonstrations against Nuruddin's Government and in favour of a "popular" Government under Kamil Chaderchi took place on 24th November, but on that evening a night curfew was imposed and no further disorders occurred in Bagdad. Five policemen were killed and more than 300

injured in Bagdad; only one demonstrator is known to have been killed. Minor disturbances occurred at Basra on 24th November and on the following day at Kut, Amara, Hilla, Kerbela and Nejef.

15. Late on the night of 24th November, Nuruddin's Cabinet, which contained only three men with ministerial experience, published its programme. Nuruddin set himself two main tasks—to restore order and bring those responsible for the riots to justice, and to make concessions to reasonable popular demands—and he embarked upon his work with an enthusiasm unprecedented in Iraqi politics. Military tribunals were established to investigate the cases of the detainees and ordinances, regulations and orders designed to reduce the cost of living of the lower classes were issued. The *istihlak* tax on fruit and vegetables was abolished and customs duty on tea, sugar and textiles was reduced. But most important of all was the Cabinet's decision to set up a committee to amend the Electoral Law to provide for direct elections. This committee set to work at once and the new law was published on 18th December. By the end of the year, however, when the shock of the disturbances had worn off, the critics, many of whom had shown a signal lack of courage when the fate of their country was in the balance, were beginning to attack Nuruddin's measures. Most Iraqis realised that, although the immediate danger had passed, discontent with social conditions, of which the November riots were a violent expression, was widespread and that only robust and imaginative handling of the country's affairs would prevent catastrophe.

16. The Regent conducted himself with dignity throughout the crisis and his bravery in driving with King Feisal through the streets of Bagdad on 25th November won him back much of the respect he had lost through his prolonged absences abroad. Nuri Pasha's reputation was unimpaired, but Saleh Jabr had behaved with such obstinacy and irresponsibility that he alienated the sympathy of many of the young educated Iraqis who looked to him for a lead.

Foreign Affairs

17. While the domestic situation deteriorated in 1952, Iraqi diplomacy made certain improvements in the country's foreign relations, particularly with the neighbouring Arab States.

18. At the beginning of the year the Iraqi Minister in Damascus was virtually a

prisoner in his own Legation. The Iraqi attitude to Shishakli's régime remained uncompromising until the early summer, when the apparent durability of the régime began to persuade the Iraq Government that there would be advantages in coming to terms with it. The Chief of Ceremonies at the Royal Bilat flew to Damascus and called on the Head of State, and in July Nuri Pasha had an informal meeting with Shishakli in the Lebanon. Feeling in Iraq against Shishakli declined further and there was no criticism when the Government recognised the régime early in December and an Iraqi military delegation attended the celebrations in Damascus on Syria's new National Day.

19. Iraq's relations with Jordan also improved. Early in the year it seemed that the flight of the Amir Naif to Iraq would aggravate the feelings of animosity between the Regent and King Talal, but a visit to Bagdad by the Jordanian Minister of Defence did something to improve the atmosphere. The abdication of King Talal solved the problem of the differences between the Royal cousins, but further ill-feeling arose from the tactless behaviour of the Regent when he met the Jordan Council of Ministers at Amman in June. He made amends when he saw Queen Zein in Switzerland a month later and some progress towards a rapprochement had been made by the end of the year. Less was heard in the latter part of the year of an Iraqi-Jordanian union.

20. The military *coup d'Etat* in Egypt and the spectacular political and economic gestures which followed it were loudly welcomed by the leaders of the Right- and Left-wing Opposition parties. But the dissolution of the political parties and, in particular, General Neguib's firm handling of the Wafd discouraged these politicians and they began to see evidence of "imperialist" direction of the military movement. The more cautious attitude to the new régime adopted by the Iraq Government, which was based on Iraq's traditional resentment of Egypt's attempts to dominate the Arab world and on distrust of military intervention in politics, found general approval. The Iraq Government kept a close watch on the course of Her Majesty's Government's negotiations with General Neguib since they realised that they would be strongly pressed to secure as favourable an agreement as Egypt obtained in regard to the British bases.

21. The events which led to the fall of President Beshara al Khoury in Lebanon in

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the autumn also caused a stir in Iraq. But the Iraq Government did not repeat the mistakes they had made in withholding recognition from Shishakli. A delegation which included members of the Cabinet flew to Beirut to congratulate the new President. The compliment was returned, and at the end of the year relations between the two countries were cordial.

22. Iraqi fears of the consequences of a successful Communist revolution in Persia increased throughout the year and the reaction to any attempt by Persian leaders to entangle Iraq in their quarrel with Britain was strong. Thus, when Ayatullah Kashani called for a strike in sympathy with the instigators of the November disturbances and criticised the new Iraqi Government, the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires was instructed to protest to the Persian Government.

23. Iraq's relations with France, thanks largely to the energy of Dr. Fadhil Jamali, deteriorated throughout the year. Iraq gradually emerged as the champion in the Arab League and in the United Nations of the Tunisian and Moroccan Nationalists. The feeling which this inevitably engendered was reflected in the Iraq Government's failure to respond to a French proposal to raise the status of the missions in Bagdad and Paris to embassy level.

24. In the spring a member of the Turkish Ministry of Finance visited Iraq to push Turkey's claim to a share in the royalties earned by Iraq on oil exports. His mission failed. The Turkish Legation in Bagdad was raised to the status of an embassy in September, but no ambassador had arrived by the end of the year.

25. Closer relations were established with Spain through the ratification of the Treaty of Friendship in March and the visits of Señor Martin Artajo to Iraq in April and of the Regent to Spain in May. No practical results emerged from these visits, but it appears to suit both the Spaniards and the Iraqis to protest their friendship for each other.

26. The Treaty of Friendship with Pakistan which was signed in 1950 was ratified in November and a similar treaty with India was signed in the same month. At the same time the Pakistani and Indian missions in Bagdad were raised to embassy level. The Iraqis have worked closely with the Pakistanis on such questions as French North Africa, and Nuri Pasha would gladly see Pakistan associated in a scheme of Middle East Defence.

27. During 1952 the number of United States experts increased from a score to more than a hundred. Over half of these belonged to the Technical Co-operation Administration and the remainder to various agencies of the United Nations. Due to their inexperience of Middle Eastern methods and a growing suspicion on the part of the Iraqis of Western technical assistance in general, the contribution which these experts made to the economic and social development of the country was limited. Through a change in their method of approach their work might yet produce results.

28. The ratification by the Iraqi Parliament of the agreements with the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Rafidain Oil Company caused satisfaction to all who believe in the benefits of Anglo-Iraqi co-operation, and demands for the nationalisation of the Iraq oil industry almost ceased. The problem of the claims arising out of the British Army's use of the Iraqi railways and other activities of the British authorities in Iraq during the war remained unsettled and threatened, during Mustafa al Umari's tenure of office, to become a major political issue. The Iraq Government's attitude to the 1930 Treaty of Alliance and to the defence of the Middle East remained unaltered throughout the year, but it became increasingly probable that it would change should an agreement between Britain and Egypt result in the evacuation of the Canal Zone. In December Anglo-Iraqi relations suffered a severe blow when Her Majesty's Government supported in the United Nations a resolution calling for direct negotiations between the Arabs and Israel. The Iraq Government in a note of protest said they could not reconcile this action with Britain's professions of friendship for the Arabs.

29. In the military sphere Anglo-Iraqi co-operation remained good. British training teams visited Iraq to conduct technical courses of instruction and to assist in the preparation and carrying out of exercises. Increasingly bitter Iraqi complaints about the alleged failure of the British authorities to fulfil orders for military equipment ceased for the time being when investigation in London and Bagdad showed that the Iraqis themselves were mostly to blame for the delays and confusion.

30. The Iraqi attitude to British experts employed by the Iraq Government became healthier during 1952 principally because, through their desire to press on with

development, the Government began to appreciate how necessary and valuable was their work. The Development Board recruited about twenty British technicians; those employed on the road-building programme created a particularly good impression.

Economic Affairs

31. The 1951 provisional budget surplus, estimated at nearly 4 million dinars, was reduced to 2 million dinars in the final total and the ordinary and capital works budget for the year ending 31st March, 1952, showed a provisional surplus of ID. 5,782,579. It is possible that this also may be reduced when the final figures are known. For the year 1952-53 a small surplus was first planned, the law being later amended to increase expenditure on certain items and so to lead to a deficit of about 2 million dinars. While the receipts from oil companies are likely to be greater than expected, there are unfortunately no figures available at present to show provisional results on income and expenditure and it is difficult to forecast whether there will be a surplus or a deficit. Early in the year the income from oil was estimated to be in the region of 30 million dinars but later estimates have put it as high as 38 million dinars. Estimates for the future are 48 million dinars for 1953, 53 million for 1954 and 59 million for 1955. As there are various safeguards in the oil company agreement guaranteeing minimum payments to the Government, it is now possible, as never before, to plan ahead to achieve the economic and social developments which are so necessary for the well-being of the country.

32. The agreement signed on 25th December, 1951, between the Iraq Government and the Khanaqin Oil Company (Limited) and the Rafadain Oil Company (Limited) and that signed on 3rd January, 1952, with the Iraq Petroleum Company group were duly ratified. Law No. 9 of 1952, amended later in the year and entitled the "Government Oil Refineries Administration Law," established a Board of Administration for the oil refineries. The stage was therefore set for energetic development of the oil industry, and 1952 has been a year of progress. The 30-inch pipe-line from Baiji to Banias in Syria was finished on 22nd April well ahead of schedule, the line being officially opened by King Feisal II of Iraq at an impressive ceremony at Kirkuk on 18th November. In August the 12-inch pipe-line from the Mosul Petroleum Company field at Ain Zalah to

Baiji, to connect with the lines running from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean, was completed. Early in December the contract for the civil engineering work at the Bagdad refinery was awarded to a British firm and work began immediately on the foundations. Some months previously the preliminary survey for the 12-inch pipe-line from Baiji to Bagdad was completed and the tender for the supply of piping awarded to a British firm. Both pipe-line and refinery are expected to be completed towards the end of 1954. A contract has been awarded to a British company for the supply of some eighty miles of piping to connect the oil-fields at Zubair, operated by the Basra Petroleum Company, with the loading depot at Fao, to permit the export of crude oil by tanker. Crude oil production from January to November 1952 was 13,844,339 long tons at Kirkuk, 1,985,507 long tons at the Zubair field and 170,596 long tons at the Mosul field. During the first nine months of the year the Khanaqin Oil Company produced 363,050 long tons of crude oil at the Naft-Khaneh field. This is the record of progress, in concrete terms, in 1952. Progress has been achieved in other ways too, and in an endeavour to create and maintain better relations between the Iraq Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company, the latter have appointed Sir Herbert Todd as their Chief Representative in Iraq. It is intended to give him wide powers to co-ordinate public relations, labour and commercial policies of the Iraq Petroleum Company and its associated companies.

33. When the Development Board programme was drawn up in 1951 it outlined a total expenditure of some 66 million dinars over a period of five years. It was revised in 1952 because of the increased expenditure possible after the new agreements with the oil companies, and provision was made for a total expenditure of over 155 million dinars from 1951 until 1956.

34. The main headings are:—

	I.D.
Irrigation projects ...	53,374,000
Roads and bridges ...	26,766,000
Buildings ...	18,018,000
Reclamation of land and other schemes ...	22,986,000
Industrial and mining schemes ...	31,050,000

35. This allocation of expenditure follows fairly closely the recommendations of the International Bank Survey Mission.

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36. The revenue of the Development Board during these years was estimated at ID. 168,740,000, so that even the expanded programme of expenditure appears to be well within the financial ability of the board. Being greatly handicapped by lack of engineering and administrative staff, the 1952 expenditure, which was planned to reach ID. 20,460,000, is not believed to have exceeded more than 14 or 15 million dinars. With the help of foreign consultants considerable progress has nevertheless been made and, among other major projects, tenders were invited for the second stage of the Wadi Tharthar scheme. The board has been subjected to a considerable amount of public criticism, and one result of the dissatisfaction has been the passage of an ordinance to withdraw ID. 5 million from the board's funds and allocate it to the Ministry of Defence. There have at the same time been certain internal rivalries among the members. Recently two have resigned and a younger man, with experience as a Director-General in the Iraqi Civil Service followed by a brief term as a Cabinet Minister, has been appointed to fill one of the vacancies. The American member, whose appointment was referred to in our 1951 report, has been extremely active throughout the year.

37. The administration and maintenance of the Iraq State Railways has continued to be a cause of concern to Her Majesty's Embassy. In July an exchange of notes was effected cancelling the Railway Agreement of 1936 and an almost immediate result was the appointment of a retired general of the Iraq Army as Director-General, the British Director-General agreeing to stay on in the rôle of Inspector-General. The dissolution of the old Railway Board has meant that the Railway Administration have now to seek the approval of the Ministry of Finance for authority on major financial matters and the result has been some delays in the placing of orders. In July the Government gave approval for the Minister of Finance to guarantee a loan of ID. 4 million to the Railways, ID. 3 million to be used to pay off the United Kingdom Export Credits Guarantee Department loan and ID. 1 million to be used to meet the deficiency in the Capital Works Development Programme for 1952. The railways have not yet taken up the full amount of the loan.

38. Turning now to international finance, the most important development in the year was an exchange of letters between Her Majesty's Government and the Iraq Govern-

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ment on 10th July, 1952, stating that the financial relationship between the United Kingdom and Iraq would continue until further notice to be on the basis of common membership of the sterling area. Her Majesty's Government agreed that the sterling held in Iraq No. 2 account would be released forthwith from all restrictions under the 1947 and subsequent agreements. It was understood during the discussions that this sum, amounting to some £23 million, would be used by the Government of Iraq as part of the cover for its currency. According to the National Bank of Iraq's quarterly bulletin, Iraq's total sterling balances, which in December 1949 were about £43 million, had reached a level of £55,507,000 by September 1952. It was announced in October that the Government had invited a Professor Iversen, of Copenhagen, to examine Iraq's financial situation with a view to devising a long-term monetary policy and advising Iraq on her position in the sterling area. About the same time the National Bank of Iraq began to show interest in the foreign currency earnings of Iraq's oil exports. According to the oil agreements ratified earlier in the year Iraq's 50 per cent. share was to be paid in sterling, it being taken for granted that the earnings of foreign currency would accrue to the share-holding companies. This was apparently never clearly laid down and the question has now been raised for detailed study. As a corollary of the agreement that Iraq's share would be paid largely in the form of income tax, it was necessary to consider the setting up of a sales organisation inside the country to bring the marketing of oil within the scope of the Iraqi income tax laws. Unfortunately such action would also bring the sale of oil within the scope of the exchange control law, and it is this which has led to the difficulties referred to. It is only the share-holding companies outside Iraq who are actually concerned in this dispute, not the Iraq Petroleum Company itself. The outcome is still undecided.

39. Closely connected with Iraq's earnings of foreign exchange is the question of the balance of payments. During the war no estimates of the balance of payments were made, and post-war calculations were fairly inaccurate until the introduction in 1951 of the system advocated by the International Monetary Fund. The figures for 1950 were recalculated by this method and Iraq had a credit balance of something less than ID. 4 million. In 1951 the apparent favourable balance was ID. 7,707,000, but this was

reduced by nearly ID. 4 million by the smuggling of money and jewellery out of the country during the Jewish exodus. The Government has not published any estimates of the balance of payments in 1952 but from the figures readily available it would appear that 1952 will not be a good year in this respect. Customs statistics for imports during the first eight months of the year total nearly ID. 41 million, equivalent to an annual rate of about ID. 60 million, as compared with ID. 51 million in 1951. Total exports for the first eight months of the year were about ID. 11 million, equivalent to an annual rate of ID. 16½ million, as compared with the total of ID. 27 million in 1951. When allowance has been made for the new season date and barley exports, which do not usually begin until October, total exports for 1952 may possibly amount to about ID. 20 million. There are, therefore, prospects of the trade gap being as much as ID. 40 million in the year.

40. Following the disturbances which broke out in Bagdad on 22nd November and the formation of a new Government, the emphasis in economic affairs was on reducing the cost of living and taking measures to improve the conditions of the poor. The new Government showed an unprecedented activity and public comment has been favourable. The first announcement was the reduction of import duties on basic necessities, such as tea, sugar, textiles, tyres and iron and steel. *Istihlak* (consumption) tax and land tax on fresh and dried fruits and vegetables were also removed and the export duty on local products, which was 5 per cent., was reduced to 1 per cent. Price control of fresh fruit and vegetables, reductions in the hire charge of agricultural implements and increases in the exemption limit for property tax were also effected, together with the sale of cheap bread. Although these measures were introduced with the best of intentions, there has been no great improvement in the condition of the poor at the time of writing. The cost-of-living index has fallen by only 14 points, a relatively unimportant decrease in an index now at 546.14. To enable the Government to carry out speedy measures without lengthy legislative procedure, advantage was taken of the declaration of martial law to announce the suspension of several laws having a bearing on the crisis. Among these was the Development Board Law and a considerable amount of uncertainty at present restricts the activities of the board. Although some changes have been made in

its membership, the vice-chairman, Arshad al Umari, continues in office.

41. The Government's intervention in the economic sphere as a calculated long-term policy, in contrast to some of the haphazard measures referred to in the preceding paragraph, is illustrated by the formation not only of the Development Board, but of the Iraqi Shipping Company (Limited), the Iraqi National Insurance Company (Limited) and the Date Trading Company. The first-named company has a capital of ID. 1 million, of which the Government will subscribe ID. 400,000, semi-Government organisations and private subscribers contributing the balance. A British manager has been appointed for the National Insurance Company, the establishment of which was authorised by Law No. 56 of 1950, and the training of staff is now in progress. In 1951, according to the Balance of Payments calculations, the equivalent of about ID. 190,000 in foreign currency was spent on insurance and it is likely that a considerable portion of this will be lost to foreign insurance companies in the future. The Date Trading Company, the shareholders in which are the Government, the Date Association and Messrs. Andrew Weir & Company (Limited), will take over the date monopoly in September 1953, and by this manoeuvre private enterprise is once again thrust into the background. While such measures may be regarded as legitimate, a recent attempt by the Government to "nationalise" the Bagdad Light and Power Company cannot be considered so. The company is owned by British and Belgian shareholders in almost equal proportions, and its constructive policy of ploughing back profits into the business has resulted in the assets expanding considerably, while the value of the shares, which pay about 7 per cent., has

remained moderate. Although protected by a concession given by the Government and ratified by law, the Iraq Government has recently evinced the desire to tear up this concession and take over the company, paying a nominal compensation equal to the stock exchange value of the shares. This is contrary to the provisions of the concession which lays down the conditions under which the Government may acquire the company.

42. In attempting to evaluate the economic position of Iraq in the year 1952 the first point which comes to mind is the probable adverse balance of payments caused by low export prices and indifferent crops and a high rate of imports. A good proportion of the imports have, however, been capital goods, with the promise of future benefits. Although there may be a budget deficit, the preceding two years had surpluses. The real wealth of Iraq, oil, has been produced in greater quantities than ever before, and this is the predominant factor in Iraq's economy. The great weakness in Iraq appears to lie in the lack of a progressive fiscal policy. In the absence of strong, public-spirited leaders to effect a change-over from indirect to direct taxation, the burden on the poor is excessive, and this leads to a popular clamour against the cost of living and a demand for quick relief from hardship. Accepting as inevitable the great contrast between rich and poor in the country, the only way to secure relief seems to the ill-informed to be to take money from the Development Board and spend it on immediate needs. The result can only be to achieve a temporary alleviation of the immediate hardships at the expense of long-term development. It will be a tragedy for the country if the wealth from oil is allowed to be squandered, instead of being used to build a balanced economy.

EQ 1941/81

No. 2

KING FAISAL II's ACCESSION—MAY 2, 1953

Sir J. Troutbeck to Sir W. Churchill. (Received May 18)

(No. 83. Confidential)
Sir,

Bagdad,
May 11, 1953.

I have the honour to report that on the 2nd May His Majesty King Faisal II of Iraq assumed his Royal Prerogatives.

2. On the days preceding King Faisal's Accession excitement mounted in Bagdad as more and more buildings and thoroughfares were decorated and as the special dele-

gations arrived from abroad. Thirty-three countries were represented at the Accession, and in addition to His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester, who represented The Queen, members of Royal Houses came from Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Bahrain and Kuwait. I enclose a list showing the names of the leaders of the foreign delegations.

3. On the evening of the 1st May the Regent of Iraq broadcast a message to the Iraqi people. He recalled that on the tragic death of King Ghazi he had had to undertake two great tasks—to prepare the boy King for his future duties and, meanwhile, to exercise the Royal Prerogatives as Regent. He thanked the people for the loyalty they had shown him during the Regency and then, placing himself at the young King's disposal, he undertook to discharge faithfully any task with which the King entrusted him.

4. A cocktail party to enable the delegations to meet was given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that evening and later there was a fireworks display which had been arranged by the Iraq Petroleum Company. Early on the morning of the 2nd May, the King accompanied by the Regent drove in the State Coach to Parliament where, before the assembled Senators and Deputies and in the presence of the heads of the foreign delegations, King Faisal took the oath. Sayid Asim al Gailani, the Naqib of Bagdad and the leading Sunni divine who was to have administered the oath, had died unexpectedly the previous day and the oath was accordingly administered by Sayid Muhammad al Sadr, the President of the Senate, a former Prime Minister and a leading Shia divine. In a strong and clear voice King Faisal told the assembly that he would strive, with the co-operation of his people, to bring prosperity to Iraq. He thanked his uncle for the care he had taken in preparing him for that day, and in moving tones he invoked the memory of his late mother, Queen Aliyah, who he said had devoted herself with sacrifice and self-denial to his upbringing. I enclose the full text of King Faisal's speech.

5. King Faisal then went to the Royal Bilat where he received the congratulations of the foreign delegations, the Cabinet, former Prime Ministers and other leading Iraqis and members of the Diplomatic Corps. Later he drove back to the Qasr Rihab with the Amir Abdul Ilah, who had now become the Crown Prince, through dense crowds who greeted him and his uncle with overwhelming enthusiasm and affection.

6. In the evening His Majesty was the host at a banquet in honour of the foreign delegates. This was followed by a brilliant reception in the beautiful illuminated gardens of the Qasr Rihab, to which some 1,200 distinguished guests were invited. One of the features of the entertainment was the

reading of a very long poem in praise of His Majesty by Muhammad Mahdi al Jawahiri, who was until very recently the leading peace partisan and fellow-traveller in Iraq.

7. Early the following morning King Faisal drove to the Royal Bilat where he took the salute at a parade of the armed forces which lasted nearly three hours. The Royal Bodyguard headed the parade and they were followed by units representing all arms of the services, including tanks and armoured cars and the River Force. Aircraft of the Royal Iraqi Air Force flew overhead. Though the parade was too long for enjoyment, it was well executed and the bearing and marching of those who took part was excellent. In the afternoon the Lord Mayor of Bagdad held a tea party in the Amanah Gardens. This was attended by 2,000 people, half of whom had been invited. Poems and speeches were read in the course of it. In the evening the Crown Prince gave a second banquet in honour of the King and the foreign delegates, at the Qasr Rihab.

8. On the 4th May King Faisal reviewed a parade of students outside the Royal Bilat. The parade consisted of a series of decorated floats symbolising Iraq's past history and aspirations for the future. This gave great pleasure to the Iraqis who felt that it was something of their own and not a foreign importation like the tanks and guns of the previous day. After luncheon, which was provided at the Mansour Club on the outskirts of Bagdad, a special race meeting was held. The King and his party arrived *à la Ascot*. In the evening the Prime Minister gave a third banquet in honour of the foreign delegates. This was followed by another brilliant reception in the Amanah Gardens, in the course of which King Faisal delivered two short speeches—one in Arabic and the other in English—which greatly impressed those present.

9. In spite of the fact that most of the arrangements, in oriental fashion, were left to the last minute—many Iraqis commented sarcastically that the Bilat had only had fifteen years' warning about the Accession—and unnecessary inconvenience was caused to Government departments and the foreign missions in Bagdad, the celebrations were an outstanding success. The King's conduct, particularly when he appeared before Parliament, was praised on all sides, the hospitality was very generous and the people of Bagdad rose to the occasion and gave a great welcome to the many visitors. The

same people who had stood by while the office of the United States Information Service was gutted and the occupants of the police station at Bab al-Shaikh were brutally murdered last November, were in their happiest mood and the foreign delegations must have taken away a very favourable impression of the country. The Duke of Gloucester, whom the Iraqis regarded as their chief guest, was singled out for special honour by the King and the Crown Prince and when he drove to the Parliament House for the Accession ceremony (and indeed whenever he appeared in the streets) he was given a tumultuous ovation by the happy crowds. On all sides one heard praise of his dignified bearing and the Iraqis were obviously greatly flattered that The Queen should have demonstrated the importance she attached to their young King's Accession by calling on her uncle to represent her.

10. The petulant behaviour of the Amir Saud was one of the features of the celebrations. He brought with him many times more followers than were invited—in fact the delegation was so numerous that two aircraft were required to bring it to Iraq. He was accompanied throughout his visit by a bodyguard of four ruffianly-looking Saudis armed with sub-machine guns. A member of his suite bribed half a dozen Bagdad editors with sums varying from ID. 500 to ID. 50 into glorifying the Saudi Kingdom. Three papers published special editions in the Saudi Crown Prince's honour. The Amir himself distributed large sums to charities and to the public as well as the usual oriental gifts to individuals. The Amir complained to the Chief of Ceremonies at the Royal Bilat that, although he took precedence of the Duke of Gloucester, he and his suite were given inferior accommodation. Tahsin Qadri, in communicating this to a member of my staff, protested that he could not have put His Royal Highness into the same building as "those bedouin." I think that the Iraqis were more amused than irritated by the Saudis' deliberate attempts to steal King Faisal's thunder. Sheikh Abdullah Mubarak's complaint that he, as Acting Ruler of the independent State of Kuwait, should have stayed at the Qasr Zuhur instead of the Duke of Gloucester, who was only the uncle of a ruler, also caused them to smile. His conceit contrasted with the modesty of the two young Sheikhs from Bahrain, whom everyone found full of charm.

11. At the last moment news came from Ankara that the Turkish Prime Minister would not be able to attend the celebrations because of pressing parliamentary duties. But it was said in Bagdad that he had taken exception to the Iraqis inviting only the heads of the special delegations to the oath-taking ceremony in Parliament and had refused to come at all unless his Minister for Foreign Affairs were also invited to that ceremony. I should add that no offence was intended on the Iraqi side. It was merely a question of space.

12. The United States delegation consisted of Messrs. Culbertson and Edge, two former Ambassadors, in addition to Mr. Berry, the present Ambassador at Bagdad. None of these gentlemen has a commanding presence and it may have been for that reason that so little notice was taken of them throughout the festivities. They were as unobtrusive in fact as the Soviet delegation. I should perhaps also mention that the delegations from India and Pakistan could not decide which should call on the other first, and when we declined their request to arbitrate in the end did not exchange calls at all.

13. In conclusion I may add that a noticeable feature of the celebrations was the small part taken in it by ladies, due no doubt to the fact that the royal ladies in Iraq still maintain strict purdah. No ladies were invited to the taking of the oath, the congratulations at the Bilat, the military parade, the parade of students or to the official banquets. They appeared only at the after-dinner receptions, the Lord Mayor's tea-party and the race meeting. Those Iraqi ladies who have given up the veil were, I gather, somewhat disgruntled at being so ignored.

I am sending a copy of this despatch with its enclosures to Her Majesty's Representatives at Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda, Tel Aviv, Washington, Paris, Ankara, Kirkuk, Basra, Mosul and the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

JOHN TROUTBECK.

Enclosure 1 in No. 2

*Heads of Special Missions attending
King Faisal II's Accession*

United Kingdom: H.R.H. The Duke of Gloucester.
Afghanistan: H.H. Prince Sardar A'Ala
Astadullah Khan, Ambassador in Ankara.

Austria: Dr. Robert Friedinger-Pranter, Minister in Iraq.
 Bahrein: H.E. Sheikh Issa al Salman, son of the Ruler.
 Belgium: M. Robert van de Kerchove D'Hallebast, Minister in Ankara.
 China: Mr. Wen Yuan-ming, Ambassador in Greece.
 Denmark: M. Axel Caspar Frederik Sporon-Fiedler, Minister in Iraq.
 Egypt: Sayid Nur-ud-Din Tarraf, Minister of Health.
 Ethiopia: H.H. Prince Makonen, Duke of Harar, Son of the Emperor.
 France: M. Ludovic Chancel, Minister in Iraq.
 Greece: M. George Seferiadis, Minister in Iraq.
 India: Sayid Mahmud, Member of Chamber of Deputies.
 Indonesia: Dr. R. Tirtawinata, Minister in Iraq.
 Italy: M. Teresio Guglielmo, a Senator.
 Jordan: Sayid Said al Mufti, Deputy Prime Minister.
 Kuwait: H.E. Sheikh Abdullah Mubarak, Acting Ruler.
 Lebanon: Sayid Ahmad Beg Al Asad, President of Chamber of Deputies.
 Libya: Sayid Mahmud al Muntasir, Prime Minister.
 Luxembourg: M. B. A. Piets, Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires in Iraq.
 Mexico: M. Valades, Minister in Iraq.
 Netherlands: Dr. H. H. Dingemans.
 Norway: M. Ernest Krogh-Hansen, Minister in Iraq.
 Pakistan: Sayid Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, Minister of the Interior.
 Persia: Sayid Hussein Fatemi, Foreign Minister.
 Saudi Arabia: H.H. The Amir Saudi al Saud.
 Spain: General Juan Bautista Sanchez.
 Sweden: M. Ragnvald Bagge, Minister in Iraq.
 Switzerland: M. Franz Kappeler, Minister in Iraq.

Syria: Dr. Dhafir al Rifa'i, Foreign Minister.
 Turkey: Sayid Fuad Köprülü, Foreign Minister.
 United States: Mr. Burton Yost Berry, Ambassador in Iraq.
 U.S.S.R.: M. A. A. Lavrishchev, Ambassador in Ankara.
 Yemen: H.H. Amir Said-ul-Islam al Hassan, Prime Minister.

Enclosure 2 in No. 2

Speech delivered by His Majesty the King in Parliament on 2nd May, 1953, after taking the oath

Senators and Deputies,

I greet you and through you the noble people of Iraq. With the help of the Almighty and with the co-operation of those in authority and the support of my dear people and their representatives I will exercise my constitutional duties from to-day and administer the Kingdom as a constitutional monarch devoted to democratic principles. I pray God to help me to serve my dear people and to bring them prosperity by all possible means. I will concentrate my efforts on achieving the nation's lofty aspirations. I pray God to enable me and you to serve our dear country. I am confident that you will support me by uniting your ranks and by your loyal endeavours so that we may co-operate in realising our national aims.

I must, before concluding, thank my dear uncle for carrying out the duties of Regency most loyally and faithfully and for the great care he has taken as a kind father to prepare me for this day. I must also recall to-day the memory of my dear mother—may God have mercy on her soul—who devoted herself to my upbringing, nursed me throughout the short span of her life with sacrifice and self-denial, taught me to love virtue and the well-being of all men, and prepared me for you and to serve my people to the best of my ability.

ER 1071/72

No. 3

PROTEST BY THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON MAY 11, 1953

Sir J. Troutbeck to Sir Winston Churchill. (Received June 8)

(No. 33. Saving)
 (Telegraphic)

Bagdad,

June 5, 1953.

Following is translation of Iraq Government's protest.

Your Excellency has no doubt realised from the reports of Her Majesty's Ambassadors in the Arab countries that the speech delivered by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on May 11, 1953 created a bad impression on Arab public opinion. In this speech he spoke of Israel in terms of praise and encouragement and wished its people well in their life in their fatherland in spite of Israel's evident hostile intentions and continued aggression which the United Nations, with Great Britain in the forefront, have been unable to check.

2. At a time when the Arab Governments were looking to the British Government earnestly to take decisive steps to end this aggression and solve the problem of the Arab refugees, the original owners of the country, who were dispersed by the Zionist gangs and driven out of their country, and at a time when Sir Winston Churchill calls upon the Arab States in their wisdom to seek a rapprochement with the Western Allies to whom they are bound by many ties of common interest, they have received with the most bitter disappointment his latest statement which shows a clear bias towards Israel which has been proved to be the aggressor.

3. The attention of the Arab Governments has been drawn to the fact that these statements extol the work done by Israel in building up a nation and reclaiming the desert to take half a million refugees from Europe alone. This is contrary to the facts and an attack on the rights of the Arabs of Palestine who were driven from their country to make room for half a million alleged refugees and other strange Jews referred to in the speech in question. It would have been very fitting and just if Mr. Churchill [sic] had shown sympathy for the plight of the displaced Arabs and the hunger and want they suffer in the camps in the arid valleys of Jordan, at a time when hundreds of millions of dollars are being poured upon the Jews who have settled down and are living in ease and luxury in a country which does not belong to them.

4. A point which must be answered is Sir Churchill's [sic] statement that "Nothing that we shall do in the supply of aircraft to this part of the world will be allowed to place Israel at an unfair advantage." Does this mean that Her Britannic Majesty's Government intend to adopt a policy which conflicts with her obligations concerning the supply of arms, ammunition, equipment, ships and aircraft of the most modern type available, to the forces of certain Arab countries which are bound to the British Government by treaties of alliance? Iraq would be glad to receive from Her Britannic Majesty's Government an explanation of this.

5. Her Majesty's Government will no doubt remember that in July, 1940, after the fall of France in the Second World War, Iraq offered to place half her forces under the command of General Wavell, the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. Iraq asked for no compensation from the British Government for this offer other than that the British Government would implement the White Paper on Palestine. When the Iraqi Government received no answer to this offer, Iraq and the remaining Arab countries began to doubt the good-will of the British Government in regard to the implementation of the White Paper, which had been supported by a majority of the British House of Commons. Mr. Churchill [sic] was at that time among the minority which opposed this policy. This had an adverse effect on the relations between Britain and Iraq in particular, and the Arabs in general. Later, certain incidents took place in Iraq which were detrimental to the interests of both parties and affected the good relations which should have prevailed between Iraq and Britain in those critical days.

6. The Iraqi Government, which completely fulfilled its obligations to her ally, Great Britain, by standing by her side in the fight against aggression in the Second World War, by offering every facility for the passage of British troops through Iraq, the stationing of British troops in Iraq and the use by them of Iraqi roads, railways, waterways, ports and airfields, and by giving her economic help and Iraqi produce

in spite of the austere life then being experienced by the Iraqis, is much grieved to find Sir Winston say in his speech that Israel had formed the best army in the Levant and that it had been able to repulse the combined attack which was made upon it by its neighbours and Egypt. He thus supports the Jews in accusing the Arabs of being aggressors, whereas the Arabs were hastening to the rescue of their brethren, the Arabs of Palestine, when Britain had abandoned her obligations in a manner incompatible with her position as a mandatory State and had left the sacred Arab country to be looted by Jewish gangs. The Iraqi Government wishes to know how Israel was able to build up her army which continues to commit aggression on the Arabs and whether this was effected without the support and assistance of the major Powers. There is no doubt that the praise of the strength of the Israel army has astonished the Iraqi Government and has reminded it of the reluctant patience with which it has endured the rejection, in spite of the previous undertaking given by Her Britannic Majesty's Government to meet these requests in accordance with the Treaty of Alliance of 1930, of her requests for the supply to the Iraqi army of the arms and ammunition which it requires to defend the sovereignty of Iraq and maintain peace in this vital area. The responsible British authorities no doubt remember that Iraq, in the common struggle against Nazism during the Second World War, willingly gave up to His Britannic Majesty's Government, as a temporary measure, some of the Iraq army's factories, in spite of the Iraq army's need for them.

7. The best service which the British Government can render to deal with this *[sic]* situation and to remove the evil effects which have resulted from it is to take definite steps to induce Israel to accept and carry out the Resolutions of the United Nations, in the drawing up and preparation

of which Great Britain took part, so that the honour and prestige of the United Nations and the friendship existing between the Arab States and their Western friends may be maintained. Such action by the British Government would undoubtedly serve to mitigate the wrongs suffered by the Arabs of Palestine as a result of the policy of establishing a national home for the Jews at the expense of the Arabs. There is no doubt that the activities of the Jews and of those who supported them in fulfilling their aims constitute a grave assault on the rights of the Arabs of Palestine.

8. The Iraqi Government, which is most eager to maintain good relations with her ally, Great Britain, finds it difficult to understand the purpose of this statement at the present moment when unrest and insecurity disturb the international situation. The Iraqi Government can only find it a plain contravention of the letter and the spirit of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of Alliance of 1930. The Iraqi Government may not be anticipating events in concluding that the speech would "encourage those elements who, when they review many aspects of the present situation, consider that the existing relationship between the two parties serves the interests of Britain only." This would hinder the efforts of the men of responsibility and vision and confuse them in their task of directing the common affairs of the two countries along their proper path and of avoiding stresses and troubles.

In conveying to you the expression of my highest consideration and esteem, I hope that the British Government will respond to the wishes of the friendly Arab peoples who stood by its side and made heavy sacrifices in the great hardships which Great Britain and the free nations endured in the past.

I am telegraphing my comments separately.

THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN IRAQ

(1)

Sir J. Troutbeck to Sir W. Churchill. (Received June 29)

(No. 108. Confidential) *Bagdad,*
Sir, *June 22, 1953.*

In recent despatches I have drawn attention to the steady deterioration in the domestic situation in Iraq. Amongst the underlying causes of this deterioration is the peculiar nature of contemporary Iraqi politics of which I now have the honour to submit the following analysis.

2. In Iraq to-day there are two political situations—the one artificial and the other actual. The former may be described as the Bagdad political situation. It changes from day to day according to the state of the relations (which may depend of course on non-political factors) between Nuri Said and those who find it from time to time in their interest to support him on the one hand, and the remaining politicians who are now out of power on the other. Until the political parties were suspended by the Government of Nuruddin Mahmud after the disturbances last November, these two main groups of politicians were divided into the Constitutional Union Party, which Nuri Pasha formed from amongst his supporters late in 1949, and four smaller parties which collectively formed the Opposition in and out of Parliament. These four parties were the Popular Socialist Party, also known as the Umma Party, formed by Saleh Jabr, the nearest approach to a statesman in Iraq after Nuri, in June 1951, the United Popular Front, formed at the same time by Taha al Hashimi and other unsuccessful "Old Guard" politicians opposed to Nuri, and two extremist parties the Istiqlal on the Right, formed by a handful of men who supported Rashid Ali's rebellion in 1941, and the National Democratic Party on the Left, whose leader was Kamil al-Chaderchi. Neither the United Popular Front nor the National Democratic Party were represented in the last Parliament which was dissolved in October 1952.

3. These parties all had their programmes and their official organs, and they convened annual meetings at which officers were elected and the policy of the party was reviewed. According to their policies and the social standing and profession or trade of the rank and file, they could be given

broad classifications. The Constitutional Union Party was thus a conservative property-owning party, the Popular Socialist Party had Fabian tendencies, the United Popular Front was Left of Centre, the National Democratic Party was Socialist and the Istiqlal Party Right-wing Nationalist. But, looking behind this democratic façade, one discovered that these groups of people resembled Western political parties in very few respects. It was not common belief in an ideal which bound these men together but loyalty to a leader. The parties were in reality personal followings; the Constitutional Union Party was in fact Nuri Said and his supporters, the Popular Socialist Party, Saleh Jabr and his, and so on. And, what is perhaps more lamentable, though comprehensible enough, the members of these parties had, with few exceptions, one ambition—to get a job. For this reason they in many cases felt greater loyalty to the throne than to the party leader, as it was believed that the throne had greater power of patronage even than Nuri himself.

4. In the preceding paragraph I have used the past tense since in Iraq to-day there are technically no political parties since their suspension. In practice this means that there is no party headquarters, no party organ and no annual meeting. But the personal followings still exist; Taufiq Wahbi, the Anglophil Kurdish Senator is still, for instance, a Saleh Jabr man, Khalil Kenna the Minister of Education a Nuri man, and Faiq al-Samarrad still the inspiration of the Istiqlal group. This is not, of course, a new situation since the history of the political parties in Iraq has been one not of a clash between political ideologies but of a struggle for power amongst a small handful of members of the privileged class. (The Socialist leaders are as wealthy and privileged as the others.) To a certain extent we are responsible for this since, during the mandate, we set up democratic institutions in the hope that the Iraqis would progress to a stage where they could make them work. But, because of the pyramidal nature of Arab society, it has been difficult for Iraqis to transfer their allegiance from

a Sheikh or leader to an idea. This may conceivably come in time as the tribal structure gives way to the urban effendis—suffice it to say that there is little sign of it yet. The effendis have lost their old roots but not established new ones.

5. So much for the artificial political situation. By the time the second World War broke out the educational facilities which it was the policy of the British High Commission to make available to all Iraqis had scarcely had time to produce a new politically-conscious class. In the fourteen years since then such a class of people has come into being and is increasing in strength every year. Here is the second and real political situation. At one end of the scale are the uneducated people in the towns and to a lesser extent in the countryside who, through the multiplication of the means of spreading news and views, are becoming aware that their standard of living could be raised if the upper classes gave them a thought or were willing, even to a small degree, to give up some of their privileges. Slightly higher in the social scale are the small shopkeepers and traders, the taxi-drivers, tailors, shoemakers, barbers, and so on. They earn just enough to live on, but have sufficient intelligence and education to discern for themselves the wide gap that separates rich and poor. On winter days one can hear them curse under their breath as one of the Pashas and his be-jewelled wife pass by in their Cadillac and splash them from head to toe with mud. At the top of the scale are the junior Government officials, lawyers, doctors and other professional men who suffer under a crushing sense of injustice. Their sons and daughters are the backbone of the discontented students. All their troubles they blame on the Pashas (as the "old guard" are unpopularly nicknamed) and on the Western Powers (principally ourselves) who, they are convinced, keep the Pashas in authority. Their views they hold with a fervour only a little removed from fanaticism, but they have so far remained inarticulate. It is the dissatisfaction and the frustration felt by all these groups of people and the fact that the Communists are ready to exploit their grievances whenever possible that make the real political situation in Iraq. It is unfortunate that the upsurge of social discontent among the unprivileged classes should have coincided with a flood of consumer goods from the West such as refrigerators, air-coolers and washing machines which, because there has not been time for the work of the De-

velopment Board to distribute amongst them the new wealth from the oil royalties, the members of these classes are still unable to afford.

6. But the unrest caused by the social conditions in Iraq is aggravated very much more by the unhappy relations which exist between the Sunnis and the Shias; it is no coincidence that 90 per cent. of the Communists in Iraq are Shias. It is only in this respect that the artificial political situation corresponds with the real situation, for Saleh Jabr represents the interests of the mass of the younger educated Shias, who are impatient to occupy a position in the country to which they feel their numerical superiority and the state of their education entitle them.

7. There are two dangers in the duality of Iraqi politics to which I would draw special attention. In the first place many members of the "Old Guard" do not recognise the existence of the real political situation and are, therefore, unimpressed by the warnings of trouble ahead that they hear on all sides from their own more enlightened followers as much as from foreign observers. They have bumbled along in the past feathering their nests as they went and now, too old to be receptive to new ideas (and too sceptical), they frankly and cynically do not believe that the Flood will occur until after their time anyway. The Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs (for all his fox-like wit) are outstanding examples of this mentality. Secondly, the co-existence of the real and artificial situations is tending to bring the principle of democratic Government in Iraq into question. It is likely that the Government will allow political parties to re-form in the near future. If they do, the same parties which fell into disrepute in November last year will most probably come into being again. Many intelligent Iraqis realise that the country has not benefited from these parties' activities in the past and will view their reappearance with misgiving. Should the parties show the same lack of responsibility once again, those Iraqis may look for salvation in a different form of Government. But if they think in terms of an autocrat, they will have to find the man. There is no Ataturk who has as yet shown his hand.

8. It would be misleading to close this despatch on a note of utter pessimism and without adding that among the independent members of Parliament and senior officials in the administration there are many younger men who recognise the faults of

their fellow-countrymen and the need for swift measures to satisfy the poor combined with steady development and reform with the help of foreign experts. It may be that these young men will one day get their chance and prove equal to the occasion, though of course there is nothing to guarantee that they would not be corrupted by power precisely as the older generation has. But in the meantime the situation is dangerous and one cannot rule out the possibility that before long more serious disturbances will occur than took place last November. Whether the throne will remain the same stabilising factor as it has been in the past must be a matter for doubt, and I propose to discuss this aspect in a subsequent despatch.

9. There is one man who can perhaps still prevent the situation getting out of hand in the immediate future. Nuri Pasha is aware of the present unrest and, while he seems not to appreciate all that has to be done to allay it, he is certainly determined to keep order if he can. But he is not the man to solve the basic problems I have mentioned, the existence of which he does not seem to recognise and in which he would not, given his mental make-up, anyway be interested. In a way, his pre-eminence has contributed to the present unhappy state of the country. For 400 years the Iraqis had the Turks, for 10 years they had the British and since then they have had Nuri. For too long they have not had to face the consequences of their own decisions and it may be that there will

be no fundamental improvement in Iraqi politics until responsibility is more widely shared.

10. I have, of course, not failed to take every opportunity to speak to the King, the Crown Prince (particularly when he was Regent) and other responsible Iraqis about the situation as I have described it in this despatch and urged that something should be done before it is too late. I therefore—as explained in my letter No. 1042/13/53 of the 29th of May to Sir J. Bowker—particularly welcomed the suggestions made by your department that Her Majesty's Government should express publicly their concern to see reform and development advancing more quickly in Iraq. I there also emphasised the close connexion between stability in Iraq and our defence arrangements. I urged that an opportunity be taken to make a further statement in Parliament along the lines discussed in correspondence between your department and this embassy. Although such a statement is perhaps unlikely to produce an immediate or startling change it may have some effect: and the sooner it is made the better.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Cairo, Damascus, Ankara, Beirut, Washington, Paris, Tel Aviv, Amman, Jedda, the Head of B.M.E.O. and the Regional Information Officer at Beirut.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

(2)

Lord Salisbury to Sir J. Troutbeck (Bagdad)

(No. 129)
Sir,

*Foreign Office, S.W. 1,
July 14, 1953.*

Your Excellency's despatch No. 108 of the 22nd of June about the internal situation in Iraq has been read with great interest in this department. I am grateful for this clear and illuminating analysis.

2. In accordance with the recommendation in the last paragraph of your despatch,

the Minister of State made a reference to Iraq, on the lines which you have suggested, in a public speech on the 4th of July: the text is contained in my telegram No. 488 of the 6th of July.

I am, &c.

(For the Acting Secretary of State)

A. D. M. ROSS.

Appendix to (2) in No. 4

EXTRACT FROM MINISTER OF STATE'S SPEECH AT WESTBURY AT 6 p.m. ON SATURDAY, JULY 4, 1953

An interesting event has just occurred in the Middle East: the young Kings of Iraq and Jordan—countries with which we have treaties of alliance and the closest ties of friendship—have recently met in Bagdad.

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In view of our cordial relations and the long standing association which we have with both these countries, it is very natural that we should take a keen interest in their progress and development, and that we

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should be prepared to help and encourage them as much as we can. As you probably know, we have, despite the difficulties of our own financial position, recently agreed to make a further loan to Jordan to help her to set on foot much-needed development projects which we believe are indispensable to her economic advance.

Iraq is in a very fortunate position, as she is now receiving a large revenue from her oil industry. Very wisely she has set up a Development Board to plan the constructive use of this money. Plans are in train for great projects which will improve the condition of the Iraqi people; some irrigation schemes are already in hand. These are, however, long-term measures, the beneficial results of which will not be apparent for some time to come. We are glad to hear that the Iraq Government is actively considering measures to reduce the high cost of living, and in fact their Finance Minister has recently taken steps to reduce the price of bread. It is hoped that this is a precursor of other reforms such as better balanced methods of taxation. By such means those causes of economic hardship and discontent will be removed which have proved so dangerous to the stability and progress of other countries of the Middle East.

Iraq now has a unique opportunity to show the Middle East and the world an example of a well-administered country which uses its new-found wealth to the fullest advantage of its people. She has already made great progress under the leadership of Prince Abdul Ilah, who held

the fort during fourteen difficult years. It is our earnest hope and desire that this progress will be continued no less surely during the new reign, and that under King Feisal's rule Iraq will make an increasingly effective contribution to the stability and prosperity of the Middle East.

The expansion of the oil industry has also brought immense wealth to the Arab Shaikhdoms of the Persian Gulf. We are working in partnership with the enlightened Rulers of these States. Great material progress is being made and the standard of living of all classes of the population has rightly shown advance. But these rapid advances bring many acute problems with them. We shall do all we can to help our friends in the Gulf and look forward to a continuation of our present constructive association.

The economic difficulties of the Middle East are seriously aggravated by the burden of some 900,000 refugees from Palestine, 450,000 of whom are in Jordan. We are giving our full support to the efforts of the United Nations to solve this problem and our contributions to the United Nations organisations concerned amount to more than £13 million. Unfortunately little progress has been made so far in resettling these people. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency has, however, made agreements with several Arab countries for projects which hold out a hope of settling large numbers of them. We hope that all the countries concerned will co-operate actively with the United Nations Agency in bringing these projects to fruition.

EQ 1943/5

No. 5

THE POSITION OF THE HASHEMITE HOUSE IN IRAQ

Sir J. Troutbeck to Lord Salisbury. (Received July 16)

(No 119. Secret) *Bagdad,*
My Lord Marquess, *July 7, 1953.*

In my despatch No. 108 of the 22nd of June I described the duality of Iraqi politics which seems to me one of the underlying causes of the steady deterioration in the domestic situation. There is another disquieting factor to which I now have the honour to draw your attention and that is the uncertain position of the Hashemite House in Iraq.

2. Hitherto the Crown has been a stabilising influence in the political situation. During the twelve years of his reign King

Feisal I kept the State of Iraq, which he founded, on a steady course. Through his dialectic skill and subtlety, and backed as he was by powerful British support, he was able to keep in check the rivalry between the Sunnis and Shias and to control the troublesome tribes of the Euphrates. The prestige which his leadership of the Arab Revolt had won him placed him in a position of authority above the squabbles of the political leaders. When he died in 1933 Iraq was a well-established State with a strong and highly-respected monarchy. But it was realised then that his death had

made a gap in the political life of the country which it would be difficult to fill.

3. King Ghazi did not survive long enough seriously to affect the prestige of the throne. During the fourteen years of the Amir Abdul Ilah's Regency, however, the position of the throne has been steadily weakened. Those fourteen years admittedly saw events of great significance throughout the world and slow but significant progress in many spheres of activity in Iraq. The Amir himself, even though his influence was declining, was capable up to the end of his Regency of knocking the politicians' heads together when their behaviour became particularly foolish. But his personal characteristics which I described in my despatch No. 79 of the 1st of May (not to all addressees) and particularly his unstable temperament, his failure to identify his own interests with those of Iraq and his indecision made him an unpopular figure. Now he has no official position other than that of Crown Prince and I have been told on the best authority that he is talking gloomily of throwing up all responsibility and perhaps even leaving Iraq altogether. He has always been subject to fits of depression but I am informed that he has never spoken in such pessimistic terms before.

4. Much therefore rests with the personality of the young King and of those who will surround him. I think it true to say that he has started well. He has a natural charm and dignity which appeal to his subjects and to foreigners alike; he is attending to his duties quietly and without showmanship; for some months now he has been free from attacks of asthma which at one time made it doubtful whether he would be able to live in Iraq at all; and he has hobbies and interests which one hopes may keep him out of mischief. On the other hand he looks immature and young for his age. He is surrounded at home by elderly relations with a prehistoric outlook, and naturally he is lacking in experience. On public occasions he is always surrounded by a cordon of officials, which is foreign to the Arab idea of kingship. As many Iraqis say, he will never get in touch with his people if this goes on. Having recently seen him and King Hussein of Jordan together, I would say that he has a less robust personality than King Hussein, but at the same time a less dangerous one.

5. As to his advisers in the Palace, he is said to lean heavily at present on the Crown Prince, though in public the Crown Prince is admirably self-effacing. When I have

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paid official visits to the Palace, I have been received by the King and the Crown Prince in separate rooms, from which I infer that the King receives all his official visitors alone. It is a moot point whether it would be better for the Crown Prince to stay on in Bagdad or not. As already mentioned, he is not popular and, so long as he is here, it will no doubt be the general impression that he is still the Ruler in fact, though no longer in name. On the other hand, if he retires, the King may lose the most unbiassed advice that he now enjoys.

6. The chief officials in the Palace have not been changed since the Accession. Ahmed Mukhtar Baban, a somewhat unsavoury and highly unpopular Kurd, has returned to be Chief of the Royal Cabinet after a brief spell as Minister of Justice. Apparently after weeks of effort it was found impossible to discover a suitable successor who would take the job. Tahsin Kadri remains as Head of the Royal Ceremonies. He has certain qualities but is something of a light-weight and inclined to give weak advice. In any case his one desire is to keep clear of political questions which he finds frustrating and depressing. The rest of the Royal Household consists of one or two subordinates to Ahmed Mukhtar Baban, who play their courtier's rôle not ineffectively but exercise no influence, and of some A.D.Cs. who alone have been changed since the King's Accession. It is this absence of change in the personnel of the Household, coupled with the fact that changes are overdue, that gives rise to anxiety. Foolishly perhaps but nevertheless sincerely, the people looked to the King's Accession as the opening of a new era. Yet what do they see? The same old faces surrounding the King as surrounded the Regent. And they were never popular faces. Nor have their owners any great intrinsic merit.

7. Another matter which is bound soon to rouse the country's interest is that of the succession. Unlike the Saudi family, the Hashemites are not prolific producers of children. If the King were to die without issue, the succession would now go to the Crown Prince, who himself has no children. An Arab boy ordinarily marries young, and one may expect the demand soon to be heard that the King should marry and produce an heir. But I am told on good authority that his present intention is not to marry for three years. If he persists in this intention, uncertainty about the future of the House will continue for some years. The Crown Prince talked to me some

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months ago about the King's marriage and was then at a loss to think of any suitable lady. I believe he has continued to give thought to the subject, though with what success I do not know.

8. For all these reasons the future of the Hashemite House in Iraq is somewhat problematical. Immature as he is and surrounded by undesirable advisers, it is hardly to be believed that the King for all his youthful charm will exercise any great influence for some years. It would indeed be desirable for him to be able to remain outside politics for the first few years of his reign while he is finding his feet and for Government and Opposition to shield him, so far as his constitutional position permits, from the necessity to take sides or make decisions on day-to-day political matters. While this would be a matter of course in many countries, there is, I regret to say, no likelihood of it occurring in Iraq. In fact, the first reaction of the Parliamentary Opposition to the Communist riots in the Bagdad gaol was to send an Opposition Deputy to petition the King in order to embarrass the Government. One must expect a difficult period when ambitious politicians will be jockeying to use the Crown for their own ends. The people for their part may become disillusioned and infected by the wave of republicanism which has already swept away the Mohamet Ali dynasty in Egypt. I greatly hope myself that the King will survive these dangerous years and develop into the man to whom

the country will look for guidance and leadership. For I do not believe that Iraq with its squabbling politicians and discordant interests and races would thrive as a republic. It needs a respected Head and one capable of playing a much more positive rôle than we of our generation have become accustomed to in the United Kingdom. There is no real place in Iraq for a constitutional monarch of the modern British kind. Here a monarch is required to rule. But I am not prepared to prophesy either whether King Feisal has it in him ever to play such a rôle or whether he will be given the time to develop the necessary experience and confidence.

9. Any help that we give him will have to be of a very discreet kind. He is already tarred with the Harrow brush and it would do him no good with his subjects if he were to appear to be in any way in the pocket of this Embassy. I hope to see him from time to time without publicity but I think it would be a mistake for me to try to force myself upon him. What I should like him to feel is that he has a friend in the background on whom he can call in case of need.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda, Tel Aviv, British Middle East Office, Ankara, Washington and Paris.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

ER 1071/81

No. 6

HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S NOTE VERBALE TO IRAQI PROTEST AT PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH

From Sir John Troutbeck to Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs

(No. 10)
Sir,

Bagdad,
July 11, 1953.

I have the honour to enclose herein a *note verbale* which I have been instructed to address to you in answer to the note from His Excellency the Iraqi Ambassador in London to Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, on the subject of Sir Winston Churchill's speech in the House of Commons on May 11, 1953.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

His Excellency
Sayid Taufiq al Suwaidi,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Bagdad.

NOTE VERBALE

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with reference to the note communicated on May 29 by His Excellency the Iraqi Ambassador in London to Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on the subject of Sir Winston Churchill's speech in the House of Commons on May 11, has the honour, on instructions from Her Majesty's Acting Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to state that Her Majesty's Government note with regret the misinterpretation which has been placed on Sir Winston Churchill's reference to Israel

in that speech. It seems scarcely necessary to state that there was no intention of condoning or encouraging aggression on the part of Israel. Her Majesty's Government's signature of the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, is evidence of their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the States in the area of the Middle East.

Her Majesty's Government welcome the Iraq Government's eagerness to foster good relations with the United Kingdom and take this opportunity to reiterate their support of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and their determination to preserve and consolidate the traditional friendship which links the two countries. It is therefore a matter of regret to Her Majesty's Government that the Iraq Government have seen fit to publicise their criticisms of the British Prime Minister's speech in a manner which can only exacerbate feelings.

Her Majesty's Government's views on the problem of Palestine are well known and do not need to be repeated. In amplification of Sir Winston Churchill's reference to the plight of the Arab refugees, it may be pointed out that Her Majesty's Government have made contributions towards their relief and resettlement totalling £13,100,000 over the last five years. In this matter actions speak louder than words.

Regarding the question of arms supplies raised in paragraphs 4 and 6 of the Iraqi Ambassador's note, the Iraq Government are aware that Her Majesty's Government have taken, and continue to take, all necessary measures to fulfil their obligations under the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. The recent assurance given with specific reference to the supply of modern types of aircraft and the assistance now being given to the Iraq Government in planning the provision of equipment necessary for the expansion of the Iraqi army clearly demonstrate the importance attached by Her Majesty's Government to the supply of arms and equipment of the latest available pattern to

the Iraqi forces. Investigation into the Iraq Government's repeated complaints about the alleged failure of Her Majesty's Government to supply them with arms and equipment has shown that in almost all cases this has been due to the fact that the Iraq Government did not place their orders in the proper manner and in time.

Her Majesty's Government feel bound to express surprise at the omissions and distortions in the Iraq Government's account of past Anglo-Iraqi relations. It may be pertinent to observe that Iraq owes her very existence to the sacrifices of the Commonwealth forces in the First World War and that it was with the support and assistance of the British Government that Iraq took her place in the comity of nations. Even in the darkest time of the Second World War when the United Kingdom stood alone against Nazi and Fascist aggression the British Government succeeded in restoring the Hashemite House against armed rebellion and saving Iraq from the horrors of war. These are concrete examples of the services rendered by Iraq's ally and friend and Her Majesty's Government must express regret that in the Iraqi Ambassador's note they appear to have been disregarded. The United Kingdom, for its part, has not forgotten the facilities afforded to British forces during the great struggle against Fascism and Naziism and is sincerely anxious to co-operate with Iraq in the furtherance of peace, stability and prosperity in the Middle East.

In the light of the foregoing facts Her Majesty's Government cannot agree that the "existing relationship between the two parties serve the interests of Britain only," but would express the hope that the Iraq Government will bear in mind the close friendship based on mutual interests which exists between the two countries.

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to renew the expression of its highest consideration.

EQ 1016/50

No. 7

THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO LIFT MARTIAL LAW

The Possibility of Further Disorders

Sir J. Troutbeck to Lord Salisbury. (Received October 3)

(No. 165. Confidential) Bagdad,
My Lord Marquess, September 30, 1953.

I have the honour to report that when the Iraqi Prime Minister returned my call two

days ago he told me that the Government had decided to raise martial law (which has been in force since the disturbances last November) next week. He added that the

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Minister of the Interior was busy reinforcing the police in Bagdad and that all precautions were being taken to deal with minor incidents or serious disorders.

2. One of the first acts of the new Government was to lift press censorship. Since then there has been a loud cry in the newspapers for the abolition of the "tyranny" of martial law, for the dissolution of Parliament and for freedom for the political parties to be reformed. This has been accompanied by allegations of disagreements within the Cabinet on these two issues, and, by the end of last week, it seemed as though the same sequence of events which led to the disorders last autumn was about to begin, the call for the dissolution of the "fake Parliament" replacing last year's demand for direct elections.

3. It is generally expected in Bagdad that the lifting of martial law will be followed almost immediately by an attempt by the Communists, probably in co-operation with the leaders of the former Istiqlal and National Democratic Parties, to provoke disorders and, eventually, to bring down Dr. Jamali's Government. During the past two weeks the Communists have shown that even under martial law they can disturb the peace by staging stay-in strikes in some of the tobacco factories in Bagdad. The new Minister of Social Affairs offered to submit the workers' complaints to arbitration (an idea which had not occurred to anyone in the previous Cabinet), and the strikes fizzled out. There is ample evidence that the strikes were inspired and organised by Communists. The motives of Kamil al-Chadirchi and his National Democrats and Muhammad Mahdi Kubba and his Istiqlalis in wishing to create disorders will be the simple ones of trying to bring about the fall of the present Government, in the hope that they will be given portfolios in the next. One of the Istiqlali leaders warned the Minister of Finance the day after the Cabinet was formed that he and his colleagues would create trouble if martial law were lifted.

4. If the Government is determined to maintain order and to deal severely with those who disturb the peace, there may be advantage in lifting martial law now. The

Communists and the other trouble-makers will be tempted to come out into the open. If the Government rounds them up and puts them, temporarily at least, out of harm's way, they will be able to get to grips with the real political situation about which, I am glad to say, they seem to have the right ideas. Dr. Jamali has already got rid of some deadwood in the higher ranks of the army and has appointed as Chief of the General Staff one of the best senior officers of the younger generation. There would also be advantage in getting any demonstrations over before the students of the law and engineering colleges reassemble for the winter term.

5. I had a talk with Nuri Pasha on the 29th of September. He did not show any great enthusiasm for the new Government, and seemed to fear that they might fail to agree among themselves, or alternatively push ahead too quickly with unconsidered reforms which would bring them up against the land-owners. I formed the suspicion that Nuri was perhaps feeling a little sore at having been left out of the discussions which finally led to Dr. Jamali being asked to form a Cabinet. When I said that I hoped he would help the Government, he replied that he would not be taking any active part at all for some time as he was proposing to leave for the United Kingdom next week in order to put his grandchildren to school. He did not know when he would be back. It seems likely, therefore, that Nuri is intending to bide his time until he thinks the moment appropriate to stage a come-back. I am sure he does not regard himself as a spent force. Nor indeed is he. He counts for infinitely more in the country than any member of the present Government, or indeed than the whole lot of them put together. Dr. Jamali, when I saw him last, made no secret of the fact that he was keeping in close touch with Nuri, who still retained his private telephone.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda, Tel Aviv, Washington, Paris and Ankara, the Head of the British Middle East Office, and the Regional Information Officer, Beirut.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

THE FORMATION OF A NEW IRAQI CABINET BY Dr. FADHIL AL-JAMALI

Sir J. Troutbeck to Lord Salisbury. (Received September 26)

(No. 159. Confidential) *Bagdad,*
My Lord Marquess, *September 23, 1953.*

In his telegram No. 531 of the 18th of September, Mr. Bromley reported that Dr. Fadhil al-Jamali had formed a new Iraqi Cabinet. I now have the honour to give a fuller account of this event.

2. Early last week it was expected that either Nuri al-Said or Taufiq al-Suwaidi would form a Cabinet similar to the outgoing Cabinet of Jamil Madfai. It seems, however, that the King and Crown Prince, who had returned to Bagdad from the north of Iraq a few days earlier, were advised that it would be injudicious to ask Nuri Pasha, or any other member of the "Old Guard," to head the next Government. It is not clear exactly who gave this advice, but the composition of the new Cabinet suggests that the King had been impressed by what Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, the Head of the Royal Diwan, and Jamali himself (who had been in close contact with the King during the latter part of his stay in the north) had to say. It is, of course, possible that the King, who has been hearing the views of all kinds of Iraqis since his accession, and who must have heard a great deal of criticism of the corruption and inactivity of the late Government, took the decision himself. He may also have been impressed by the fulminations of Saleh Jabr who was threatening to make trouble should Nuri form a Cabinet again.

3. On the evening of the 15th of September, Jamali was summoned to the Palace where the King and Crown Prince, in the presence of Nuri Pasha, asked him for his views on various domestic questions. On the following day he was asked to form a Government and by the same evening he had a dozen names. His first disappointment came when Nadim al Pachachi declined his invitation to continue as Minister of Development. Nadim told a member of my staff that, since it contained none of Nuri's close supporters, the Cabinet could not last more than a few months. Muhammad Ali Mahmud, the Minister of Justice in the previous Cabinet, who is now setting himself up as "a Palace man," having hitherto been "a Nuri man,"

accepted only after hesitation the Deputy Premiership and it was not until the afternoon of the 17th of September that the Cabinet was complete. Jamali himself held the portfolio of the Interior, having failed to persuade Muhammad Said Qazzaz, the exceptionally able Director-General of Ports, to accept this post. This was clearly the weakest point in the structure of the Cabinet and many of Jamali's well-wishers, including my United States colleague, begged Said Qazzaz to reverse his decision. After seeing King Faisal he did so on the 19th of September.

4. The new Government is large; it contains eighteen Ministers of whom four have no portfolio. It has more Shias than any previous Iraqi Cabinet. For the most part the Ministers are young—their average age is well below fifty—and none of them is known to be corrupt. For the first time an Iraqi Cabinet contains no "Ottomans"; the new Government represents the oldest generation of Iraqis to receive their education either at Western schools and universities or locally under a British-inspired educational system. As one Iraqi has put it: "This is a Cabinet of new faces and new ideas to match the new era of the new King." It is also a Cabinet of poor men and a welcome change from the plutocrats who have been so prominent in all previous Governments.

5. This is indeed King Faisal's first Cabinet. He has told his new Ministers that he expects them to work and he recited to them the many things which had to be done to improve the country. He has lectured the Ministers collectively and individually. It is clear that the new Government as it embarks on its task not only enjoys the support of His Majesty but carries with it some of his hopes.

6. On paper it is a good Government. It has been chosen with skill; the inclusion of two fervent Sunnis (Hassan Abdul Rahman and Shafiq al-Ani) amongst so many Shias has, for instance, pleased the orthodox religious circles in Adhamiya. But its members have, I fear, more enthusiasm than experience. Its new look will appeal to the middle class, but not to the professional politicians. Many of the

latter will dislike it because they are not in it; and I should expect the "Old Guard" to be apprehensive lest it should succeed where they have failed. Its success, they must recognise, would probably mean that they would never return to power and they may well be tempted to take steps to ensure that it does not succeed.

7. Much depends on the attitude of Nuri Pasha, for it is one of the weaknesses of this country that no Government can survive without his backing. Dr. Jamali himself assured me that Nuri (and Jamil Madfai) had promised him their support. He is certainly counting on it, but I do not share his confidence that he will get it, at any rate for very long. Yesterday Nuri issued an equivocal statement to the effect that he took part neither in the preliminary consultations at Sersank (see paragraph 3 of Mr. Bromley's despatch No. 157 of the 16th of September) nor in the consultations which resulted in the formation of this Cabinet. To most Iraqis Nuri's purpose in making such a statement will be to dissociate himself from a Government in which he has little confidence and less influence than he is accustomed to.

8. Much will also depend on Jamali. He is a man of many enthusiasms—too many perhaps. But he is largely untried in the conduct of internal affairs. It is to be hoped that he will display qualities of statesmanship which have not so far been evident. I am a little afraid too lest his

energies may be distracted from the urgent social and economic problems which beset the country by purely political issues such as the lifting of martial law, the reconstitution of political parties and the holding of new elections. Such questions are the breath of life to the professional politicians and the press and Dr. Jamali may not be able to ignore them. He may too be tempted to cut a figure in the field of foreign policy where his enthusiasm is not controlled by his wisdom. So all in all one can only cross one's fingers and hope for the best.

9. When I was received yesterday by the King and the Crown Prince I expressed to both of them my hope that the new Government would be given a fair chance and in particular not be undermined by the older politicians. They both appeared to agree. I found the King not only in excellent health but considerably more mature and self-assured than he had been when he came to the throne a few months ago. Dr. Jamali told me that he was much impressed by his qualities when he accompanied him recently on a tour in the north.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda, Tel Aviv, Washington, Paris, Ankara, the Head of British Middle East Office and the Regional Information Officer, Beirut.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

EA 1421/13

No. 9

THE SUPPLY OF WATER TO KUWAIT

(1)

Her Majesty's Embassy, Bagdad, to the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Note Verbale

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and has the honour, on instructions from Her Majesty's Acting Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to inform the Ministry that Her Majesty's Government have been asked by His Highness the Ruler of Kuwait to seek, on his behalf, the views of the Iraq Government on the question of the supply of water to Kuwait.

His Highness is anxious to make arrangements for the supply of fresh water

from the Shatt al Arab to his Kingdom. During his visit to Bagdad last year, His Highness discussed the question with the Iraq Government and understood that the Iraqi authorities would be willing to approve any arrangements for the supply of water that might be convenient to the Government of Kuwait.

His Highness wishes accordingly to put a scheme into motion in the near future and has asked that Her Majesty's Embassy should obtain confirmation that the Iraq Government are agreeable to the proposal in principle and should also enquire whether

they would be prepared to grant facilities for a preliminary survey.

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy would be grateful to learn as soon as possible what reply the Iraq Government would wish

made to His Highness the Ruler on this matter.

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to renew the expression of its highest consideration.

(2)

The Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Her Majesty's Embassy, Bagdad

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy, Bagdad, and has the honour to refer to the embassy's note No. 459 of September 7, 1953, and to state that the Iraqi Government agrees in principle to the

proposal relating to the carriage of water from Shatt-el-Arab to Kuwait.

In requesting the esteemed embassy to communicate the foregoing to His Highness the Amir of Kuwait, the Ministry avails itself of the opportunity to express its highest consideration and esteem.

E 1112/11

No. 10

STATEMENT OF CERTAIN PROBLEMS IN CONNEXION WITH THE CREATION OF AN ARAB BANK FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Eden to Sir J. Sterndale Bennett.

(No. 334. Confidential) *Foreign Office,
Sir, November 20, 1953.*

In his despatch No. 18 DevDiv of the 10th of July, your predecessor put forward a thoughtful study by Dr. J. Murray of the discussion now current in the Levant about the possibility of creating an Arab Bank for Economic Development, the basis of which would be the financing of development in the poorer countries of the Levant by the oil-producing States of the Middle East.

2. In the course of the summer, Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Bagdad, Bahrain, Beirut and Damascus have all commented on this idea more or less unfavourably. Attention has been drawn to three main objections. First, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have insufficient surplus funds, or local opinion is not ready to see such funds invested elsewhere on the scale contemplated. Secondly, the lack of expertise and the prevalence of corruption in the Arab countries would militate against the success of an Arab Development Bank. Thirdly, the political atmosphere surrounding the proposal (which was remitted for study to the Secretariat of the Arab League) would probably lead to a general reduction of Western influence in the area;

and in particular to a sharp deterioration of our position in Jordan, and also in the Persian Gulf if Kuwait were drawn into the orbit of the Arab League.

3. On the other hand, Her Majesty's Representatives all recognised that it would equally work against our interest to appear hostile to this idea. If possible, they thought it better to evolve some alternative scheme whereby the development of the "have-nots" could be financed indirectly by the "haves" in the Middle East without cutting out Western influence.

4. The problem has since been discussed in London between the interested departments of Her Majesty's Government, who have concurred in the enclosed paper. Briefly, the following provisional conclusions have been reached in the financial and practical fields.

5. It can be argued that Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait could each invest a few million pounds a year for, say, five years if they wished. Iraq's attitude (as shown at Arab conferences this year) is, however, negative. The habit of long-term investment is absent, and local opinion is that all Iraq's revenues must first be used to develop that

country far above its present low level. This opinion is unlikely to change for at least several years. In Saudi Arabia the dissipation of the oil revenue militates against even the development of the few other local resources, and therefore more so against the investment of funds in other Arab countries. The question of financing an Arab Development Bank therefore resolves itself into consideration of whether Kuwait should do so alone. In my opinion the Ruler would not and should not take this course at present. The Shaikh himself, still less accustomed than most Arabs to long-term investment, is content with his present arrangements for placing his funds in safe, accessible and productive sterling securities; and I am advised that, on balance, it is in our immediate economic interest that he should do so rather than make his sterling available in the Middle East, even though United Kingdom concerns might then absorb a large proportion of it by furnishing goods and services to countries borrowing from the Arab Bank.

6. As regards the proposed bank's efficiency, from the point of view of the borrowing country and the investors, the consensus of opinion is that the necessary expertise is not yet available in the Arab countries and that Western advice and assistance are needed. An Arab Bank would tend to reject or ignore such help; but on the other hand a purely Western organisation (even if we could find the necessary finance) would be politically unacceptable; therefore it is considered that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development should be involved in the operation, as a means of ensuring sound financial policy and technical decisions.

7. Consideration was given at an earlier stage to the thought that the International Bank, or a regional offshoot of it, might absorb investments from Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and dispense them to the Levant States. At present it would be unwise to encourage Kuwait alone to take the initiative in such a scheme; and in any case the International Bank have shown no readiness, in the absence of funds, to make counter-proposals to the Arabs; but this possibility clearly deserves study in the light of developments.

8. Politically speaking, I would repeat that Her Majesty's Government must not appear to oppose the idea that the "haves" could usefully help the "have-nots"; but the dangers of conducting the operation through an Arab Development Bank under

the ægis of the Arab League appear to be so great that this proposal should be approached very cautiously until the probable alternatives are clearer. Meanwhile, our first object should be to ensure, as far as possible, that the Shaikh of Kuwait is not thrust out on a limb, over the Arab League whirlpool. The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf is therefore being instructed to encourage the Ruler to extend financial assistance to the poorer Gulf States, in order that he may not only fulfil actual needs but also be able to plead prior commitments if pressed to give assistance to the Levant States.

9. Bearing the same point in mind, Sir Edmund Hall Patch is being asked to assess in Washington the attitude of his United States colleague to the idea of an Arab Development Bank and the prospects of an approach being made to Saudi Arabia.

10. Meanwhile the interplay between the International Bank and the Arab League Secretariat remains of interest. The impression gained from Mr. Dorsey Stephens in London was that the bank had practically advised the Secretariat to shelve the draft charter of the Arab Development Bank until they had ascertained that the necessary funds would be invested; but the more detailed report of the correspondence given in Dr. Murray's letter of the 11th of November (not copied to all recipients of this despatch) shows that, at least on paper, the International Bank were rather more ready with suggestions, and that on the other hand they would prefer not to provide a panel of advisers for the Arab Development Bank, as the Arab League Secretariat had proposed. These questions will have to be considered. It is hoped that any resulting differences of view between Her Majesty's Government and the International Bank will not, however, affect the usefulness of the bank's new Regional Office at Beirut, which should be able to accelerate the transaction of ordinary business with the Arab Governments, and may even to some degree slake the thirst of Jordan, the Lebanon and Syria for development funds.

11. For the present I wish your Excellency, and Her Majesty's Representatives to whom I am copying this despatch, to be guided by the enclosed paper; but I shall welcome comments and recommendations on this whole subject, which seems likely to call for important decisions by Her Majesty's Government in the next few years.

12. Copies of this despatch are being sent to Her Majesty's Representatives at the Development Division Beirut, Amman, Bagdad, Bahrain, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, Tel Aviv, Khartoum, Taiz and Washington.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

Enclosure in No. 10

Investment in the Development of the Middle East

Considerable attention is still being given in the Levant and Middle East to the idea that the increased oil revenues now enjoyed by Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia should be employed in part to develop the more needy Arab States: Syria, Jordan and the Lebanon. In his despatch No. 18 (DEV DIV) of July 10, 1953 (copied to Washington as well as Middle East capitals) the Head of the British Middle East Office forwarded a very thoughtful note by Dr. J. Murray of his Development Division, which described the serious examination now being carried out by leading economists in the Lebanon, with a view to forming a Middle East Development Bank on this basis, with a predominantly Arab character. A number of Her Majesty's Representatives in the Levant and Middle East have since commented on that despatch and there have been inter-departmental discussions in London, leading to the following conclusions.

2. In the first place, it seems clear that the immediate hopes of the have-not countries are ill founded. Iraq, which has more natural advantages than the other two oil-producing countries, expects to be able to absorb its revenues for many years to come in the development of its own resources and the raising of its own standard of living, which is well below that of the Lebanon and Syria. Saudi Arabia, whose standard of living is even lower, may be expected to follow the same course, although inefficient planning and administration, to say nothing of gross extravagance, are at present responsible for the dissipation of most of its wealth. As for Kuwait, it has few natural resources apart from oil but has nevertheless undertaken a considerable development programme. The Ruler has at our instigation set up an Investment Board, which he expects to provide security, liquidity and

profitability for his funds, and which serves also to underpin the primitive financial administration of his State. For these reasons the board, whose secretary is in London, is at present investing in sterling securities which serve as a useful reserve but leave nothing over for risk investment in the Middle East.

3. It has been suggested that publicity might somehow be arranged in Kuwait, in order to demonstrate to the have-not countries that the Ruler has practically no surplus available for a general development scheme in the Middle East; but the highly personal nature of the ruler's investments makes this undesirable. Publicity from elsewhere would be misplaced, and in any case would scarcely carry conviction.

4. It is generally agreed in London that for the next few years at least no attempt should be made to change the Shaikh of Kuwait's policy. It is true that if his funds were invested in the Middle East they might increase the demand for British goods and services, *inter alia*, thus enabling the United Kingdom to pay off gradually what will otherwise be a mounting debt; but it is considered that this advantage would be outweighed by the danger of large amounts of sterling reaching undesirable destinations. On balance, therefore, it is desirable to continue educating the Shaikh in the cautious investment of reserves.

5. Given the ruler's demand for secure, accessible and profitable investment, it is considered unlikely that he would be tempted to make direct loans to the have-not members of the Arab League. It is, however, most desirable to ensure that he should be diverted as far as possible away from close association with League members, and for this purpose he might be encouraged to make small loans to the poorer rulers in the Gulf so that he can plead prior commitments as well as self-interest when approached by the Lebanon or Syria or Jordan.

6. Meanwhile, the agitation for a Middle East Development Bank is unlikely to abate. As conceived by Arab politicians and even by Professors Badre and Himadeh of the American University at Beirut, the idea is objectionable to the Western Powers. It presupposes the subordination of that Western advice and influence which would be needed for efficient management, to the control of local personalities who would be swayed by Arab nationalist agitation and would be subject to the traditional oriental corruption. The effect on the British

position in Jordan would be particularly disastrous, with concomitant damage to the ability of the Western Powers to defend the Middle East.

7. In the present conditions of mistrust between the Arabs and the West, it would do more harm than good for Her Majesty's Representatives to speak openly to all and sundry against the idea of an Arab development bank; they should therefore avoid unnecessary discussion of the theme but should take the line with their Allied colleagues that some more practical scheme must be looked for because the present conception is harmful and because the association of Arab and Western Governments in a more efficient version of the project is not politically feasible at the moment. Moreover, for several years to come, the absence of funds from Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait renders the question hypothetical.

8. In the long run, when such funds begin to be available, it is considered that the most satisfactory form of regional development bank would probably be an offshoot of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. At present the "haves" do not wish to invest in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development because they prefer to devote their funds either to national development or to more liquid investments such as sterling securities. In the long run, however, they would probably consider the International Bank a safer investment than either an Arab development bank which would be inefficient or a joint Arab-Western Government enterprise which would be subject to political influences. If only to satisfy local pride the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development might, in due course, need to establish a regional office with more apparent independence from Washington than its newly opened Regional Office.

9. From the point of view of Her Majesty's Government such an arrangement would have drawbacks, because the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is widely regarded as an American enterprise and because we should not be able to control the use to which the sterling was put; but it would probably be better than any alternative, principally because, once the oil-producing States are prepared to invest in the development of other Middle East countries, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development provides the most likely

means of ensuring efficient management and obtaining a fair share of profit for United Kingdom enterprise.

10. After consultation with the United Kingdom Executive Director of the International Bank, the opportunity was taken to discuss the two related questions of a Middle East Development bank and investments by the Persian Gulf shaikhs with Mr. Dorsey Stephens, who passed through London in October on his way to open at Beirut a new Middle East Office of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

11. Regarding an Arab development bank, Mr. Stephens said that after the Arab League had decided to set up an institution of this character the I.B.R.D. were visited in New York by the Secretary of the Arab League, who sought their comments on a charter and constitution for the new Development Bank. This had put the I.B.R.D. in a position of some difficulty since they believed that they themselves should be able to cover the needs of the area. They gave the Arabs what assistance they could, however, while pointing out that the first essential was to find enough capital and suitable projects justifying investment. Mr. Stephens said the I.B.R.D. were very sceptical about the ability of the Arabs to do anything of the sort and agreed that the project might well be a face-saver on the part of the "haves" among the Arab countries.

12. As regards the Persian Gulf shaikhs, Mr. Stephens asked whether Her Majesty's Government had any views on the use of surplus funds of the Persian Gulf Shaikhdoms for Middle Eastern development by the I.B.R.D. In reply it was recalled that this question had been discussed briefly between Sir Leslie Rowan and Mr. Black and that the former had explained the difficulties which this might have for us in the form of a further drain on our resources. Her Majesty's Government had the impression that the rulers had not yet got used to the idea of receiving their enormous royalties and were not, so far, in the least interested in using them to assist other countries, whether Arab or not. Mr. Stephens enquired about the Kuwait Investment Committee. It was explained that the ruler regarded this committee as a means of investing for the benefit of Kuwait. We had no information as to the committee's investment portfolio on the London market but the ruler was, we understood, very interested in security. Mr. Dorsey Stephens

was clearly thinking in terms of the I.B.R.D. borrowing from Kuwait. The opportunity was therefore taken to express the hope that, in view of Her Majesty's Government's economic and political interests in the area, the I.B.R.D. would always consult with us before taking any steps affecting the Gulf Shaikhdoms. Mr. Dorsey Stephens agreed.

13. When informing the United Kingdom Executive Director of the International

Bank of this development it is proposed to ask him to assess the attitude of his United States colleague towards the idea of an Arab Development Bank and to report from time to time what feelers have been put out to secure Saudi Arabian investment (through the I.B.R.D. or otherwise) in the Middle East.

November 19, 1953.

No. 11

HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S POLICY CONCERNING UNITED STATES MILITARY AID TO IRAQ

Mr. Eden to Sir R. Makins

(No. 1235. Secret. Guard)

Sir, November 27, 1953.

With reference to paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 2416 of November 6, I transmit to your Excellency herewith a brief for use in discussions with the United States Government about the provision of military aid to Iraq.

2. The principal objects to be achieved in these discussions are as follows:—

- While recognising the value of United States help in building up Middle East defence to ensure that the grant of United States military aid to Iraq does not conflict with the efforts being made by Her Majesty's Government to build up the Iraqi armed forces or otherwise injure British interests in Iraq;
- to dissuade the United States Government from sending any form of military mission or advisory group to Iraq;
- to secure that as large a proportion as possible of the military aid made available to Iraq by the United States is spent on off-shore purchases from the United Kingdom.

3. If you see no objection, I shall be glad if you will now institute these discussions in consultation with the British Joint Services Mission. I am aware from paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 743 Saving of September 10 that the State Department wish to discuss this question in connexion with the political background and expect shortly to send you instructions about discussions on the latter. In view of your telegram under reference I do not,

however wish you to defer discussion of United States aid to Iraq meanwhile.

4. Since the enclosed brief was drafted, I have received Bagdad telegram No. 656 of November 25, repeated to you, pointing out the disadvantages of the United States Government providing United States motor vehicles to the Iraqi army as a part of their military aid programme. This re-emphasises the desirability that as large a proportion as possible of the aid to be granted to Iraq should be spent on off-shore purchases from the United Kingdom. We should therefore try to ensure that we provide motor vehicles as well as arms; but it would be preferable that any aid not spent in off-shore purchases should be used to provide United States vehicles to Iraq rather than arms of United States types other than those listed in paragraph 10 of the enclosed brief. That list therefore stands, with the addition of the items suggested in paragraph 6 of Bagdad telegram No. 656.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad and to the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

United States Military Aid to Iraq

Objects

Her Majesty's Government welcome the United States Government's intention to contribute to the defence of the Middle East by the provision of military assistance to certain countries, including Iraq, and are glad to have this opportunity to discuss with

the United States Government the form which this assistance can best take. It is necessary to make clear the special responsibilities which Her Majesty's Government have under the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty for the defence of Iraq and the extent of the effort they have made and are making to build up the armed forces of Iraq by the supply of arms and equipment and by advice and assistance with training. The special position of Her Majesty's Government in Iraq is of importance to them and to the free world as a major element in the defence of the Middle East, the main burden of which at present rests upon the United Kingdom. It is therefore hoped that in planning the provision of military aid to Iraq the United States Government will give attention to and be guided by the views of Her Majesty's Government.

2. It is desirable that the two Governments should agree on the parts which each will take in their common purpose of improving the effectiveness of Iraq's armed forces and that the representatives in Iraq of the two Governments should co-operate in the carrying out of the plans thus agreed. It is also desirable in order to avoid confusing the development and organisation of Iraqi forces that agreement should be reached in detail on the purposes to which any United States military aid for Iraq should be put and on the types of any arms or equipment which the United States may supply

Background

3. Under the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1950 (Article 5 of Annexure)⁽¹⁾ Her Majesty's Government are obliged to grant all possible facilities in the provision of arms, ammunition, equipment, ships and aircraft for the Iraqi forces. The Iraq Government are obliged (Article 6) to choose any foreign military instructors from amongst British subjects and to ensure that the armament and essential equipment of their forces does not differ in type from those of the British forces.

4. In support of their responsibilities for the defence of the Middle East Her Majesty's Government have worked out in conjunction with the Iraqi Government a plan for the re-equipment and expansion of the Iraqi forces; this is now being executed and will take several years to complete. The plan provides for the establishment of three Iraqi divisions as soon as possible and of a further (fourth) division in due course, also of several

squadrons of aircraft; these will be able to play a useful part alongside British forces in holding back any Soviet attack on the Middle East. The bulk of the equipment needed to fulfil this plan is available from the United Kingdom and arrangements exist for its supply as quickly as Iraq is in a position to accept it. British officers on loan to Iraq advise on the procurement and use of this equipment and on the training of the Iraqi forces as a whole. A basic principle of this programme is the standardisation of the Iraqi forces on British lines.

Military Missions

5. For political reasons the British officers on loan to the Iraq Government are not organised as a military mission. It is expected that there will shortly be a sufficient number of such officers in key positions in the supply and training spheres to make a substantial contribution to the efficient development of the Iraqi forces, and Her Majesty's Government are able to meet any reasonable requests for further such loans which the Iraq Government may make.

6. Her Majesty's Government consider it of the greatest importance that the United States Government should not seek to establish a military mission or a military survey team or a military advisory group in Iraq. Their doing so would disturb Her Majesty's Government's military liaison arrangements described in the preceding paragraph, which are working satisfactorily, and by duplicating training and procurement methods would cause confusion and reduce the efficiency of the Iraqi forces. A vital feature of the present development of the Iraqi forces is that their organisation and methods are based on British models. This is designed to promote close co-operation in supply and operational matters between British and Iraqi forces in the event of war.

7. There is also an important political objection to the establishment of a United States military mission; the close military collaboration which the United Kingdom enjoys with Iraq fosters mutual confidence and demonstrates the advantages of co-operation, and is therefore an important factor in the continuation of air base facilities at Habbaniya and Shaiba on which Her Majesty's Government rely to a large extent in defending the Middle East. If as the result of a United States mission being introduced into Iraq this co-operation were weakened, these facilities might be

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

prejudiced to the disadvantage not only of the United Kingdom but of Western defence as a whole.

Arms Purchases

8. Her Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad has reported (in his letter of October 30) that the United States Government intend that Iraq should pay for as much as possible of the military material she requires from her own dollar resources. Her Majesty's Government earnestly trust that the United States Government will not proceed with this intention. An aide mémoire of November 7, 1952 given to the State Department by Her Majesty's Embassy at Washington (Sir Oliver Franks' despatch No. 526 of November 12, 1952) set out the reasons why Her Majesty's Government were opposed to the purchase of arms from the United States of America by Iraq. Such purchases would be contrary to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty; they would be made with dollars from the sterling area reserves and would entail an expenditure of dollars which Her Majesty's Government must deprecate as an unnecessary drain on the sterling area reserves, since the United Kingdom could supply for sterling any arms which Iraq might wish to buy. Finally, by introducing new types of equipment into the Iraqi forces, purchases of United States arms would cause administrative difficulties and possibly confusion in the supply of units in the field. For these reasons Her Majesty's Government are strongly opposed to the United States Government's apparent intention of asking for dollars against the supply of equipment; the last of these reasons also constitutes a substantial argument against the supply without payment of equipment of United States types.

9. It is the view of Her Majesty's Government that United States military aid to Iraq could most usefully be devoted to off-shore purchases from the United Kingdom. The advantages of this would be that the existing plans for the expansion of the Iraqi forces would not be disturbed and could perhaps be accelerated and that the equipment of the Iraqi forces would continue to be of British types, thus avoiding any infringement of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and, more important, preserving the present system under which a single supply channel could serve both British and Iraqi forces in the event of war. A further advantage of off-shore purchases would be that they

would help the sterling area whereas any other system would have the opposite effect. In the light of these considerations Her Majesty's Government would be grateful to know to what extent the United States Government are prepared to devote military aid to Iraq to off-shore purchases from the United Kingdom.

Additional possible uses for United States Military Aid

10. Her Majesty's Government wish to reach agreement with the United States Government on any arms or equipment which may be supplied under United States aid to Iraq other than by off-shore purchase from the United Kingdom. The lists at Annex A⁽¹⁾ shows the arms and equipment which it is proposed to supply from the United Kingdom to complete phase I and carry out phase II of the plan already referred to for the expansion and re-equipment of the Iraqi army. The United States might suitably supply buildings for base installations and barracks to meet the requirements of this expansion programme. The following items extracted from the phase I list could be supplied by the United States without causing difficulties in the supply or maintenance arrangements of the Iraqi forces:—

- 46 Scout cars
- 950 Dodge 1 ton trucks
- 636 Dodge 3 ton trucks

If these are considered insufficient the following may be added:—

- 40,000 rounds of 4.2" mortar ammunition
- 40,000 rounds of 4.2" mortar ammunn
- Static engineering plant
- 460 mine detectors
- 30,000 mines anti-tank
- Dodge power-wagons
- Jeeps
- Jeep ambulances

If the United States Government are determined to provide arms for a military unit they could supply:—

- 795 3.5 rocket launchers and rockets.

Air Force Equipment

11. The Royal Iraqi Air Force is equipped with British aircraft and the United Kingdom is well able to meet their future requirements. They are in the process of re-equipping with British Vampire and Venom fighters and the Royal

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

Air Force provides some assistance in the training of the Iraqi Air Force. The limiting factor in the expansion of the Iraqi Air Force is the lack of trained personnel rather than shortage of aircraft. Her Majesty's Government therefore consider that United States aid should be concentrated exclusively on the Iraqi army.

Conclusion

12. Her Majesty's Government consider it important that they and the United States Government should co-operate closely in this matter and that great care should be taken not to let the Iraq Government gain the impression that there exists a rivalry between the two Powers which they can exploit to their own advantage. Her Majesty's Government therefore hope that

the United States representatives in Iraq may be instructed to make it plain to Iraqi officers and officials that United States military aid is complementary to the efforts already being made by Her Majesty's Government to develop Iraq's armed forces and that this is being provided after consultation between the two Powers. Her Majesty's Government hope also that as much as possible of this United States aid will be applied to off-shore purchases from the United Kingdom of suitable items listed in Annex A, and that the United States Government will not press Iraq to spend dollars on military equipment.

*Foreign Office, S.W.I.
November 26, 1953.*

EQ 10345/3

No. 12

UNITED STATES-IRAQI RELATIONS

Sir J. Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received December 7)

(No. 200. Secret and Guard) *Bagdad,
December 1, 1953.*

In recent letters I have mentioned discussions on a variety of topics which the Iraqi Prime Minister has recently had with my United States colleague and members of his staff and, separately, with myself. Though I have seen a good deal of Dr. Fadhil Jamali recently, I think Mr. Berry has seen even more. He tells me that in the last couple of months he has received instructions no less than eleven times to make a representation to the Prime Minister on one topic or another. Up to a point Mr. Berry has found these talks useful as they invariably start off with a long harangue by Dr. Jamali, which has enabled Mr. Berry to get a clear idea of the present Iraqi view of United States-Iraqi relations.

2. Recently Mr. Berry showed me a copy of a very long semi-official letter which he had sent to the State Department analysing these talks and his own views on the present American position in Iraq. I could only read the letter very hastily and cannot claim that I have recalled all the points which it made. Mr. Berry said that he recognised that the American position had seriously deteriorated and he took advantage of these conversations to discuss what could be done to improve the situation.

3. Dr. Jamali is not one to pretend that he is satisfied when he is not. He told Mr. Berry that he had been hopeful that when Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles came into power there would be a reorientation of American policy in the Middle East but, despite the friendly words which they uttered from time to time, he had been disappointed. His conclusion was that Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles were getting bad advice at home. He then went on to dilate on the American attitude over Palestine and North Africa. Mr. Berry assured him that the United States Government were doing more behind the scenes in both respects than the Arabs gave them credit for. No more was at present practicable. For example, the United States Government attached great importance to good relations with France and were not prepared to arraign her publicly over any shortcomings in North Africa. Dr. Jamali had then complained that the United States Government consistently faced the Arab States with *faits accomplis* and did not bring them into consultation privately before announcing decisions which affected them. As examples, he quoted the announcement about the Middle East Defence Organisation and Mr. Eric Johnston's visit in connexion with the Jordan Waters Scheme. Dr. Jamali also said that

the Americans made a great mistake in thinking that a solution of economic problems could precede a solution of political problems. He thought the political solution must come first; otherwise there would never be any economic solution.

4. Mr. Berry told Dr. Jamali that he did not see how his Government could satisfy the Arabs in the immediate future about either Palestine or North Africa, but he had asked for Dr. Jamali's views as to what the United States Government could do in the meantime to improve relations in other ways. Dr. Jamali had then made four suggestions concerning respectively assistance to the Iraqi armed forces, the bases at Habbaniya and Shaibah, United States economic aid and Arab union. I have already described Dr. Jamali's suggestions on the first two points in my letters to Mr. Allen, Nos. 1192/42/1953 and G 1195/120/1953, both of November 24. I need only add here that Dr. Jamali has continued to press Mr. Berry and visiting American Senators on the subject of military aid to which he evidently attaches the highest importance. I am writing separately by this bag about the last two points.

5. It is interesting that the United States Ambassador and his staff should have held these conversations with Dr. Jamali. He is popularly, though not necessarily correctly, regarded as being more pro-American than pro-British as are some other members of the Cabinet, for instance, the Ministers of Finance, Communications and Works, and Agriculture. The State Department may regard his Government as a break in the long line of Nuri-dominated and therefore pro-British Governments of Iraq (in fact, no one who knew them well could describe Mustafa al-Umari, Jamil Madfai or Ali Jaudat as pro-British) and they may have an idea of forging a strong "American connexion" which, I feel sure, they intend should supplement and not necessarily replace the "British connexion."

I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Paris, Amman, Damascus, Cairo, Jedda, the head of the British Middle East Office, Beirut, Tel Aviv and the Development Division of the British Middle East Office at Beirut.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

EQ 1016/65

No. 13

REPORT ON POLITICAL SITUATION

Sir J. Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received December 7)

(No. 202. Confidential) *Bagdad,
December 1, 1953.*

On the eve of the opening of the Iraqi Parliament it may be useful if I attempted to describe the Prime Minister's intentions in so far as I know them.

2. Since it came to power two months ago, Dr. Jamali's Cabinet has been very active. The measures which it has taken to reduce the cost of living were described in my despatch No. 195 of November 10. They were much less spectacular than most people expected, and if anything the Cabinet has shown a lack of self-confidence rather than the impetuosity which its well-wishers feared when it was formed. It is during the coming months that the Government will face its biggest trials, since it is planning to introduce controversial legislation.

3. The Prime Minister described the reforms he had in mind in the course of a long conversation which I had with him on November 19. The most important related

to land reform. He had three measures in mind. First, he intended to enforce at long last the decree issued by General Nuruddin Mahmud when Prime Minister a year ago, which provided that when the leases of Government-owned, pump-fed land came to an end, the land should be distributed to small-holders. The Sheikhs would not be affected by this measure and he anticipated no opposition from them. But many wealthy and politically powerful men, including Saleh Jabr, Ali Mumtaz and Nasrat al Farisi, would be affected. Secondly, a law was being drafted enabling the Agricultural Bank to buy large holdings and to sell them to small-holders against long-term payment. Thirdly, he hoped that parliament would pass a law on land taxation. He told me that he was very soon going to discuss this question fully with the King and the Crown Prince, and it would then be decided how far the Government could safely go. A still more controversial measure which the Minister of Finance has

discussed with members of my staff relates to the improvements which will accrue to privately-owned land as a result of the new irrigation projects. The Government object to enriching fortuitously a few undeserving Sheikhs or Bagdadi land-owners out of an expenditure of public money. One such stands to gain £1,200,000 of improvement to his land from the scheme. The Government are, therefore, contemplating legislation by which land-owners will be forced to put up cash in advance for the improvements to any land in excess of a small fixed minimum or see the land in excess of that minimum expropriated. The Government also wish to revise in favour of the small-holders the Amara land law into which a previous Government of Nuri Pasha had inserted a clause which in practice allowed the Sheikh's families to acquire almost all the land. Negotiation on both these subjects will undoubtedly encounter great opposition in a Majlis largely composed of large land-owners. The Minister of Finance says, however, that the Government intends to "do or die" on the former of the two issues.

4. To deal with the Opposition, the Prime Minister said that he was seriously considering how to organise a system of Government information and propaganda. Money, time and legislation were necessary. He had it in mind, for instance, to introduce a law which would eliminate harmful newspapers. He also hoped to improve the press through the creation of a Press Association. And he wished to organise student bodies on healthy lines to counteract the influence amongst the students of the Communists and Istiqlal Party. He had already had some success in encouraging student organisations in the colleges based on national as opposed to Communist lines. But these new organisations were unfortunately still hostile to the Western Powers on account of the latter's policy in Palestine and North Africa.

5. Dr. Jamali then went on to describe the state of the various political parties. The National Democratic Party, he said, was working in the service of the Communists and undoubtedly was having an effect on the students and on labour. The party has also gained control over the Bar Association and partially over the Medical Association. In addition to the National Democrats, the Partisans of Peace and the Iraqi Union of Students were working in the interests of the Communists.

Of the other two small parties, Dr. Jamali said that the Istiqlal was agitating actively, though he claimed (without much apparent foundation) that it was now giving him a limited measure of public support. The United Popular Front was co-operating with the Government, in which it holds two portfolios. These three parties have held their annual conferences during the past week and I am reporting on them separately.

6. At present, Dr. Jamali said, the two major parties, Nur Pasha's Constitutional Union Party, and Saleh Jabr's Popular Socialist Party, were dormant. He believed that both these men had the same aims and ideology as himself. Saleh Jabr had told him that he wished to have a frank talk with the Crown Prince to find out what Nuri was aiming at. Having first, as he hoped, received the Crown Prince's assurance that he had confidence in his loyalty, he would ask the Crown Prince what should be done to ensure that both he and Nuri moved in the same direction, and ultimately move together. Saleh Jabr had told the Prime Minister that he had frozen his party's activities until a decision had been taken in the light of his conversation with the Crown Prince.

7. Dr. Jamali then told me that he thought that the personal jealousy between Nuri and Saleh Jabr had subsided since he himself had been made Prime Minister. But in his view the country needed political organisation. I asked him whether by political organisation he meant political parties. He replied that this was not necessarily so, but it was impossible to allow the country to be led by the Communists and the Istiqlal Party. Nuri Pasha and Saleh Jabr held different views as to the best means of preventing this. Saleh Jabr wanted to lead the masses, not by going into the streets himself but by sending his agents into the streets. Nuri thought that this was moonshine. Dr. Jamali himself believed that if Nuri could be persuaded to co-operate with Saleh Jabr many political troubles would be avoided. But co-operation must be on the basis of honest and efficient Government and not on the basis of a police State.

8. Dr. Jamali has since had a conversation with my United States colleague, in which he claimed to have the support of Saleh Jabr. Saleh Jabr, it seems, had promised to support him in parliament and not to press for new elections before the end of the new parliamentary session, *i.e.*, in the

summer. Dr. Jamali was less certain of Nuri Said. In his letter of November 24 to Levant Department, my oriental counsellor described how Nuri had recently caused some embarrassment both to the Palace and to the Prime Minister by writing from London to the Chief of the Royal Cabinet, asking that Abdul Wahhab Murjan should be made President of the Chamber or, failing him, Khalil Kenna. Dr. Jamali, when I saw him, shed further light on this affair. He said that Khalil Kenna was unacceptable (as, of course, Nuri well knew as Khalil Kenna has for long been at loggerheads with Dr. Jamali). Nuri had therefore in fact put forward a single candidate who, though personally acceptable, was an embarrassing choice because he is a Shia. Dr. Jamali had long complained before he became Prime Minister that all the good jobs went to Sunnis. He did not wish now to be accused of giving them all to Shias. And that was

the kind of accusation that the Sunnis might well make if, at a time when the Prime Minister and the President of the Senate were both Shias, the presidency of the Chamber were also to be given to a Shia. With some reluctance Dr. Jamali had agreed to abide by Nuri's wish, but this incident has evidently caused Dr. Jamali to feel some anxiety as to Nuri's intentions. It looks to me as though Nuri may have decided to start bowling some overs of slow googlies against the Government. It would be very typical of him.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda, Tel Aviv, Washington, the Head of the British Middle East Office, and to the British Acting Consul, Basra, and the British Consul, Kirkuk.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

(18907)

No. 14

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN IRAQ

Sir J. Troutbeck to Lord Salisbury. (Received July 20)

(No. 123. Confidential) *Bagdad,*
My Lord Marquess, *July 7, 1953.*

With reference to Mr. Beeley's despatch of the 7th of July, 1952, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on leading personalities in Iraq in July 1953.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

Enclosure in No. 14

Leading Personalities in Iraq

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Leading Personalities in Iraq

The Royal Family

1. King Faisal II

Born in Bagdad on 2nd May, 1935, the son of King Ghazi and a sister of the Amir Abdul Ilah. He succeeded to the throne on the death of his father on 3rd April, 1939.

During the Rashid Ali rebellion in May 1941 he and his mother were at first confined at Qasr Zuhur on the outskirts of Bagdad but were removed to the summer palace at Pir Mum just before the collapse and flight of the rebel Government.

The King spent his summer holidays in Egypt in 1943 and 1944 and in England in 1946, where he attended the Victory Celebrations and was the guest of the King and Queen at Buckingham Palace.

His early education was directed by an English governess who was succeeded by an English tutor in 1946. In 1947 he went to Sandroyd Preparatory School and entered Harrow, his father's old school, in May 1949. He spent the summer holidays of 1948 and the Easter holidays of 1950 in Iraq. In 1950 he was given a notably warm welcome by the people and the opportunity was taken for him to visit a number of important provincial centres. He came to Iraq in the autumn of 1950 with his mother and returned to Harrow seven weeks after her death in December 1950.

The King did not return to Iraq again until December 1951, when he spent the winter holidays in Bagdad. He suffered most of the time from asthma, to which he has a tendency, and was unable to take part in public life. Returned to Harrow for the Easter term 1952. Visited the United States in August 1952. Returned to Iraq in October 1952. Visited Kuwait in April 1953 and acceded to the Throne in May 1953. Appointed a G.C.V.O. in 1952.

He is intelligent and well-mannered and is very popular in Iraq. His health appears to be improving.

2. Abdul Ilah, His Royal Highness the Amir

Born in the Hejaz in 1912, the only son of the late King Ali, ex-King of the Hejaz. He came to Bagdad with his father in 1926 after Ibn Saud had expelled the latter from the Hejaz. He was educated privately and at Victoria College, Alexandria. He became Regent on the death of his cousin King Ghazi in April 1939 and remained Regent until the Accession of King Faisal II in May 1953.

During the Cabinet crisis of January 1941 which led to the fall of Rashid Ali's Cabinet, he endeavoured to resist the Prime Minister's demands for the appointment of new Ministers, but fled to Diwaniyah to escape the threats to his life made by four army officers Salah-ud-din Sabbagh, Kamil

Shabib, Fahmi Said and Mahmud Salman. Rashid Ali thereupon resigned and Taha al Hashimi succeeded him. The Amir then returned to the capital.

During the night of 1st April the four army officers already mentioned occupied Bagdad with their troops and went to the Palace to demand the resignation of Taha al Hashimi and the appointment of Rashid Ali as Prime Minister. The Amir was, however, warned in time, eluded them and took refuge in the American Legation. Thence he was smuggled to Habbaniya on 2nd April and flown to Basra. On instructions from Bagdad, the Officer Commanding, Iraq Army, at Basra attempted to arrest the Amir, who took refuge on board of one of His Majesty's ships. By now any hope of rallying support for his cause in the south had been lost. On 16th April he was flown to Jerusalem, together with Ali Jaudat and Jamil Madfai, who had meanwhile joined him at Basra. During the hostilities in May, the Amir remained in Palestine. He returned to Bagdad on 1st June, after the collapse of Rashid Ali's régime and was welcomed by a large gathering of officials, notables and well-wishers.

In November 1943 he was declared Heir to the Throne under the provisions of an amendment to the Organic Law passed in October.

In December 1943 he paid an extensive visit to the United Kingdom at the invitation of His Majesty's Government. For three days he was a guest of Their Majesties the King and Queen at Buckingham Palace. During 1944 the Amir toured extensively within the country and paid particular attention to the army manoeuvres which he constantly attended. In June he visited Alexandria, returning early in July, and in September he again visited Transjordan and Egypt. He paid a second brief visit to Transjordan in February 1945.

In May 1945 he left on an official visit to the United States, returning via Canada and Great Britain. In London he was twice received by the King, met the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet and attended the Victory Thanksgiving Service. He also visited the occupied area of Germany. He returned via France and Italy, whence he proceeded on an official visit to the President of the Turkish Republic before returning to Iraq in September.

The Amir visited London in the summer of both 1946 and 1947. In 1946 he attended the Victory Celebrations on 8th June, and in 1947 he paid official visits to France and Belgium as well as to London. He and Nuri Pasha held informal discussions with the Foreign Office in September 1947 about the Iraq Government's desire to replace the 1930 Treaty. He was therefore to some extent committed personally to the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty and was placed in a difficult position by the demonstrations against it in Bagdad in January 1948. He did not extricate himself from this position with undiminished credit.

In 1948 he took a personal part in the unsuccessful attempts to unify the war effort of the Arab States against Israel and paid a number of visits to the Iraq Army in Palestine. He paid a State Visit to the Shah of Persia in June 1949 and visited England later in the summer.

He again visited England in the summer of 1950 when his sister became seriously ill and had to enter hospital. He returned to England in the autumn to arrange for the Queen Mother's journey to Iraq. In the last few months of the year he was pre-occupied with his sister's declining health. Shortly before her death he flew with his mother and sisters to the Hejaz where they visited Mecca. He returned to Iraq the same day. He accompanied the King to England in February 1951 and returned after six weeks. He again left the country at the end of May for a short visit to Amman. Left for London in

July 1951 and returned to Iraq in September. While in London he had been examined for suspected appendicitis, and a successful operation was performed in London in November 1951, the Amir returning to Bagdad in December. He paid an official visit to Kuwait in March 1952, and an unofficial one to Bahrain in April. In May he paid an official visit to Spain and returned to Iraq towards the end of the month. He visited Amman for a few days in June in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Jordan Government to accept a Hashimite as member of the Jordan Council of State. He returned to Bagdad angry and disillusioned. Between July and October 1952 he visited the United Kingdom and the United States with King Faisal. Visited Kuwait with the King in April 1953. Head of the Iraqi Delegation to the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth, June 1953.

The Amir is an intelligent man with an excellent memory. He has a shy charm of manner and his natural judgment is good. But his will is abnormally weak and he can seldom withstand either his own passions or the pressure of others. He has tried to take his duties seriously and has been genuinely anxious to hand over the monarchy unimpaired in strength and reputation to his nephew the King, but he is easily discouraged or intimidated. He is much influenced by his mother. His intense pride in the Hashimite Royal House and his concern to maintain its unity and prestige explain his deep anxiety over events in Jordan since the death of King Abdullah and provide the motive for his well-intentioned but generally ill-timed interventions in Amman since King Talal's illness precipitated the crisis in Jordan.

He is basically uninterested in affairs of State and does not identify himself with the progress and aspirations of his people, whose interests he seems to regard as distinct from those of the Royal Family. He feels more at home with Englishmen than with Iraqis and his recreations are those of the English. He maintains a large racing stable, supports a pack of hounds and breeds pheasants and spaniels. He is irresponsibly extravagant, and in 1945 spent over \$200,000 in the United States on jewellery. He is also believed to have invested heavily, at the cost of grave indebtedness, in speculative industrial enterprises in Bagdad.

His Regency was a troubled one and he has twice been forced to flee from Bagdad. These experiences impelled him to make a real effort to obtain the personal loyalty of the Army, in which he had some limited success. But these experiences also implanted in him a deep distrust of his people and a determination to keep in his own hands as much power and patronage as possible. His fears caused him to interfere in details of Government policy and administration, particularly in the appointments of officials and the choice of Government candidates for Parliament. He would never allow a Prime Minister a completely free hand in the selection of his Ministers. At the same time his indolence made him neglect the higher direction of policy. He seldom read State papers unless they had direct connexion with the position of the Hashimite House. None the less he kept Iraq on a steady course for fourteen years while tumultuous events were taking place elsewhere.

He has twice been married. First in 1936 to the daughter of Salah-al-Din Fauzi Beg of Cairo, whom he divorced in 1940, and secondly to another Egyptian lady Mlle. Faiza Tarabulsi in November 1948, whom he divorced in 1950. Stories about his dissipations circulate. He speaks very good English.

He was made an Honorary Air Vice-Marshal in the Royal Air Force in 1952, was appointed Honorary G.C.M.G. in 1942 and Honorary G.C.V.O., with the award of the Royal Victorian Collar in 1943.

3. Zaid, His Royal Highness the Amir

Born at Istanbul 1900, he is the youngest son of the late King Hussein of the Hejaz and a half brother to the late Kings Ali of Hejaz and Faisal I of Iraq, and to King Abdullah of Jordan. His mother was a Turk. He was educated at Istanbul. He served with the Sharifian forces during the first world war and won the good opinion of British officers. He was appointed an Honorary G.B.E. for his services.

He came to Iraq in 1922 and was commissioned in the Iraqi cavalry. He acted as Regent for a short time during King Faisal's absence in 1924. From 1925 to 1928 he studied agriculture at Oxford and from 1928 to 1931 he lived in Cyprus where his father had retired after being driven from the Hejaz by Ibn Saud.

After the death of King Hussein in 1931 the Amir Zaid was appointed Iraqi Minister at Ankara in January 1932. He was transferred to Cairo in 1934, owing to the scandal caused by the marriage of his sister to Atta Amin (q.v.), but he refused to accept this appointment. At the end of 1934 he was engaged in litigation in Athens about properties which he claimed to have inherited in Greece. He was appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935. In 1937 he was recalled for enquiries into allegations that he had used his position to give false certificates for arms destined for Spain. He survived the enquiry and returned to Berlin. He was withdrawn from Berlin in the spring of 1938 and remained in Iraq until the summer of 1939 when he went to live at Istanbul.

In 1933 he had married a Turkish lady who had been divorced by her previous husband. This *mesalliance* was the main reason for his not being made Regent on the death of King Ghazi in 1939.

He came to Bagdad in October 1941 to meet the Amir Abdullah who paid a state visit to Iraq in that year. In June 1942 he returned to Turkey, which remained his home until he was appointed the first Iraqi Ambassador in London in 1946.

In 1943, 1945, 1946, 1949, 1950 and 1951 he came to Iraq to act as Regent during the absences of the Amir Abdul Ilah.

The Amir Zaid is a friendly and well-mannered man. He is a shrewd observer who takes a detached and cynical view of Iraqi and Arab politics. Although he is lazy, dislikes responsibility, and is a heavy drinker, he would probably have made a more successful Regent than his cousin Abdul Ilah. He speaks English and Turkish in addition to Arabic. His wife has had some success as an artist, having held exhibitions of her paintings in London and in Paris, but she is seldom seen in Iraq.

4. Hussein Nasir

A cousin of the King and of the Regent, with the style of "Highness."

He was educated in Istanbul during the 1914-18 war. From 1935 to 1938 he was attached to the Iraqi Legation at Ankara and later held an appointment in the Royal Palace at Bagdad. Iraqi Consul in Jerusalem from 1946 to 1948.

He is married to a daughter of King Abdullah of Jordan, whose service he entered in 1948. He was appointed Jordan Minister at Ankara in December 1948.

A good humoured, genial and friendly man without much ability or personality.

Other Personalities

1. Abbas Mahdi

Shia. Born 1898. Served in the Head Post Office, the Iraqi Legation at Tehran and the Ministry of Education. Minister of Education 1932-33. Minister of Economics and Communications in Jamil Madfai's Cabinet in 1934. Director-General of Tapu 1934. Master of Ceremonies at the Palace

1937. Minister of Economics and Communications 1937-38, in the Cabinets of Hikmat Sulaiman and Jamil Madfai. Appointed Principal Private Secretary at the Royal Palace in July 1941.

Minister at Tehran 1943-45. Appointed first Iraqi Minister in Moscow in 1945. Was made senator in 1949, after his final return from Moscow. He played a prominent part in opposing the policy of Nuri Said's Government in the Senate in 1951 and again in 1952.

2. Abdul Amir al Uzri

Born 1899 at Kadhmain of the well-known Shia landowning family. Brother of Abdul Karim al Uzri (q.v.). Educated Bagdad and United States. D.Sc. Michigan University. Appointed engineer in Directorate-General of Irrigation 1929 and rose to Assistant Director-General in 1941.

Minister of Communications and Works in Hamdi Pachachi's Cabinet of 1944. Minister of Supply for a month in August 1944 and then returned to Communications and Works. Appointed Director-General of Irrigation 1946. He resigned this post in November 1950 on being appointed a member of the Development Board. Resigned from the Board in December 1952.

A rather weak personality, incompetent, unreliable, and said to be corrupt.

3. Abdul Ghani al Dalli

Shia of Suq al Shuyukh. Born about 1920. Educated at Naseriyah, Bagdad Law College and the London School of Economics (1945). Became a teacher at the Bagdad Law College in 1946 and in the same year was appointed by Saleh Jabr Assistant Master of Royal Ceremonies in the Palace. Became director-general of the Industrial Bank in September 1947, in which post he has shown himself to be a competent official. Assistant Director-General of Finance, September 1952. Visited Canada with Darwish al Haidari to buy wheat for the Iraq Government in the winter of 1952. Elected Deputy for Suq al Shuyukh January 1953.

A founder member of the Ba'ath Club in 1949. Intelligent and, though critical of some aspects of Western policy, a believer in co-operation with the West. He speaks excellent English and his wife, whom he married in 1950, also speaks a little.

4. Abdul Hadi Chalabi

Shia of Kadhmain. Born Bagdad 1895, the son of a wealthy landowner.

Deputy for Bagdad 1934 and again in 1935. Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet of Arshad al Umari 1946. Appointed Senator in June 1947 and elected First Vice-President of the Senate in February 1950, 1951 and January 1953.

In politics he supports Saleh Jabr and Nuri Said, but he is more interested in business. He is probably the largest corn broker in the country and many agriculturalists are heavily indebted to him. He made big profits from the export of barley at the inflated prices ruling in Greece and Italy in 1947, and was attacked in the press for obtaining more than his share of export licences through Saleh Jabr who was then Prime Minister. His business record shows that he is unscrupulous and will not hesitate to evade his obligations if it suits him.

Stout and unattractive in appearance, he is good company but speaks Arabic and Persian only. He is a philanthropist. His wife appears in public.

5. Abdul Hadi Dhahir

Bagdad Shia, born about 1900, whose wealth derives mainly from property in the city of Bagdad. Interested in politics, but too rich to need to work, he twice entered Government service and twice

resigned after two or three years. He has often been a Deputy and has intermittently practised as a lawyer. As Mutasarrif of Hilla from 1943 to 1944 he showed himself an experienced and honest but lazy administrator.

He has a clear mind, but though by nature affable and moderate, he has in recent years been under the influence of his more energetic and fanatic younger brother Abdul Razzaq (q.v.).

He was Minister of Economics in Tawfiq Suwaidi's Cabinet in 1946 and is a bitter opponent of Nuri Said and Saleh Jabr. He is a founder member of the United Popular Front and was elected to the Front's Political Committee in June 1951. Member of the Court of Cassation April 1953.

6. Dr. Abdul Hadi Pachachi

Sunni. Born in 1894. Son of a former Rais Belidiya of Bagdad and cousin of Muzahim al Pachachi (q.v.). Educated in Bagdad and Istanbul, he qualified as a doctor in France and entered Government service in 1933 as director of the Isolation Hospital.

He was Minister of Social Affairs in Arshad al Umari's Cabinet from June to November 1946, was appointed Mayor of Bagdad in 1948, and Director-General in the Ministry of Social Affairs in 1949. He represented Iraq at the International Labour Organisation Conference at Geneva in June 1951.

Fat, genial and lazy, he does not play a prominent part in politics. He is married to a White Russian wife and speaks fluent French and some English.

7. Abdul Ilah Hafidh

Born about 1897 in Mosul. Son of Mohammed Ali Fadhl who was for some time a Senator. Educated in Paris where he qualified as a dentist but also took a degree in political science.

Deputy for Mosul in 1926 and again in 1935. In 1935 and again from 1938 to 1940 he held foreign service appointments at Paris, Beirut and Bombay. In 1936 he was Director-General of Commerce and in 1941 Director-General of Revenue.

Held a number of ministerial appointments from 1942 onwards under Nuri Said, Arshad al Umari and Saleh Jabr. Appointed first Governor of the National Bank in 1949 and reappointed for a further term of three years in 1952.

Fair and fat with a passion for growing roses, he is friendly and co-operative, but not energetic. Has little knowledge of banking and is inclined to play for safety. He speaks French and English.

8. Abdul Jabbar al-Chelabi

Bagdad Shia, born about 1906. Graduated in agriculture at the University of California and in education at Columbia Teachers' College. He served first in the Ministry of Education, in which he became Director of Primary Education (and Acting Director-General) in 1943 and Chief Inspector in 1946. He left Education in 1946 to become Minister of Supply in Tawfiq Suwaidi's Cabinet. When this Cabinet resigned he was appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Communications and Works. He has also been a member of Iraqi delegations to the San Francisco and other conferences. Minister of Agriculture, July 1952. Member of the Development Board, December 1952.

He is a sincere nationalist but broad-minded and reasonable with a keen sense of humour. He is convinced of the need of Western assistance for Iraq, and is highly respected by his many British friends, who can always rely on his co-operation. One of Iraq's few honest and competent officials, he has no illusions about his countrymen and is subject to fits of depression. He drinks fairly heavily. He speaks English very well. His wife, who speaks some English, appears in public.

During Mr. Dulles's visit to Bagdad in 1953 he spoke up strongly (and apparently much to their surprise) to members of Mr. Dulles's mission on the advantages to Iraq of the British connexion.

9. Abdul Karim al Uzri

Kadhmain Shia, born in 1908; brother of Abdul Amir al Uzri (q.v.). Educated in Bagdad and at the London School of Economics, he has held a number of Government appointments. Secretary to the Ministry of Education, 1932. Assistant Secretary at the Royal Palace, 1934. Master of Ceremonies at the Royal Palace, 1936. Acting Director-General of Revenues, 1937. Director of Commerce, 1938. Resigned 1938. Director-General of Economics from 1939 until he resigned again in 1942 after being involved in a financial scandal.

Elected Deputy in 1943, and again in 1950, he is a member of the Bagdad Chamber of Commerce and of the Board of the National Bank. He joined the National Democratic Party on its foundation in 1946 but resigned about a year later. He has a profitable estate near Kadhmain and interests in a cement factory. He married into the large Rifa'i family of Najaf.

Minister of Finance under Tawfiq al Suweidi, February 1950.

As a nationalist, he is highly critical of many aspects of British policy in Iraq; but he is western in outlook, realises the value for Iraq of the British connexion, and is friendly and co-operative. He was an able Minister of Finance and was chiefly responsible for the passage through Parliament of the law establishing the Development Board. He has supported Saleh Jabr in the past but is not at present on very good terms with him. He speaks English well.

10. Abdul Mahdi (Saiyid)

Shia from the lower Gharraf (Muntafik). Born about 1894 of an influential family and owns a large estate.

Deputy in the Turkish Parliament and in most Iraqi Parliaments from 1927 onwards. He was a supporter of the late Yasin Pasha al Hashemi.

Minister of Education under Rashid Ali in 1933. Minister of Economics in the Governments of Taha al Hashimi and Nuri Said in 1941 and of Communications and Works under Nuri in 1942. Senator from 1941. Again Minister of Communications and Works under Tawfiq al Suweidi in 1950. He now strongly supports Saleh Jabr and is the main instrument of the latter's influence in the Muntafik. He is a founder member of Saleh Jabr's Popular Socialist Party. An implacable opponent of Nuri Said. His influence over Saleh Jabr is considerable and is resented and feared by a large number of Saleh Jabr's followers.

In November 1950 he was accused of the attempted murder of Senator Khaiyun al Ubaid but was released on bail after a week in prison. Although the case against him was subsequently stopped, he bitterly resented what he considered to be a deliberate act of hostility on Nuri's part. He has still not forgiven the insult and is one of the principal agents in keeping Nuri and Saleh Jabr apart.

A strong nationalist and fervent Shia, he is uneducated and xenophobic. He speaks no European language.

11. Abdul Majid Allawi, C.B.E.

Born 1901. Shia of Bagdad. Graduate of the Bagdad Law College. Subsequently joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he held various appointments, including that of Legal adviser, until he was appointed Head of the Political Section. Minister of Social Affairs in the Cabinet of Hamdi Pachachi, 1944. After serving as Mutassarif of

Kerbela until 1948, he was an Administrative Inspector in the Ministry of the Interior until his appointment as Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet formed by Mustafa al Umari in July 1952. Resigned with Mustafa al Umari in November 1952. Appointed Director-General of Customs in February 1953. A dull, colourless Civil Servant, but a supporter of the British connexion. He speaks English and is intensely proud of his C.B.E.

12. Abdul Majid Mahmud

Shia. Born about 1909. Educated in the United States where he obtained a degree in Agriculture. Director of Education in the Muntafik in the early 1930's. Superintendent (Personnel) of Public Revenues. Inspector in the Income Tax Department in 1941. Held an appointment in the Ministry of Economics in 1942. Appointed Assistant Accountant-General in 1944. A member of the Iraqi delegation to the Bretton Woods Conference in 1945. Has until recently been Director-General of the Agricultural Bank to which post he was appointed by Saleh Jabr. Visited England in 1950 in connexion with the purchase of a trawler for fishing in the Persian Gulf. Appointed Minister of Economics under Nuri Said in December 1950 and Acting Minister of Agriculture in April 1952. Defeated by Sadiq al Bassam in the elections of January 1953. Appointed to the Government Oil Board in February 1953.

Abdul Majid Mahmud was Secretary of the Muthanna Club, most of the members of which were Western educated nationalists with leanings towards national socialism, and was a founder member of the Ba'ath Club, which contains many of the same individuals whose ideals are now those of democratic socialists. He played an active part in the Rashid Ali movement. He is much under the influence of Fadhil al Jamali.

To meet, he is a mild and friendly little man, who says that he has moved away from his earlier extreme nationalist ideas and believes in co-operation with the West. He was a member of the Committee appointed in 1951 to negotiate with the Iraq Petroleum Company and, in his capacity as Minister of Economics, signed the oil agreements in February 1952. It is doubtful whether he fully understood the complicated issues under discussion and was content to take his orders from Nuri Said. His wife speaks some English. He and his wife both go out of their way to be friendly to this Embassy. But in Iraqi politics he has rather fallen by the wayside. He feels that, having left his former extremist friends to join Nuri, he has now been forgotten by Nuri.

13. Abdul Majid Qassab

Sunni of Bagdad, born about 1908. Educated at Bagdad and Beirut. Took a medical degree at Montpellier. A member of the Muthanna Club. Joined the Constitutional Bloc in 1947 and the Nationalist Bloc of Independent Deputies in 1952. He voted for the ratification of the agreement between the Iraq Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1952. Appointed Minister of Health in Nuruddin Mahmud's Cabinet in November 1952. During his few weeks in office he attempted to undo the work of his predecessors and antagonised most members of his Ministry. Unreliable and unbalanced. He speaks French and some English.

14. Abdul Qadir Gailani

Born in Bagdad in 1904 of the family of the Naqibs of Bagdad. Elder brother of Yusuf Gailani (q.v.). Educated at Bagdad and studied at the London School of Economics. Entered the Foreign Service 1926, and served in London and Cairo, where he was

in charge of the Legation several times between 1934 and 1940. Master of Ceremonies at the Royal Palace, 1940. He was closely associated with the rebel Government of Rashid Ali and after its collapse was interned in Rhodesia and later in Iraq. Released 1944. Reappointed to Foreign Service and sent as Chargé d'Affaires to Karachi, 1948. Transferred to Cairo, 1949, but was not appointed Minister because the Regent distrusts him for the part he played in 1941. In June 1951 he was appointed Counsellor in the Iraqi Foreign Service on special duty with the Arab League. Appointed Minister to Pakistan 1953.

He tries hard to be pleasant and has done his best to live down the past. He speaks good English. His Egyptian wife has little English, but speaks good French.

15. Abdul Rahman Jaudat

Born about 1910. His father was Sunni and his mother Shia; he himself is considered a Shia. Educated Bagdad Law College.

Served as Qaimmaqam in Najaf Suq al Shuyukh and Diwaniya. Appointed Mutasarrif in the Muntafik in 1946 and in Diwaniya in 1947. Mutasarrif of Bagdad December 1949 and appointed Director-General of the Interior in June 1951. Minister of Health under Mustafa al Umari, July 1952. Minister of Communications and Works, December 1952, and of Agriculture, January and May 1953. Deputy for Hindiya, January 1953.

A competent official and co-operative in his dealings with the British. He has not distinguished himself as a Minister. He is in poor health. He speaks some English.

16. Abdul Rasul al Khalisi

Shia of Kadhima and a nephew of the Shia Mujtahid Muhammad al Khalisi. Born in 1910. Joined Government service in 1932, served as Administrative Inspector and was appointed Mutasarrif of Kerbela in September 1948. Transferred to Diyala in June 1950 and to Bagdad in June 1951. Appointed Minister of Justice and Acting Minister of Communications and Works in Nuruiddin Mahmud's Cabinet in November 1952. Elected Deputy for Kadhima in January 1953. Unintelligent and a fervent Shia. He speaks no English.

17. Abdul Razzaq al Dhahir

Shia of Bagdad. Born about 1903. Younger brother of Abdul Hadi Dhahir (q.v.). He has travelled in Europe and speaks English fairly well. In 1942 he was attacked by a nervous disease which affected his brain, and he spent some time in a mental home in Beirut. Joined the Istiqlal Party when it was founded in 1946, but soon left it to join the late Sa'ad Saleh's Liberal Party, of which he continued to be a member until Sa'ad's death early in 1949. Deputy for Bagdad since 1948 and has been on Iraqi delegations to several inter-Parliamentary conferences. Minister of Economics in Ali Jaudat's Government of December 1949. He resigned with the opposition deputies in March 1950 and is a founder member of the United Popular Front. In June 1951 he was elected to the Front's Permanent Bureau. Arrested after the riots in November 1952.

Abdul Razzaq and his brother are well off, having property in Bagdad and lands in Abu Ghuraib. He is a self-opinionated and somewhat unbalanced man with a wide range of superficial knowledge. A political opponent of Nuri Pasha. He has published a book damning tribal feudalism in Iraq and three volumes of essays inveighing against British imperialism.

18. Abdul Wahhab Mahmud

Sunni of Basra. Born in 1909. Educated Basra and Bagdad, where he graduated in law in 1932. As a young man he held advanced Leftist opinions. Arrested by Jamil Madfai's Government in 1938 for attempting to raise the Diwaniya tribes against them. Released by Nuri Pasha after the military demonstration which removed the Madfai Government. Deputy 1939 to 1947. Minister of Finance in Suwaidi Cabinet of 1946. Member of the Liberal Party from 1946 to 1948, when the party suspended activity. Elected President of the Bar Association in 1950, 1951 and 1952. He is one of the leading Iraqi fellow-travellers and played a prominent part in the agitation leading up to the riots in 1952. As a result he was detained for six weeks.

19. Abdul Wahhab Murjan

Born about 1910 of a rich Shia landowning family of Hilla. Educated at the Bagdad Law College, he was appointed a judge about 1935 but soon resigned to practise as a lawyer.

In 1946 and 1947 he was leader in Hilla of Kamil Chaderchi's National Democratic Party but resigned in 1947 owing to his exclusion from the party's Higher Committee and to his being taken up by Saleh Jabr, who secured his election to the Chamber of Deputies in March 1947.

He was again elected Deputy for Hilla in the 1948 elections and was appointed Minister of Economics in June 1948 in Muzahim Pachachi's Government. Resigned on his election as President of the Chamber of Deputies in autumn 1948. Elected vice-President of Nuri Sa'id's Constitutional Union Party in December 1949. Became Minister of Communications and Works under Nuri Said in September 1950 and was transferred to Finance in December 1950. Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1951. Deputy for Hilla in January 1953. Minister of Communications and Works, January and May 1953. Resigned after a quarrel with Said Qazzaz in May 1953.

He is not very intelligent, and owes most of his influence originally to Saleh Jabr's and recently to Nuri Sa'id's support. He has fallen foul of Saleh Jabr on two personal issues and may think in terms of setting himself up as a rival Shia leader. He knows a little English.

20. Abdullah Damhiji

Sunni, born in Mosul in 1895, and formerly called Abdullah Said Effendi. Studied medicine in Constantinople and served in the Turkish army, but transferred his allegiance to Ibn Saud when the latter occupied Hama in 1913.

As Ibn Saud's Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1922 he signed the Uqair Protocol, and in 1926 took part in the negotiations in London which led to the Treaty of Jeddah in 1927. His influence with Ibn Saud afterwards waned and in 1928, after the failure of the Medina Railway Conference at Haifa, at which he was Ibn Saud's representative, he posted his resignation to Ibn Saud and came to Bagdad instead of returning to the Hejaz.

In Iraq he has been thrice Minister for Foreign Affairs (in 1930-31, 1934 and 1942), thrice Director-General of Health (1932-33, 1934-35 and 1941-42), and Master of Ceremonies at the Palace in 1937-38.

From 1942 onwards, he devoted himself mainly to business. He was a member of the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations in 1947 and was elected Deputy for Mosul in the 1948 elections.

He was appointed Iraqi Ambassador in Tehran in February 1950. He spent most of his time in Bagdad however and eventually resigned from this post in May 1951. Minister of Education under Mustafa al Umari, July 1952.

He speaks English well.

21. Abdullah Qassab

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1900, the son of an 'Alim, Abbas Amin al Fetwa. Educated Bagdad, graduated from the Law College, 1928, and entered Government Service. Qaimmaqam Samarra 1936, Director of Tribal Affairs, Ministry of Interior, 1938, Mutasarrif of Diwaniya, 1941, Mosul, 1944, Director-General of the Date Association, 1947. Appointed Mayor of Bagdad, 1951. Returned to Date Association, March 1953.

Minister of Interior under Nuri Pasha, 1943 and again under Arshad al Umari in 1946.

A fairly capable administrator without marked political leanings. He is now a sick man.

22. Ahmad al Ajil

Sunni Sheikh of the Shammar Jarba tribe. Younger brother of Sfuq al Ajil (q.v.), he was born about 1923 and educated at Victoria College, Alexandria and in Mosul and Bagdad.

He went to London with his father Ajil in 1937 to attend the coronation of His Majesty King George VI. After Ajil's death in 1940 Ahmad set about undermining Sfuq's position in the tribe, disputed the inheritance with him, and in 1944 was suspected of being involved in an attempt to poison him with locust bait.

He became Deputy for Mosul in 1948 and in October of that year he was recognised by the Government as paramount Sheikh of the Shammar in Iraq instead of Mish'an al Faisal who had replaced Sfuq the previous June. He is now more popular than his rivals with the tribe, but constant intrigue amongst themselves has reduced the influence of all Shammar Sheikhs. Accompanied King Faisal II to America in 1952. Deputy for Tel Afar, January 1953.

Flashy, engaging and plausible, Ahmad is one of the very few English-speaking tribesmen. He is believed to be in touch with Ibn Saud.

23. Ahmad Mukhtar Baban

Born about 1895. Sunni from near Khaniqin. He is not a true Baban but takes the name from a marriage connexion with the late Jamil Bey Baban of Kifri. Educated Bagdad Law School and served as a judge for many years. Director-General of Supplies, 1942. Successively Minister of Social Affairs, Communications and Works and Justice under Nuri Sa'id, 1942-44. Minister of Social Affairs, 1946. Head of the Royal Diwan, 1946. He visited Europe in the summer of 1951. Took a prominent part in the conduct of the elections of January 1953. Minister of Justice under Jamil Madfai, January 1953. Head of the Royal Diwan again in April 1953.

The advice he gives in the Palace is not always good and he is widely regarded as a sinister figure. His personal morals are questionable. He speaks no English.

24. Ahmad al Rawi, K.B.E.

Born about 1896, the son of a Bagdad Sunni Alim. Brother of Najib al Rawi (q.v.). Became a police officer soon after the formation of the Iraq Government and after reaching the rank of Commandant, served in several liwas as a mutasarrif. In 1939 he was made an administrative inspector and soon afterwards was placed on pension.

After the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebel Government in 1941 he was recalled by Jamil Madfai and made Director-General of Police. He held this position successfully for four years of war and co-operated wholeheartedly with the British Forces. He was appointed Honorary K.B.E. for his war services in 1946.

Created Pasha by Amir Abdullah of Transjordan in 1943, he was appointed Iraqi Minister to Syria and the Lebanon in 1945 and to the King of Transjordan in

1946. He returned to Iraq the same year to take up the post, first of Director-General, and later (1949) of Under-Secretary, in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In this capacity he represented Iraq at several meetings of the Arab League Political Committee in 1948 and was a member of the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations in the latter half of 1949. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Amman in January 1951. In May 1952 he was appointed Iraqi Minister at Karachi. Defeated in the elections of January 1953. Appointed Ambassador to Lebanon, 1953.

A supporter of Iraq's British connexion, Ahmad Pasha is an intelligent and pleasant man. More politician than administrator, he is generally well-informed but does not carry the weight that his position and connexion would lead one to expect. He used to aspire to cabinet rank, but now seems satisfied with his present career, in which he can indulge his liking for travel and talk. He speaks English well.

25. Akram Mushtaq

Sunni, born Bagdad 1903. Gazetted officer in the Iraqi army, 1927. Passed Cranwell and appointed to the Royal Iraqi Air Force, 1930. Captain, 1932; Major, 1937; Lieutenant-Colonel, 1938; Commander of the Royal Iraqi Air Force 1937 to 1939. Relieved of his command and commission and appointed Director-General of Civil Aviation in 1939. He still holds this post. Member of the Iraqi delegation to the International Civil Aviation Conference at Chicago in 1944.

He is an intelligent and likeable man and speaks English well, but he is an indifferent administrator and has little influence. He took an active part in Bekr Sidqi's *coup d'état* of 1936 and some people still hold this against him. A drug-taker, he tried to commit suicide in 1949, and was afterwards sent to Europe to be cured.

26. Ali Haidar Sulaiman

Born at Rowanduz 1905 of a well-known Kurdish family. Educated at Mosul and the American University, Beirut. He represented his university at the 1929 meeting of the International Students Union at Geneva.

Lecturer in Modern History at the Higher Teachers' Training College, 1930. Transferred to Ministry of Interior, 1933. Transferred to the Iraqi Foreign Service and served at Rome and Cairo between 1937 and 1939. He was interned after 1941 as a sympathiser with Rashid Ali (he is a brother-in-law of Yunis Sab'awi who was hanged for his part in the rebellion). Released in 1944 he became a partner of Ali Kemal in the New Bagdad scheme. In 1949 he was associated in business with Abdul Hadi Chelabi and is now director of the firm, Iraq Engineering Works.

Deputy for Rowanduz 1948. Resigned 1950. Re-elected 1953. Minister of Social Affairs under Muzahim Pachachi, 1948. Minister of Communications and Works under Ali Jawdat, 1949-50. Appointed a Minister Plenipotentiary in the Iraqi Foreign Service in May 1951.

He supports Muzahim Pachachi and is opposed to Nuri Pasha. A sincere and intelligent nationalist with moderate reformist views. Speaks good English. His wife appears in public, but does not know English.

27. Ali Jawdat al'Ayyubi

Sunni of humble Mosul origin, born 1886. Educated at Istanbul and commissioned in the Turkish army. In Turkish times he was a member of the Arab Nationalist society Al Ahd al Iraqi. He fought against the British at Shuaibah but surrendered soon afterwards and was employed in 1915 to encourage Arab officer prisoners to join the Arab Revolt. Later he joined Faisal, and in 1920 was Faisal's Military Governor at Aleppo.

He returned to Iraq with King Faisal in 1921 and from then until 1923 he held various posts in the provincial administration. In 1922 he took an active part in agitation against the Mandate.

As Minister for Interior under Ja'far al Askari (1923-24) he voted for the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922. He was again a provincial Governor and later worked in the Ministry of Interior between 1924 and 1930, when he became Minister of Interior under Nuri Sa'id. He resigned from the Cabinet in September 1930 and also (in company with Yasin al Hashimi and Rashid Ali) from the Chamber of Deputies in protest against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930.

Private Secretary to the King 1933; Prime Minister 1934, he was forced to resign by an agitation against him throughout the country organised by Yasin al Hashimi and Rashid Ali.

President of the Chamber of Deputies, 1935. Iraqi Minister in London, August 1935; Paris, December 1936-October 1937. Minister for Foreign Affairs under Nuri Sa'id 1939.

After the Rashid Ali *coup d'état* in April 1941 he joined the Regent at Basra and accompanied him to Jerusalem. After the collapse of the rebellion he returned to Baghdad and became Minister for Foreign Affairs under Jamil Madfai in June 1941.

Iraqi Minister at Washington 1942-48. He joined Muzahim Pachachi's Government in the reshuffle of September 1948 as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and in December 1949 he succeeded, after two failures, in forming a Cabinet which resigned in February 1950. Deputy Prime Minister under Jamil Madfai, January and May 1953.

He has always been a weak and vacillating character of small intelligence and he is now a semi-invalid. He is, however, well meaning and friendly, and he is respected for his Nationalist past. He is in close touch with the United States Embassy. He has become rich through acquiring Government land. His wife is a Syrian who speaks good English, his elder son is married to an American and his daughter is married to the son of Muzahim al Pachachi (q.v.). His sons are close friends of the King. He himself speaks some English.

28. Ali Khalid al Hejazi, C.B.E.

Sunni, born about 1893 in Damascus. After serving in the Ottoman army he became an officer in the Kurdish gendarmerie at the end of the first world war and was awarded the B.E.M. and the M.C. for gallantry during campaigns in Kurdistan.

Appointed Inspector of Police, 1921; Assistant Commandant of Police, 1923; Commandant of Police in the Mobile Force, 1935; Commandant of Police Sulaimaniya, 1937. He was Commandant of Police Bagdad from after the Rashid Ali rebellion in 1941 until 1946 and did good work to stop looting after May 1941.

In 1946 he was appointed Honorary C.B.E. for war services.

Mutasarrif of Sulaimaniya 1947-48, he was one of the very few Arab officials to speak fluent Kurdish. Appointed Director-General of Police in May 1948, he did much to restore the police morale which had been shaken as a result of the disturbances of January 1948. A heavy drinker and a poor administrator, but tough and strict in discipline, he set about re-equipping the police, especially the mobile forces. He was loyal to the Regent and the British connexion.

In February 1950 in a fit of drunken resentment he made an abortive attempt to use his mobile forces against the Government. He was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment. The sentence was later reduced to three and a half years, and he was released in November 1950 by Nuri Sa'id.

A courageous but stupid man who was more than normally corrupted by power, his thoughts may have

been turned to the use of force by the example of the three successful Syrian *coups d'état* of 1949.

29. Ali Mahmud Sheikh Ali

Sunni, connected with the Ubaid tribe. Born Bagdad, 1902. Educated at the Bagdad Law College, he practised as a lawyer from 1923 to 1936. An extreme Nationalist, he was arrested both in 1924 and 1930 for violent agitation against Anglo-Iraqi treaties. He was twice elected Deputy.

Appointed judge in the Court of Appeal in 1936 and Minister of Justice under Hikmat Sulaiman in 1937. Mutasarrif of Basra, 1939; Director-General of Customs, 1940. Again Minister of Justice in Rashid Ali's rebel Cabinet, he fled to Persia after Rashid Ali's collapse but was later surrendered to the British military authorities and interned in Southern Rhodesia. Sent back to Iraq, tried and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment in 1942. During his internment he embarked upon an immense history of Palestine, taking the story back to pre-Islamic times.

Released in 1949, he practised as a lawyer. It was proposed by Tawfik Suweidi to appoint him to the Court of Cassation in 1950. Appointed Director-General of Customs, July 1952. Minister of Finance under Mustafa al Umari for one week and then under Nuruddin Mahmud in November 1952. He drafted most of the ordinances issued by that Government aimed at lowering the cost of living of the lower classes.

He is now on good terms with members of this Embassy.

30. Ali Muntaz al Daftari

Born 1901. Sunni of the Daftari family of Bagdad. Educated at Bagdad Law College and entered Government service in 1920. Rose to be Director-General of Revenues by 1935, but had to leave Iraq after Bekr Sidqi's *coup d'état* which overthrew the Government of Yasin al Hashemi in 1936. Re-appointed Director-General of Revenues by Nuri Sa'id in 1939.

Minister of Finance under Taha al Hashemi, 1941. Director of Rafidain Bank 1941. Again Minister of Finance under Nuri Sa'id in 1941 and 1943. Minister of Communications and Works under Tawfik Suweidi in 1946. Minister of Finance under Muzahim Pachachi in 1948 and under Ali Jawdat, December 1949 to February 1950. Resigned from the Chamber of Deputies in 1950.

Appointed a Member of the Development Board in November 1950 and tendered his resignation from the Board in June 1951. Minister of Finance under Jamil Madfai, January and May 1953. Appointed Senator, April 1953. The most energetic Minister in that Cabinet, Ali Muntaz earned the respect of almost all Deputies for his conduct of affairs in the Chamber.

He was a member of the Liberal Party formed in 1946, but resigned in 1948. His name has frequently been mentioned as a possible neutral Prime Minister. He gives an impression of sincerity and ability, but when in power finds difficulty in co-operating with his Cabinet colleagues. He has been involved in at least one financial scandal. He and his wife, who is the daughter of the late Yasin al Hashimi, speak very good English.

He is said to have been investing in land on a large scale. His financial reputation continues to be clouded, due, it is rumoured, to his having to find large sums to pay his wife's gambling debts.

31. Ali al Sharqi

Shia from Najaf. Born about 1890. Originally a Mulla in Najaf and later Qadhi in Basra and elsewhere, he finally became Head of the Supreme

Ja'afari Court. He was made a Senator in 1947 during Saleh Jabr's term of office. Minister without Portfolio in Ali Jawdat's Government of December 1949. Minister of State under Jamil Madfai, May 1953.

He is of no political importance.

32. Alwan Hussein, C.B.E.

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1899. Educated at the English Protestant School, Bagdad.

He joined the Civil Police in 1917 and did good work during the rebellion in 1920. Assistant Commissioner of Police, Mosul, in 1920. Commissioner of Police Central Criminal Investigation Department, 1924. He went to England in 1930 and attended a Senior Officers' Course at Scotland Yard. He then gradually took over the C.I.D. from the British D.I.G. Removed by Yasin al Hashemi, he returned to the C.I.D. in 1939 when Nuri Sa'id became Prime Minister. Transferred to the provinces by Rashid Ali, he again returned to the C.I.D. after the collapse of Rashid Ali's Government in 1941. Director-General of Police, 1946. He was attacked by the Opposition for the alleged undue severity of police action against the demonstrators during the riots against the Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948. He lost his nerve under these attacks and suffered a minor nervous breakdown. Appointed Commandant of the Police Training School, May 1948, and transferred to be Director-General of Prisons in December 1948. Re-appointed Director-General of Police in September 1950.

A pleasant, friendly and competent official without much personality. He speaks good English. He was appointed Honorary C.B.E. for war services in 1946.

33. Arkan Abadi

Shia, born in 1919. A tribesman of the Fetlah tribe of Diwaniyah. Educated at the London School of Economics. Joined the Iraqi Foreign Service in 1944. He accompanied Fadhil al-Jamali to the Palestine Conference in London in September 1946.

Deputy for Diwaniyah in 1947 and 1948. Resigned in 1950. Contested a by-election in 1950 but was defeated by Government action. Deputy for the Muntafiq in November 1950 and for Shamiya in January 1953. He was offered the portfolio of Agriculture by Nasrat al-Farisi during his abortive attempt to form a Cabinet in January 1953. He was a member of Nuri Sa'id's Constitutional Union Party and is bitterly opposed to Saleh Jabr.

He and his wife, who is the daughter of Jamil Madfai, speak excellent English.

34. Arshad al Umari, K.B.E.

Sunni, born in 1888 of the well-known Umari family of Mosul. Educated in Turkey and employed as Municipal Engineer in Istanbul. He served on the Turkish staff in 1914-18 war.

A member of the first Iraqi Parliament, he later held several official appointments. Mayor of Bagdad from 1931 to 1933, and again from 1936 to 1944, with a short interruption in 1941 when he formed a Committee of Internal Security to conclude an armistice with the British forces after Rashid Ali's flight. He was a successful Mayor and can claim credit for much of such modernisation as Bagdad has achieved.

He represented Iraq at the Arab Unity Congress in Cairo in 1944 which resulted in the formation of the Arab League and in 1945 he led the Iraqi delegation to San Francisco. Minister of Economics and Communications under Ali Jawdat in 1934. Minister of Supply under Hamdi Pachachi in 1944. Appointed a Senator in June 1944. He was Prime Minister from June to November 1946, and aroused great opposition by his dictatorial methods. He played some part in the political intrigues which resulted in the rejection of the Portsmouth Treaty and was

Minister of Defence in the Government of Mohammed al Sadr which took over after the Portsmouth riots. Resigned his seat in the Senate in November 1950 on his appointment as Vice-Chairman of the Development Board. In this capacity his erratic nature and his tendency to concentrate all work in his own hands earned him much criticism, which his outspoken retaliation did nothing to assuage. On the other hand, there was probably no other Iraqi who would have applied so much energy to the work of the Board.

He is president of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society and has done a good deal to improve their finances. His daughter, Mme. Muntaz al Umari, is a leading figure in the Ladies' Committee of this society.

He has an attractive personality and a capacity for hard work which is rare in an Iraqi, but his rapid changes of opinion, his obstinacy and impatience of criticism make him unfit for politics. He speaks Turkish and some rather curious French. He was appointed Honorary K.B.E. for war services in 1946.

He has aged somewhat in the past year. Even his ebullient nature was finally overborne by the merciless criticism of his work in the Development Board. He threw in his hand in June 1953 and his resignation from the Board was accepted in July. As a sop he was reappointed to the Senate.

35. Ata Amin

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1898. Educated at the Bagdad Law School.

Assistant Private Secretary to King Faisal, 1921. Joined the Iraqi Foreign Service in 1925 and was appointed to the Iraqi Legation in London. Legal draftsman in the Ministry of Justice, 1927. Returned to the Foreign Service in 1928 and held appointments at Ankara, London, Rome, Paris and Berlin between 1932 and 1943. From 1940 to 1943 he was in charge of the Iraqi Legation in London. Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1943; Minister at Ankara, 1944; transferred to Paris, 1949. Director-General of Government Oil Board in July 1952.

He is married to a sister of the Amir Zaid. He speaks good English.

His appointment to the Oil Board caused some criticism as he had no qualifications for the job either in experience or personality.

36. Baba Ali Sheikh Mahmud

Kurd. Born about 1912, second son of the well-known Sheikh Mahmud (q.v.). He spent much of his childhood in Persia, when his father was engaged in various rebellions. Between 1928 and 1932 he was educated at the expense of the Iraq Government at Victoria College, Alexandria, where he was a class-mate of the Regent. Later he went to Columbia University.

He was appointed to a minor post in the railways in 1938, but soon resigned. His outspoken criticism of Iraqi administration in Kurdish areas led to his arrest and exile for a few months in 1943. A repetition of the offence in 1945 narrowly missed having the same result. He is still a strong critic of the Iraq Government's handling of Kurdish problems.

Minister of Economics under Arshad al Umari in 1946 and in the succeeding Government of Nuri Pasha. Deputy for Sulaimaniya, 1947; lost his seat in 1948.

Baba Ali speaks excellent English and possesses an attractive, though not very forceful, personality. He is interested in the improvement of agriculture in Kurdistan and particularly in the growing and marketing of tobacco. Since 1948 he has spent most of his time in Sulaimaniya and although not a member of his party, is Saleh Jabr's most influential supporter in Sulaimania. He visited America in 1950 and since then has been in close contact with the United States Embassy.

37. Baha ud Din Nuri

Kurd, born in Bagdad about 1897 of an Erbil family. His father was a well-known 'Alim. Educated in Bagdad, he joined the Turkish army in 1917 and the Iraqi army in 1921.

In 1924 he was First-Lieutenant Small Arms Instructor and in 1927 he was promoted Captain. Passed Iraqi Staff College, 1930; attended Staff College Camberley, 1935-36. On his return to Iraq he was deeply involved in Bekr Sidqi's *coup d'état* and was thereafter appointed to Operations Branch. Dismissed from the army by Taha al Hashimi in 1938, he became Assistant Traffic Director on the Iraqi State Railways.

In autumn 1941 he rejoined the army as Major-General and was appointed Assistant C.G.S., but was retired again in 1944. He was Acting Mutasarrif of Sulaimaniya in 1944 and was elected Deputy for Sulaimaniya in 1947 and 1948. Minister of Social Affairs under Nuri Said during 1949. Appointed a Minister Plenipotentiary in the Iraqi Foreign Service in May 1951, and chargé d'affaires at Tehran. Ambassador there in 1953.

One of the most capable Staff Officers in the Iraqi army, he suffered twice for his connexion with Bekr Sidqi. He is an intelligent man and a fairly good administrator; but in spite of a frank and engaging demeanour he is not entirely honest or reliable. He is a Freemason and a connoisseur of mystic poetry, but he is also self-seeking. As Minister he was co-operative with the British, but he was widely censured for his continued connexions with a Lebanese firm supplying the Government. He speaks Arabic, Kurdish, Persian, Turkish and English well.

38. Darwish al Haidari

Born in Bagdad in 1907 of the Haidari family which originated from Erbil. Educated at the American University, Beirut, and at Texas University where he studied agriculture.

Entered Government service, 1930. Director of Rustamiya Experimental Farm, 1933 and of Abu Ghuraib Experimental Farm, 1940. Director of Grain in the Local Products Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior, 1942. Transferred back to the Department of Agriculture after he had been accused of the illegal disposal of a quantity of grain.

He was on the Iraqi delegation to the Hot Springs Food Conference in 1943 and since becoming Director-General of Agriculture in 1946 he has represented Iraq at several international conferences of Food and Agricultural Organisation. Visited Canada in 1952 to buy wheat for Iraq Government.

Fat and jovial in appearance, he has a strong personality and much energy, initiative and determination, mainly directed towards furthering his own interests. He is a devout Moslem and a Xenophobe. He is a dictator in his department and his jealousy of any interference has made it difficult for British experts to co-operate with him. On account of his American training he is generally believed to be biased in favour of American machinery and ideas, but the United States Point IV officials in Iraq have found him equally difficult. A window dresser, and regarded by many as a barrier to progress.

He and his wife, who is a sister of Yusuf and Abdul Qadir Gailani (q.v.) speak good English and French.

39. Daud al Haidari

Bagdad Sunni, born about 1885. Son of a one-time Sheikh al Islam, his family is of Kurdish origin from Erbil. Once an A.D.C. to Sultan Abdul Hamid, he spent the 1914-18 war in Constantinople and came to Bagdad in 1921.

Member for Erbil in the Constituent Assembly in 1924. Minister of Justice under Tawfiq Suweidi, 1929. Deputy for Erbil, 1930-34.

Iraqi Minister in Tehran, 1941-42. Minister of Justice under Nuri Said, 1942-43. Minister in London, 1943-45. Appointed Senator in 1945. Minister of Social Affairs in Mohammed al Sadr's Cabinet, January-June 1948.

He was an intermediary when the British Oil Development Company's concession was negotiated and has since been paid a retaining fee by the Basra and Mosul Petroleum Companies, who describe him as their legal adviser, but do not in fact consult him. He resigned from the Senate under a new interpretation of the Constitution in March 1949 rather than give up this fee.

Daud Pasha is a friend of the Crown Prince but is widely distrusted both politically and financially. He was involved in the agitation against the Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948, but by 1952 he had become a supporter of Saleh Jabr.

His two step-daughters are well known in Bagdad society. He speaks English fairly well and is well disposed towards the British, but his actions tend to be dictated by his financial embarrassments. A nice old man.

40. Dhia Ja'far

Bagdad Shia, born in 1911. He studied mechanical engineering at Birmingham University, where he obtained a B.Sc. in 1934 and a Ph.D. in 1936, and then had twenty months' training with the Great Western Railway.

Appointed Assistant Mechanical Engineer in the Iraqi State Railways in 1937, he was subsequently promoted to be Mechanical Engineer. During the war he was Director-General of Engineering Supplies.

Deputy for Bagdad in 1947. He failed in the 1948 elections, but was later returned for Kerbala in a by-election.

Minister of Communications and Works under Saleh Jabr in 1947 and of Economics under Nuri Said in 1949 and under Tawfiq Suweidi in 1950. A founder-member and member of the Central Committee of Nuri Said's Constitutional Union Party, December 1949. Minister of Economics under Nuri Said in September 1950. Transferred to Communications and Works in December 1950. He played a prominent part in the negotiations with the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1950 and 1951. Appointed Acting Minister of Finance in December 1951. Headed the Iraqi delegation which proceeded to London in June 1952 for discussions on Iraq's sterling balances and other financial matters. Elected Deputy for Bagdad January 1953. Minister of Economics under Jamil Madfai in January and May 1953.

He is well educated and speaks excellent English. He was a successful Minister of Economics, and is a strong supporter of Nuri Said, having close connexions also with Saleh Jabr. He helped to save British property in 1941. The financial reputation of his family is doubtful.

He enjoys British company, but is exceptionally resentful against what he considers the unequal relationship between Britain and Iraq, and is consequently difficult to deal with officially. The I.P.C. regarded him as the main obstacle to an agreement on oil problems. He is extremely ambitious and has energy and ability, and must be reckoned with as a potential Prime Minister.

His wife, who is related to the Agha Khan, looks as though she would be more at home in Beirut than in Bagdad. She speaks some English.

41. Faig Samarrai

Sunni, born at Basra about 1904. Educated Bagdad Law College, 1928-32. Appointed a secretary in the Ministry of Justice, 1933; transferred to Tapu Department 1934; Superintendent of Labour, Ministry of

Interior, 1935, and attended a Labour Conference at Geneva in 1936. After a further period in the Ministry of Justice, he became Director-General of Press and Propaganda in 1939. After a short period of service in the police and at the Ministry of Social Affairs, he became Director-General of Municipalities in 1940.

An extreme anti-foreign nationalist since his student days, he served a short sentence in 1930 for his part in the demonstrations against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. He was an active supporter of Rashid Ali and was interned from 1941 to 1945 at Fao, where he caused much trouble to the authorities. He was a founder member of the Istiqlal Party in 1946, Secretary-General in 1947 and vice-president 1948-1949 and 1950. Deputy for Samarra 1948, he resigned with the opposition Deputies in March 1950, but was again elected in the by-elections of June 1950. In 1949 and early 1950 he travelled in Syria and Lebanon for his party to make propaganda for Iraqi-Syrian union. Resigned with the other Istiqlal Deputies from the Chamber of Deputies in February 1952 in protest against the manner in which they alleged Nuri Said was attempting to railroad the Oil Agreements through Parliament. Took a leading part in the agitation which led to the riots in 1952. He was interned for six weeks.

A grossly fat and unhealthy looking individual with a bad moral reputation, he is nevertheless intelligent, and a persuasive talker. His nationalist views are sincerely held, but are probably subject to modification if it suited his personal ambition. His attitude to Great Britain became slightly less hostile during 1949, possibly owing to the influence of Nuri Pasha who was in that year attempting to split the Istiqlal Party. He is not altogether trusted by his party colleagues. He speaks English.

42. Fakhri Tabaqchali

Sunni. Born about 1900.

Began his official career as a judge. Mutasarrif of Amara, 1945 and Basra, 1948. Appointed to the Court of Cassation in December 1949 and made President of the Tribal Court of Cassation in 1950. Lord Mayor of Bagdad, April 1953.

He is a protégé of the late Hamdi al Pachachi. Pompous, a showman and said to be corrupt, he is unpopular with his subordinates. He speaks fair English.

43. Ghazi Daghestani, C.V.O.

Sunni, born in Bagdad in 1910. Son of Muhammad Pasha Daghestani and brother of the wives of Hikmat Sulaiman (q.v.) and Najib al Rawi (q.v.).

Attended the Royal Military College, Woolwich, and the Staff Colleges at Quetta and Bagdad. He is at present Director of Military Works. He quarrelled violently with the Regent over the despatch of Iraqi troops to Palestine in 1948, but his family influence and his strength of character have enabled him to retain his position in the Army and in society. Appointed Military Attaché in London in April 1952. A.D.C. to the Duke of Gloucester at the accession of King Faisal II.

An intelligent, high-principled aristocrat and an able officer, he might well take a prominent part in politics in the future.

He and his attractive wife speak excellent English and French, in addition to Turkish and Arabic.

44. Hashim Jawad

Sunni, born Bagdad 1911, the son of a small official. He was educated at the American University, Beirut, and at London University, from which he graduated in Economics in 1936.

He was appointed Assistant Secretary to the Council of Ministers in 1936, joined the Iraqi foreign

service in 1938 and was sent as Iraqi representative to the International Labour Organisation at Geneva. He returned to Iraq in 1941 and in 1942 became the first Acting Director-General of Labour in the Ministry of Social Affairs. He also acted as Secretary to a committee for the organisation of post-war affairs in Iraq. In his capacity of Director-General of Labour, he took part in the settlement of the Iraq Petroleum Company strike at Kirkuk in 1946. Later in the same year he was removed from his post by Arshad al Umari who regarded him as a fellow-traveller. In 1947 he was appointed to a position in the I.L.O. and has only paid short visits to Iraq since then.

A quiet and studious man with a clear head and a genuine interest in labour questions, he found the conditions in the Ministry of Social Affairs extremely frustrating and is therefore unlikely to return permanently to Iraq. He is married to a Swiss and speaks excellent English.

45. Hassan Sami Tatar

Turcoman of Kirkuk, born about 1899. His education at the Constantinople Law School was interrupted by the first world war, in which he was taken prisoner by the British forces in Mesopotamia and spent two years in a prisoner-of-war camp in India.

Returning to Iraq after the armistice, he entered the newly founded Bagdad Law College and passed out at the head of the first batch of graduates. He was immediately appointed a judge in Bagdad and thereafter served in the Ministry of Justice and on the Court of Cassation until in February 1950 he became Minister of Justice under Tawfiq al Suweidi. Minister of Justice again under Nuri Said in September 1950. Elected Deputy for Khanaqin in February 1951. Appointed first Iraqi President of the Court of Cassation, July 1951.

He is a quiet man with no particular political affiliations. He speaks Arabic and Turkish.

46. Hassan al Talabani

Kurd, born about 1911 of a well-known family of Kirkuk. His ancestors were heads of a Sufi brotherhood. He graduated from the Bagdad Law College in 1934 and joined the Ministry of Interior in 1935. He served as Qaimmaqam in various Kurdish districts and at Mandali. Appointed Mutasarrif of Sulaimaniya early in 1947, transferred to Erbil later in the year, to Hilla in 1948, to Diyala early in 1950 and Dulaim in October 1950. A.H.Q., R.A.F., Habbaniya, found him very helpful. Re-transferred to Diyala, August 1952.

He visited Europe and England in the summer of 1949.

He is intelligent, honest and capable. He is not a strong character, but as an administrator he makes up in some measure for his lack of strength by persistence and a good sense of diplomacy. He has not yet entered politics but will probably do so eventually. He is well liked by Saleh Jabr and Arshad al Umari. Personally he is good company. He speaks Kurdish and Arabic, some Turkish and good English.

47. Hazim Shemdin Agha

Kurdish chief of the Sharifan tribe of Zakho and son of Yusuf Pasha. Born about 1895. One of the largest landowners of the Zakho district, he is a progressive farmer.

A Deputy from 1925 to 1929 and again from 1938 to 1947, when he was appointed a Senator, he became Minister without Portfolio under Tawfiq Suweidi in February 1950.

Popular and influential in Zakho and well respected throughout Iraq, he is a rich man who has never taken an active part in politics. He was appointed Minister only to fill up the number of Kurds in the Cabinet. He speaks Arabic and Turkish and some English.

48. Hikmat Sulaiman

Sunni, born 1886. A member of the Committee of Union and Progress, he was Director of Education and Assistant Governor of Bagdad under the Turks, and was in Constantinople when the British forces occupied Bagdad in 1917.

Returning to Iraq in 1921 he became Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in 1923 and was Minister of Interior under Abdul Muhsin Sa'dun (1925-26) and again under Rashid Ali Gailani in 1933. He visited Turkey in 1935 and was much impressed with modern Turkish methods.

In 1936 he joined Bekr Sidqi in the *coup d'état* which over-threw Yasin al Hashimi's Government, and became Prime Minister. He resigned in 1937 after the murder of Bekr Sidqi. As Prime Minister he disappointed expectations.

Although apparently reconciled with Nuri Said in 1938, he was arrested and tried by court martial for treason under the latter's premiership in 1939. The death sentence passed on him was commuted to five years' imprisonment, and he was interned in Sulaimaniya. Released by Rashid Ali in April 1941, he was in Persia during Rashid Ali's rebellion.

When he returned to Iraq he devoted himself to farming and prospered. Unpopular with the Regent and Nuri Said, he took little part in politics until 1947, when he was involved in the intrigues which culminated in the fall of Saleh Jabr and the rejection of the Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948. Since then he has often been reported to be making contact with discontented army officers and people of the Left, and is generally regarded as the "dark horse" of Iraqi politics; but this impression is probably coloured by his history and is an exaggeration of his present influence. He had a heart attack in 1949 and is unlikely to play any great political part again though he frequently gives advice to Nuri Said. He was appointed a member of the Regency Council in April 1952. He shows considerable friendship to Her Majesty's Embassy despite his inability to converse in any language but Turkish and Arabic.

His wife, a Daghestani, is a sister of the wife of Najib al Rawi (q.v.). She also is friendly but speaks Turkish only.

49. Husamuddin Jumaa

Born 1899. Sunni. Officer in the Turkish Army during the first World War. After the war entered the Police Department in Bagdad and was appointed Commandant of Police in 1932. Mutasarrif of Kirkuk in 1937, and later of Diwaniya. From 1939 to June 1941 he was Director-General of Police. Although he was much criticised for his behaviour during the Rashid Ali rebellion in May 1941 he was not punished and was appointed Mutasarrif of Mosul at the end of 1941. Between 1942 and December 1944 he held various appointments, including those of Director-General of Supplies and of Revenues. From December 1944 to 1946 he was Mayor of Bagdad, and was then transferred as Mutasarrif to Basra but resigned. Elected deputy for Diyala in 1948. Appointed Minister of Defence in the Cabinet formed by Mustafa al Umari in July 1952. Just before the riots in November he became Acting Minister of the Interior. He resigned with Mustafa al Umari when the riots began. Elected Deputy for Diyala in January 1953. Minister of the Interior under Jamil Madfai in January 1953. A wealthy man, he is a close friend of Mustafa al Umari. In office he is undistinguished and finds difficulty in co-operating with his colleagues. He speaks no English.

50. Hussain Jamil

Sunni of Bagdad, born about 1906. A member of the Jamil family which has marriage connexions with the Suweidis. His father was a judge. Educated at Bagdad and graduated from the Law College in 1930.

From 1933 to 1946 he served as a judge in a number of provinces including Diyala, Diwaniya, Hilla and Bagdad.

He resigned from the Public Service in 1946 in order to become a founder member of the National Democratic Party; he went into private practice as a lawyer and acted as defence counsel in a number of cases concerned with political offences.

Deputy for Bagdad, 1948. He resigned with the opposition Deputies in March 1950. Minister of Justice in Ali Jawdat's Cabinet of December 1949 to February 1950. Arrested after the disorders in November 1952.

Hussain is a convinced Democrat and a sincere reformer who is generally respected. He is a poor man and free from suspicion of corruption. He is less intransigent than most of the opposition leaders and is not always in agreement with the leader of his party. He dislikes Americans. He speaks some English and his wife, who appears in mixed society, is fairly fluent.

51. Ibrahim Akif al Alusi

Sunni, born Bagdad, 1894. Graduated from Istanbul Medical College in 1916 and served in Iraq under the Turks.

He later joined the Iraqi Health Service and rose to be Director-General of Public Health in 1939. He was also Secretary-General of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society for some time.

Minister of Education under Hamdi Pachachi, 1944-45. Appointed Director-General of Social Affairs in 1946; Minister in Damascus, December 1948; Minister in Ankara, February 1950; Ambassador there, 1953.

As Minister of Education he was incompetent and prejudiced, and it is generally considered that he was not a success in Damascus. Superficially friendly, he is a born intriguer.

52. Ismail Safwat

Sunni of Mosul, born 1894. In Turkish times he graduated from the Teachers' Training School, and was a teacher in 1914. He was conscripted and served as a warrant officer in Eastern Anatolia during the first world war. In 1919 he joined the Arab army at Deir el Zor and took part in Jamil Madfai's advance on Tel 'Afar in 1920. After the collapse of Faisal's régime in Syria he went to Turkey.

He came to Iraq in 1922 and joined the Iraqi army. He was on Bekr Sidqi's staff at the time of the latter's *coup d'état* in 1936. From 1940 to 1943 he headed the Iraqi Military Mission to the Yemen. After his return to Iraq he held several brigade commands. Director of Military Operations, Ministry of Defence, 1944. Promoted Major-General, 1946.

In October 1947 he presided over the Arab League Military Committee which sat at Aley Lebanon. Appointed Deputy C.G.S. early in 1948, he was made Commander of the Irregular Arab Army of liberation on the outbreak of hostilities in Palestine in May 1948. He returned to Iraq and was appointed G.O.C., Second Division, Kirkuk, in 1949. In the autumn of 1950 he became Deputy Chief of the General Staff on the revival of that appointment. In June 1952 was appointed director-general of the Iraq State Railways. In the spring of 1953 he quarrelled with Abdul Wahab Murjan and went on leave.

He is a taciturn man with no sense of humour, but he has a reputation for efficiency and for being a good disciplinarian. He has been reported as interested in politics, and he is a close friend and supporter of Jamil Madfai and Ali Jawdat who are also both from Mosul.

As Director-General of the State Railways he has not proved a success and is said to show little interest in anything but giving jobs to his protégés.

53. Jalal Baban

Kurd of the Baban family, born 1892. At first an extreme nationalist, he was deported in 1920 but released in 1921. Appointed Qammaqam in 1923 and later promoted to be Mutasarrif, he served in the administration until 1932.

Minister of Economics and Communications under Naji Shaukat in 1932, of Defence under Rashid Ali in 1933, and of Education under Jamil Madfai in 1934. Director-General of Finance 1934-35 and 1936-37.

Minister of Communications and Works under Nuri Said 1939-40 and under Jamil Madfai in 1941. Minister of Finance under Nuri Said in 1943. Senator 1937-43.

Again appointed Minister of Communications and Works under Mohammed al Sadr in January 1948, he managed to retain his portfolio in the succeeding Governments of Muzahim al Pachachi and Nuri Said until November 1949. Deputy for Diyala in the 1948 elections. Resigned his seat on his appointment as a Member of the Development Board.

No man is better versed than Jalal in the art of government as practised in Iraq. Like his distant cousin Jamal Baban (q.v.), he has been the Kurd in many Governments, though neither he nor Jamal can speak Kurdish nor have any special interest in Kurdistan. An unusually competent but elusive Minister, he is undoubtedly corrupt, but except in 1938 has managed to avoid open scandal.

54. Jamal Baban

A Kurdish lawyer of the Baban family, born 1890. After serving for some time as a judge in Northern Iraq he became Deputy for Erbil in 1928.

Minister of Justice under Nuri Said 1930-32, under Jamil Madfai 1933-34, and under Ali Jawdat 1934-35. In 1935 he joined the party organised by Jamil Madfai to oppose Yasin al Hashimi.

Minister of Social Affairs under Nuri Said 1941-42 and of Justice under Saleh Jabr in 1947. Between his ministerial appointments he practised as a lawyer, and was often Deputy. Appointed Senator in July 1947. Minister of Justice under Mustafa al Umari, July 1952. His lenient treatment of the Communists during the autumn of 1952 gravely weakened the Government's authority.

Like his relative Jalal Baban (q.v.), he has been almost a professional Kurdish Minister. As Minister under Saleh Jabr he was criticised for venality and for influencing judges. He was Acting Prime Minister during Saleh Jabr's absence in London for the signature of the Portsmouth Treaty, and his handling of the situation caused by the demonstration was inept; but in his defence it must be said that Saleh Jabr had kept him in the dark over the course of the negotiations. He resigned with two other Ministers before Saleh Jabr himself gave up hope, and has not been very active since. He is critical of the measures taken against Iraqi Jews in 1950 and 1951. He is a champion of the cause of the emancipation of women. An attractive but weak man.

55. Jamal Umar Nadhmi

Kurd, born in 1912. Son of Umar Nadhmi (q.v.). Studied at the American University of Beirut.

After serving in the Northern liwas and in Diyala he was appointed Mutasarrif of Basra in July 1949. Deputy for Rania, January 1953.

Energetic and respected by the local officials and fond of social life. He has a good name for honesty. Intelligent but easily excited and violently anti-Jewish. He has no particular political affiliations but he is thought to have prospects as an Iraqi diplomatic representative abroad. He speaks excellent English. His wife is a daughter of Rauf al Kubaisi.

He was exceedingly helpful during the Abadan crisis and gave every possible help and facility to our evacuees.

56. Jamil Abdul Wahhab

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1910 of a middle-class family. Educated at Bagdad Law College and practised for a short time.

Joined Iraqi Government service in 1933, and was appointed Assistant Magistrate, Bagdad. He was later transferred to Baquba.

Deputy for Diyala in 1939 and Bagdad in 1943 and 1947. He lost his seat in 1948, but became Deputy for Mahmudiyah in 1950. A member of the Central Committee of Nuri Said's Constitutional Union Party from its foundation in 1949.

Minister for Social Affairs under Nuri Said 1946, and under Saleh Jabr 1947. Appointed Minister of Justice in Nuri's Cabinet in July 1951. Deputy for Bagdad, January 1953.

His marriage in 1933 to a niece of Nuri Said is the main reason for his political advancement. In spite of this connexion, his attitude during the Rashid Ali rebellion was ambiguous. He is a personal friend of the Crown Prince and Shakir al Wadi, and in April 1949 was selected as Iraqi Minister at Cairo. The Egyptian Government, however, refused the *agreement*. He is reported to have engaged in doubtful land transactions in Hilla liwa and he is said to be dissolute, ambitious and untrustworthy. He speaks a little English.

57. Jamil Madfai

Sunni of Mosul, born about 1886. Educated Istanbul and gazetted an officer in the Turkish Army. He joined the Arab revolt and in 1920 was commanding the Sharifian forces at Deir el Zor. In that year he instigated the murder of the British Political Officer and entered Tel Afar, calling upon the tribes to rise against the British in the name of the Sharif. He retired to Syria when British troops approached from Mosul.

Returned to Iraq in 1923 and served as Mutasarrif in several liwas.

Deputy from 1929 and President of the Chamber from 1932 to 1933; Senator from 1935 to 1945 and again from 1948 onwards. President of the Senate 1943, 1949, 1950 and 1951.

Minister of Interior under Nuri Pasha 1930; Prime Minister 1933 and again in 1934 with a different Cabinet. Minister of Defence under Ali Jawdat, August 1934; Prime Minister again for twelve days in March 1935, after which he was forced to resign by an agitation in the Middle Euphrates organised by Yasin Pasha al Hashimi. He refused an invitation to join the Government formed by Hikmat Sulaiman after the Bekr Sidqi *coup d'état* in 1936. He visited the Yemen in the winter of 1936-37 to obtain the Imam's adherence to the Iraqi-Saudi pact of Arab Brotherhood. Became Prime Minister again in August 1937 after the murder of Bekr Sidqi and Hikmat Sulaiman's resignation. He was forced to resign in December 1938 by a military demonstration organised in favour of Nuri Said. He accompanied the Regent on his flight to Palestine during the Rashid Ali rebellion in 1941 and after its collapse became Prime Minister for a short time. In 1943 at the suggestion of Nuri Pasha, he toured the Arab countries to canvass support for Arab unity. In 1948 after the riots against the Portsmouth Treaty he took the portfolio of Interior under Muhammad al Sadr for a few months. In 1949 he was sent by Nuri Said to various Arab capitals in an attempt to unify Arab policy towards Palestine. Accompanied the Regent on the latter's official visits to Spain in May 1952 and to Amman in May 1953. When disorders broke out

in November 1952 and Mustafa al Umari's Government resigned, the Regent called on him to form a Cabinet. He failed to do so but became Prime Minister after the elections in January 1953. He resigned when King Faisal II acceded to the throne and was reappointed in May 1953.

Jamil Madfai is said to have been energetic and resolute in his earlier years. He is popular in most political circles and his influence, which is generally used on the side of moderation, is still considerable, but he is an ageing man, susceptible to the intervention of others and afraid of making enemies. He is unlikely to take any further political part except as a figurehead, but he is said to have influenced Nuri Said against Saleh Jabr. His acquisitions of land and commercial interests have made him a rich man. He speaks no English.

58. Jamil al Urfali

Born about 1907, of a long-established Baghdad family. Sunni. Educated at Baghdad Law College, whence he graduated in 1930, and studied for a short time at the London School of Economics. On his return he edited a weekly legal journal. He joined the Iraqi Judicial Service 1933 and served as a Judge in Hilla, Diwaniya, Nasiriya and later as Chief Magistrate and President of the Execution Department, Baghdad.

Deputy for Diyala 1947 and 1953. Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies 1949 and 1953. Founder-member and member of the Central Committee of Nuri Said's Constitutional Unity Party, December 1949. Minister without Portfolio in charge of Aqaf Affairs under Taufiq Suweidi, 1950.

He is a protégé of Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, without much personal influence.

59. Kamil Chadirchi

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1901. Half-brother of Raouf Chadirchi (q.v.). His father was exiled in 1920 and he accompanied him to Istanbul where he studied medicine for a year.

On returning to Iraq he studied law and graduated from the Baghdad Law College in about 1925, when he was appointed to a minor position in the Ministry of Finance. Became Private Secretary to Yasin al Hashimi in 1929, and left official employment soon after to edit *Al Ikha al Watani*, the organ of Yasin Pasha's party of that name. In the early 30's he was associated with the Ahali group with Mohammed Hadid, Abdul Fettah Ibrahim and Abdul Qadir Ismail and started the newspaper *Saut al Ahali*, which has continued with some interruption and changes of name ever since. He was convicted under the Press Law in 1934 and arrested in the same year for publishing pamphlets against King Ghazi but released for lack of evidence.

The Ahali group was privy to the Bekr Sidqi coup d'Etat against Yasin al Hashimi in 1936 and Kamil became Minister of Economics and Commerce in the Cabinet formed by Hikmet Sulaiman. He resigned in June 1937 because of the increasing influence of the Army. He later formed the Democratic Party with Mohammed Hadid, Majid Mustafa and Hikmet Sulaiman which had little success. He refused to enter Nuri Said's Cabinet in 1943. In 1946 he formed the National Democratic Party, which voluntarily suspended activity in 1948, but resumed in 1950. Both in 1946 and 1947 he was prosecuted on Press Law charges. He took a leading part in the agitation which led to the 1952 riots. He was interned for six weeks.

Kamil is a muddle-headed idealist who holds progressive social democratic views with complete sincerity, but he is incapable of translating these views into a consistent policy suitable to Iraqi conditions. The poor success of the National Democratic

Party is largely due to his lack of leadership and organising ability. He is an unrelenting opponent of Nuri Said. He is known to have been in contact with the Soviet Legation in 1951 and 1952.

Formerly a rich landlord, he has now sold much of his land and is no longer wealthy. He speaks very little English.

60. Khalil Ismail

Bagdad Sunni, of an obscure family of Indian origin. Born 1903. Educated at the Baghdad Law College, he held various positions in the Ministry of Interior from 1925 to 1932.

Secretary of the Cabinet 1932-35. Appointed Director-General of Interior 1935; of Education 1936; for Foreign Affairs 1937. Mutasarrif of Amara 1937-38.

Appointed Director-General of Interior 1938; of Aqaf 1940; of Census 1941; of Revenues 1942; of Finance 1943; and of Customs and Excise 1945.

In November 1948 he was made Under-Secretary in charge of the Ministry of Finance during Muzahim al Pachachi's Government. In January 1949 he became Minister of Finance under Nuri Said and held this post until the whole Cabinet resigned in autumn 1949. He became Deputy for Amara in a by-election in March 1949.

A competent though ponderous official of the old school. While Minister of Finance he gave the appearance of being friendly and co-operative, but his habit of distorting facts was apt to lead to difficulties. Both during and after his period of office he was widely accused of corruption on a large scale. Speaks excellent English and prides himself on his legal knowledge. His daughter appears modestly in mixed society.

61. Khalil Kanna

Sunni, born in Felluja about 1905. His family is of Turkoman origin. Educated at the American University of Beirut, and the Baghdad Law College, he entered Government service in 1933 and worked mainly in the Ministry of Communications and Works until 1941, when he supported Rashid Ali Gailani's coup d'Etat and was consequently interned.

In 1946 he was a founder-member of the Istiqlal Party, but he resigned from the Party with a flourish in 1947 and married a daughter of Ali Ridha al Askeri, thus becoming a relative of Nuri Said. Elected Deputy for the Dulaim in 1947, he was not returned in the 1948 elections. Deputy for Dulaim in by-elections of June 1950.

In January 1949 he started the newspaper *Al Ahad*, which was Nuri Said's mouthpiece. In December 1949 he became a founder-member of Nuri's Constitutional Union Party and was elected to its Central Committee.

Appointed Minister without Portfolio in Tawfiq Suweidi's Government in February 1950 to supervise press and propaganda affairs.

Appointed Minister of Education under Nuri Said in September 1950. His success in this post has largely re-established his political reputation. He represented Iraq at the U.N.E.S.C.O. Conference in Geneva in June 1951. He visited the United Kingdom in the same year.

Elected Deputy for Falluja, January 1953. Minister of Education under Jamil Madfai, January and May 1953.

A fervent Sunni and deeply distrusted by the Shias. A bitter opponent of Saleh Jabr and his party. He speaks good English.

His young wife speaks some English.

62. Mahmud I Sheikh Said : Sheikh

Kurd of the family of Barzinja Sayyids. Born 1884. He inherited from his father considerable religious and tribal influence and a tradition of opposition to

central authority. In Ottoman times he was notorious for his oppression and rapacity.

He was appointed Hukumdar of Sulaimaniya and given British advisers in December 1918. In June 1919 he attempted to throw off British control but was defeated, wounded and condemned to death. The sentence was commuted and he was imprisoned in India. He was again appointed Hukumdar in August 1922 but soon began to try to extend his personal power. He was summoned to Bagdad in February 1923 but took to the mountains with his personal following and remained an embarrassment to the authorities until his surrender in 1930. From 1931 to 1941 he was in forced residence at Nasiriya, Ramadi and Bagdad.

In 1941 he escaped to Kurdistan and prepared to oppose Rashid Ali's unconstitutional Government by force. Since the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion he has lived in semi-retirement at Dari Kella in Barsian near Sulaimaniya.

He is still very influential in Sulaimaniya and causes the local authorities some trouble. He hates all Arabs and holds the Bagdad Government in contempt. He has three sons, Raouf, Baba Ali (q.v.) and Latif. He speaks Turkish and Arabic in addition to Kurdish.

63. Majid Mustafa

Kurd of Sulaimaniya, born about 1895. An officer in the Turkish Army during the First World War, he remained pro-Turkish for some time and later became an active supporter of Sheikh Mahmud (q.v.).

Appointed Mudir Nahiya 1927; Qaimmaqam 1928-35; Mutasarrif 1935-41; he was an able administrator.

His attitude during Rashid Ali's rebellion in 1941 was equivocal, and he forfeited the trust of both sides. On the Regent's return to Bagdad he was suspended for four years for having complied with Rashid Ali's orders.

Nevertheless in December 1943 the Regent reluctantly agreed to his appointment as Minister without Portfolio to advise on Kurdish affairs in Nuri Said's Government. He achieved a peaceful settlement with Mulla Mustafa of Barzan in January 1944, but resigned with the whole Cabinet in June 1944.

Appointed Minister of Social Affairs under Nuri Said in September 1950 and elected Deputy for Erbil in November 1950. Minister of Social Affairs under Mustafa al Umari July 1952 and under Nuruddin Mahmud November 1952. Resigned in December 1952. Deputy for Sulaimaniya January 1953. Minister of Social Affairs under Jamil Madfai January and May 1953.

Although he is a Kurd first and an Iraqi afterwards, Majid has proved an able Minister. He has sought the assistance of this embassy on numerous occasions in connexion with the reorganisation of his Ministry. In the summer of 1951 he was given a tour of social services in the United Kingdom by the British Council and returned an enthusiastic admirer of Britain and with a much improved knowledge of English. Subsequently, however, the apathy of other members of the Cabinet to his ideas of social reform have discouraged him, and he has expressed a desire to return to his large and successful business interests which include a marble quarry in Rowanduz.

64. Mar Shimun

Eshai Mar Shimun XXIIIrd, Patriarch of the Assyrians. Born about 1909, he succeeded to the patriarchate in 1920 when a child. Educated in England at a seminary in Canterbury.

After his return to Iraq he inspired the mutiny of the Assyrian Levies in 1932 and the exodus of the Assyrians to Syria in 1933 which precipitated the massacres in Mosul liwa of that year. He was

deported in 1933 and given asylum in Cyprus. He spent the next seven years in Europe, mostly in England and Geneva, trying to obtain assistance for his people. Granted British naturalisation in 1939 and went to Cyprus, but in 1940 he went to America and has since been living in Chicago, taking a full part in intrigues which split the Assyrians both inside and outside Iraq.

Mar Shimun's aim was to establish the whole Assyrian community in a compact enclave under his own spiritual and temporal authority. His political inexperience and overweening ambitions caused his people much needless suffering.

65. Mudhaffar Ahmad

Sunni, born in Hilla in 1899. Educated in Bagdad, he was an officer in the Turkish army.

Gazetted Assistant Commandant of Police in 1921, he was promoted Commandant in 1932. After a course at the Birmingham City Police School he was appointed principal of the Inspectors' Training School and thereafter held several appointments on the headquarters staff of the police. As Director of the C.I.D. after Rashid Ali's rebellion he enforced energetic anti-Nazi measures. His reputation in the police was high.

Director-General of Civil Defence 1941-43; Mutasarrif of Ramadi 1943; Basra 1944-45; Mosul 1946; Bagdad 1946-48. He was allotted some of the blame for police action against the January 1948 demonstrations and was removed to the Administrative Inspectorate in March 1948. He was appointed Mayor of Bagdad in 1949, and in 1950 refused the Directorate-General of Police in succession to Ali Hejazi (q.v.). Director-General of the Date Association, 1951. Mutasarrif of Basra, February 1953.

Appointed Honorary O.B.E. for war services 1946. He is a polished and popular man and a keen sportsman, but there were reports of corruption when he was Mayor of Bagdad. He is related through his mother to Nuri Said and to the Askari family, and his wife, who appears in public, is a Partow. He and his wife speak good English and Turkish and some French.

66. Muhammad Ali Chelabi

Shia of Kadhmain, born about 1910. Brother of Abdul Hadi Chelabi (q.v.). In 1933, after studying at the American University of Beirut, he went to London to study economics. In 1938, was given a post in the Agricultural and Industrial Bank. In 1941 he was transferred to the newly-opened Rafidain Bank in Bagdad, of which he was appointed director in 1945.

He speaks good English and is married to a Syrian.

67. Muhammad Ali Mahmud

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1895. Educated Bagdad Law School and employed in the Ministry of Justice, in which he rose to become Director-General. He also held post of Director-General Tapu and in 1935 was a member of the Court of Cassation.

Deputy for Diyala in the Parliament of 1935 and for Erbil in those of 1936 and 1937. Minister of Finance in Hikmat Sulaiman's re-formed Cabinet of 1937.

He was Minister of Communications and Works in Rashid Ali's unconstitutional Cabinet of April 1941. On its collapse he fled to Persia but was handed over to the British in September 1941. He was interned in Rhodesia and sent back to Iraq in 1944, where he was tried and sentenced to five years' imprisonment, but released in 1947. He was elected Deputy for Kor Sanjaq in November 1950.

His daughter is married to a son of Ja'far al Askari and probably because of this connexion he joined Nuri Pasha's constitutional party in 1949. Elected to the Central Committee of the Party in November 1950. Minister of Justice under Jamil Madfai May 1953.

He speaks no English.

68. Muhammad Fadhl Jamali

Shia of Kadhmain, born 1902. Educated American University, Beirut, 1921-27, and Columbia University 1927-29. Joined the Ministry of Education, 1929. Director-General of Instruction, 1933; Inspector-General of the Ministry, 1937. He visited Germany in 1937 and made arrangements for an Iraqi party to attend the Nuremberg Rally of 1938. Visited England in 1938 at the invitation of the British Council.

He was a founder member of the Muthanna Club, whose members were mostly Western educated nationalists, and whose political thinking was much influenced by national socialism. He strongly resisted British influence in the Ministry of Education and it was British influence which caused his transfer from that Ministry to a position in the Iraqi Embassy in Washington in January 1943. He did not take up this appointment, but became Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1944. He was a member of the Iraqi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in 1945.

Foreign Minister from June 1946 to January 1948 in the successive Cabinets of Arshad al Umari, Nuri Said and Saleh Jabr. During this time he attended the Palestine Conference in London in 1946 and the United Nations General Assembly in 1947. He was out of politics for a time after the failure of the Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948, but was given a sinecure in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs later in the same year and was appointed Iraqi Minister in Cairo in February 1949. He was recalled almost immediately to become Minister for Foreign Affairs under Nuri Pasha in March 1949. He resigned after six months under a constitutional rule, since he had no seat in Parliament, and was appointed Permanent Iraqi delegate to the United Nations Organisation. He was elected Deputy for Diwaniya in the by-elections of June 1950 and became President of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1950. Minister for Foreign Affairs under Mustafa al Umari, July 1952, and Nuruddin Mahmud, November 1952. Headed Iraqi delegation to United Nations, October 1952. Deputy for Diwaniya, January 1953, and elected President of the Chamber of Deputies.

Jamali is a self-made man, and is one of the first of the type to reach a prominent position. Although he is ambitious, he is unlikely to become a powerful influence in the country, having little political support in his own right.

Jamali is intelligent, energetic and honest, but he is also vain, at times unreliable and emotionally unstable. The Xenophobic nationalism of his younger days has been greatly modified by his extensive contacts with the West and by a genuine conviction of the necessity for Iraq of co-operation with the West. But he will never forgive the British policy in Palestine and the Shia fanatic is not far below the surface. He is interested in Western literature and likes Western music.

He is married to a Canadian and has a large circle of British and American friends.

69. Muhammad Hassan Kubba

Shia of Baghdad, born 1891 and educated locally. In 1913 he became a teacher of Arabic at the German School in Baghdad. After the occupation he set up in commerce in a small way. He entered the Law School in 1920 and as a student was associated with the nationalist activities of Jafar Abu Timman. He

graduated in 1923 and joined Government service. Judge at Suwaira 1927, at Kadhmain 1931; legal draftsman in the Ministry of Justice 1938.

Deputy 1944 and President of the Chamber 1947. Senator from July 1947 and Vice-President of the Senate December 1947. Minister for Social Affairs under Nuri Said 1943, he retained this portfolio in the succeeding Government of Hamdi Pachachi, but resigned to become President of the Chamber. Minister of Justice under Arshad al Umari 1946 and again in 1948 under Muzahim al Pachachi. Minister of Justice under Nuri Said January 1949. Minister without Portfolio in Nuri Said's cabinet in December 1950. Appointed Acting Minister of Health in April 1952.

A weak individual who would never have become a Minister had he been born a Sunni. He wished to resign from Arshad's Cabinet in 1946 owing to the Prime Minister's interference with the courts, but a word from the Regent restrained him. He is pleasant and friendly and proud of his erudition in Shariya law. He speaks no English.

70. Muhammad Hassan Salman, Dr.

Shia of Bagdad, born 1908. Was a teacher in Government primary schools. Entered the Iraqi Medical College, graduated as a doctor in 1934 and joined the Iraqi Medical Service. Member of the Muthanna Club. Appointed Chief Medical Officer of Health at the Ministry of Education in Rashid Ali's rebel Government, but after only one day in office he left for Turkey to undergo medical treatment. Returned to Bagdad after the war and rejoined the Iraqi Health Service as a Chief Medical Officer. Appointed Director of Amir Abdul Ilah Hospital for Chest Diseases at Tuwaitha in April 1951. Elected Deputy for Amara in January 1953. Became Minister of Health under Jamil al Madfai in January 1953. In this capacity he has brought back into authority many doctors who supported Rashid Ali. He is reported to be corrupt. He speaks some English.

71. Muhammad Hussain Hadid

Sunni, born 1906 of a merchant family of Mosul. Educated at American University, Beirut, 1924 to 1928, and London School of Economics 1928 to 1931.

Employed in the Ministry of Finance 1931 to 1937; Deputy for Mosul 1937; Minister of Supply under Nuri Pasha in 1946, he resigned from this Government in protest against Government interference in the elections.

He was a prominent member of the so-called Ahali Group in the first half of the 1930's. This group advocated a mild form of socialism. Some of its members later became communists. In the later '30s he was associated with Kamil Chaderchi's Democratic Party and was one of the founder members of the National Democratic Party in 1946. He is Vice-President of this party which suspended activity in 1948 but resumed in 1950. He resigned his seat in the Chamber in 1950 with the rest of the opposition deputies in protest against the intolerance of the Government and of Nuri Said's majority party. Visited the United Kingdom in 1951, 1952 and 1953. He was in London at the time of the 1952 disorders. Letters of his criticising the "Old Guard" at that time were published in *The Times* and the *Manchester Guardian*.

Apart from his political activities, he has large business interests and is a partner with Kamil Khedairi in a flourishing soap business which exports to India and Egypt.

Mohammed Hadid is an intelligent and sincere democrat, an effective speaker and a persuasive writer, but he has not made the intellectual effort required to transform the ideas he learned at the London School of Economics into a suitable policy

for Iraq. Until this is done he and his kind are likely to remain in sterile opposition. Although a nationalist and a critic of British influence in Iraq, he is friendly to us and has a number of British friends. He dislikes Americans. He speaks excellent English.

72. Muhammad Hussain al Kashif al Ghita

The most important Arab Shia mujtahid of Najaf. Born between 1880 and 1890 of a large family of Najaf, he was educated in the religious schools of Najaf, and is said to be very learned in Shi'ite law and theology. He has published a popular book on the origins and doctrine of the Shia.

He was Iraqi delegate to the Moslem Conference at Jerusalem in 1931, and has since visited Persia. In 1935 he played a prominent part in the Euphrates tribal insurrections against Yasin al Hashimi's Government, hoping thereby to secure for the Shia a greater share in the Government of Iraq. After the defeat of the tribes he withdrew to the silence of Najaf.

Suspected in 1939 of accepting money from the German Legation to foster anti-British feeling, he issued a fatwa against the British during Rashid Ali's rebellion in 1941, but recanted after Rashid Ali's defeat and managed to rehabilitate himself very quickly. His nephew Ahmad was, however, interned from 1941 to 1944. During the disorders in Nejed in November 1952 he showed personal courage in driving round the town appealing to the mobs to go home.

Honoured by all Iraqi Shias, Sheikh Muhammed Hussain still has some influence with the tribes of Southern Iraq. A foxy, inscrutable man and a born intriguer, he maintains relations with several Shi'ite politicians. He hates Communist Russia, but will never forgive the British for their policy in Palestine.

73. Muhammad Mahdi al Jawahiri

A Shia born at Nejad in 1901. At one time he was employed by the Ministry of Education, but was removed from service prior to Bakr Sidqi's coup d'Etat in 1936. He has long been associated with various Left-wing newspapers, but is best known as a poet for which he has a considerable reputation throughout the Arab-speaking world. He has published two volumes of his works, and is at present working on the publication of a further two volumes, for which he received a grant from the Ministry of Education of £300 early in 1952.

He is a man of pronounced Left-wing views, but although he is ideologically a Marxist he is not an activist.

He has been prominently connected with the "Peace" movement in Iraq, and in November 1950 was elected as a member of the World Peace Council at the Second World Peace Congress, held in Warsaw in November 1950. In May 1951 he left Iraq for Egypt and is known to have attended a meeting of the Peace Council at Vienna before returning to Iraq in November 1951.

Since his return he has expressed dissatisfaction with the various "Peace" activities in Iraq and has kept aloof from the leading supporters of the movement. For this reason he has been severely criticised by leading Left-wing persons, and it has been alleged that the grant he received from the Ministry of Education for publishing his poetical works was the price of his silence. He was arrested after the riots in November 1952. Since his release he appears to have abandoned his Left-wing activities. He recited a poem in praise of the monarchy during the celebrations at King Faisal II's accession.

In January 1951 he became chief editor of a new Left-wing newspaper, *Al Thabat*, until its suppression by the Government in April 1952. He then became owner and editor of another new Left-

wing daily newspaper, *Al Jihad*. This was suspended in November 1952. In 1953 he began publishing a new newspaper, *Al Jadid*.

74. Muhammad Mahdi Kubba

Born about 1900 of the well-known Bagdad Shia family of Kubba, he was educated in the religious seminary at Najaf in Grammar, Persian and theology.

After the First World War he engaged in quite a humble way in the textile trade in common with other members of his family. He never held Government office of any kind until 1948, although he was once a Deputy for Bagdad in 1937.

He was a member of the Nationalist Muthanna Club from its foundation and was helped into politics by a fellow member Dr. Jamali (q.v.). He developed pro-Axis sympathies during a visit to Germany in the late 30's but took no active part in the Rashid Ali movement.

He was made president of the Istiqlal Party on its formation in 1946, probably owing to his Shia origin, well-known name, and clean record. His voice in its councils is less effective than those of Faiq Samarrai and Siddiq Shenshal. Re-elected president of the Istiqlal Party in November 1950, he strongly supported the Persian Government in their efforts to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951.

Minister of Supply in the Sadr Cabinet of January 1948, he resigned in June over the conduct of the elections. However, he became Deputy for Bagdad in these elections, but resigned his seat in protest, in common with the rest of the opposition, in March 1950. He was re-elected in the by-elections in June. Resigned with the other Istiqlal Deputies from the Chamber of Deputies in February 1952. He took a prominent part of the agitation which led to the riots in November 1952, after which he was interned.

An untidy looking man, he has a reputation for sobriety and honesty. His enemies accuse him of folly rather than knavery. Intelligent, but not politically astute, he only speaks Arabic and Persian. He is a strong opponent of British "imperialism."

75. Muhammad Ridha Shabibi

Shia of Nejad, born 1889. Educated in the religious schools of Nejad. In 1908 he began to publish poetry in the Egyptian periodical press and acquired a reputation as a literary man. He played some part in the nationalist disturbances in Nejad during the occupation. In 1919 he was sent to the Hejaz by some Iraqi nationalists to offer the Iraqi throne to the Amir Abdullah; thence he went to Syria and did not return to Bagdad until 1921.

He was a member of the Constituent Assembly and was Deputy for Bagdad in most Iraqi Parliaments until 1935. Senator from 1935 to 1943 and President of the Senate for a few months in 1937. He returned to the Lower House in 1943 and was its President in 1943-44. He resigned from Parliament with the Opposition deputies in March 1950. Deputy for Bagdad, January 1953.

Minister for Education under Yasin al Hashimi in 1924, he resigned from this Government with Rashid Ali Gailani over the Turkish Petroleum Company concession. Again Minister for Education in 1935 under Yasin al Hashimi, under Jamil Madfai in 1937 and 1941, and under Mohammed al Sadr in 1948.

In 1951 he played a prominent part in the formation of the United Popular Front and was elected Chairman of the Front's Political Committee. He was offered the Deputy Premiership by Nasrat al Farisi during his abortive attempt to form a Cabinet in January 1953.

A genial old bigot whose views on education are strongly reactionary. He is a strong critic of British influence in Iraq, but he is personally friendly to Englishmen. He is on good terms with Nuri al Said. He speaks no English.

76. Muhammad Said Qazzaz

Kurd of Sulaimaniya, born about 1903. Largely self educated. He began his career as a clerk in the Mutasarrifiya in Sulaimaniya in 1924. Appointed Qaimmaqam of Halebja in 1934. Transferred in 1939 to Zakho and in 1941 to Kifri. From 1941 to 1944 he served in the Ministry of the Interior. In 1944 he was appointed Mutasarrif at Kut. Transferred to Erbil in 1945 and to Kirkuk in 1947, after a short spell as an Administrative Inspector. Appointed Mutassarif of Mosul in 1949. Was offered an appointment with the Basra Petroleum Company in the spring of 1952, but at Nuri Said's request agreed to remain at Mosul until the general elections.

Minister of Social Affairs under Nuruddin Mahmud, December 1952. Appointed Director-General of Iraqi Ports in February 1953 but resigned after a quarrel over the appointment of Finance Officer with Abdul Wahab Murjan (q.v.) in March. Reappointed in June 1953.

He has visited England and in the summer of 1950 he toured America as a guest of the United States Government.

Hard working, honest and fearless, Said Qazzaz is generally regarded as one of the best administrators in the country. He is a close friend of Mustafa al Umari and Majid Mustafa. He speaks good English.

77. Muhammad al Sadr (Sayid)

Shia of Kadhima, born about 1885. Educated in religious circles at Kadhima.

He was a strong nationalist in the early days of the British occupation and took an active part in the insurrection of 1920. He fled to Syria after its suppression and returned with King Faisal in June 1921.

Appointed Senator in 1925. He was president of the Senate from 1929 to 1937 and again after a short interval from 1937 to 1943. He was several times a member of the Regency Council during the Regent's absences from Iraq. Prime Minister January to June 1948. He administered the oath at King Faisal II's accession.

Muhammad al Sadr's political importance is due to his religious prestige and his nationalist past. For these reasons he is always consulted at moments of crisis but his weakness, ignorance and incapacity were amply proved by his total failure as Prime Minister to restore normal conditions after the disturbances in Baghdad which removed Saleh Jabr and secured the rejection of the Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948. He speaks no English but does his best to be friendly.

78. Muhammad Siddiq Shenshal

Sunni, born in Mosul about 1908. Studied law at Baghdad and Damascus. He subsequently studied at the Sorbonne, returning to Iraq in 1939.

After serving as a Legal Adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs he became Director of Propaganda under Rashid Ali in 1941. Although acquitted of the charges brought against him he was interned. In 1946 he took a leading part in the formation of the Istiqlal Party. Resigned with the other Istiqlal Deputies from the Chamber of Deputies in February 1952. Did not contest the 1953 elections.

Sadiq Shenshal is violently anti-British and he keeps up a flow of invective against the British connexion in Parliament and in the press. He is married to a sister of Yunis Sab'awi who was executed for the part he played in the Rashid Ali revolt.

79. Muhammad Salim al Radhi

Sunni, born Baghdad 1899. He was educated in Baghdad, the American University of Beirut and the Universities of California and Texas, from which he obtained doctorates in Agriculture and Science. Returning to Iraq in 1926 he joined the Department

of Agriculture, in which he eventually became, and remained for several years, Director-General.

Director-General of Labour in the Ministry of Social Affairs, 1946. Iraqi Minister in Tehran, 1947-49. Appointed first Iraqi Minister to India, July 1949. Ambassador there, 1953.

He is a landowner and is connected with the wealthy Shabandar family. His reputation in the Department of Agriculture was good, but as Minister in Tehran he was not popular with the Persians. Iraqi Shias accuse him of being a fanatical Sunni. He and his attractive wife both speak English well.

80. Mulla Mustafa

Kurdish chieftain of Barzan, born about 1898. Younger brother of Ahmad of Barzan (q.v.).

He was the fighting leader of the Barzanis in the troubles of 1931-32, surrendered with Sheikh Ahmad in 1933, and was banished to Sulaimaniya, where he lived for ten years in poverty on a small allowance from the Government.

In 1943 he escaped to Barzan, where he soon became involved in skirmishes with the Iraqi police. At first concerned only with his own position, he later began to pose as a champion of Kurdish nationalism and won much Kurdish sympathy and support. He resisted successfully the forces of police and troops sent against him. In January 1944, a settlement was arranged, and he visited Baghdad to make submission to the Regent. Returning to Barzan, he remained restless, but was formally pardoned in April 1945, when the Iraqi Government announced a programme for improving security and developing agriculture in the Barzan area.

Becoming impatient, he again took up arms against the Government in August 1945. Large Iraqi forces and clever bribery administered by Mustafa al Umari (q.v.) eventually defeated the Barzanis, and he and his brother Ahmed fled to Persia, where they were well received by the Russian authorities.

After the collapse of the Persian Kurdish independence movement led by Qazi Muhammad, Mulla Mustafa and his brother retired before the Persian forces and entered Iraq in May 1947. Sheikh Ahmad surrendered to the Iraqi Government but Mulla Mustafa refused unconditional surrender and managed to escape with a few hundred men through Turkey and Azerbaijan into the Soviet Union.

At first welcomed by the Russian authorities, but now, it is said, despised, the Mulla remains in the U.S.S.R. Popular fear of his eventual return keeps his name alive in Iraq.

81. Musa Shabandar

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1899, the son of a wealthy landowner. His brother Ibrahim is a prominent Bagdad merchant. Educated in Bagdad and in Switzerland, he was in Europe from 1918 to 1932, mostly in Switzerland and Germany.

Joined the Iraqi Foreign Service, 1932; Secretary of Iraqi delegation to the League of Nations, 1933; First Secretary, Berlin, 1935. In 1937 he was accused of giving certificates of export to Iraq for munitions destined for Spain. He was recalled and arrested, but proceedings against him were dropped.

Deputy for Amara 1937 to 1939.

Re-appointed to the Foreign Service 1939 and sent to Berlin as chargé d'affaires. Assistant Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, October 1939. Minister for Foreign Affairs in the unconstitutional Government of Rashid Ali in April 1941. He fled to Persia after Rashid Ali's collapse, but was caught and interned in Rhodesia and later sent back to Iraq for trial. He was sentenced in 1944 to five years' imprisonment and sequestration of property. Owing to ill-health he did not serve all his sentence.

He has been free since 1947 and in 1949 he joined Nuri Said's Constitutional Union Party and was

appointed Minister at Damascus. Appointed Ambassador in Washington in June 1953.

Musa Shabandar is not a strong personality. He is intelligent and accommodating, an official rather than a politician. He is married to a Lebanese and speaks English, French and German.

82. Mustafa al Umari

Sunni of the Umari family of Mosul. Born in 1893 and educated at the Bagdad Law School, he served as an officer in the Turkish forces in Mesopotamia in the first world war and was taken prisoner.

He entered Government service at the end of the war, served as Qaimmaqam and Mutasarrif in several districts and also held the posts of Accountant-General and Director-General of Interior.

He was Minister of Interior under Hikmat Sulaiman in 1937; under Jamil Madfai, 1937-38 and in 1941; under Hamdi Pachachi, 1944-46 and under Muzahim Pachachi in 1948. He has also been Minister of Justice under Madfai in late 1938, of Economics under Muhammed as Sadr, January-June 1948 (Acting Interior from March 1948 onwards), and without Portfolio under Muzahim at the end of 1948 and under Nuri Said from December 1950. He has been a Senator since 1937. Acting Prime Minister during Nuri Said's absences from Iraq in the first half of 1952, accompanied the Regent to Amman in June 1952. In July he became Prime Minister. He resigned when rioting broke out in November.

Of all Iraqi politicians and officials Mustafa is probably the most notorious for corruption. He is also one of the most capable administrators in the country. He may be said to exhibit the best and the worst features of the Ottoman idea of Government. His administration during 1945 and his conduct of the 1948 elections aroused severe criticism, but he served his country well during the Barzani troubles of 1945, when his well-directed bribery was of great assistance to the Iraqi forces operating against Mulla Mustafa. His term as Prime Minister was almost disastrous, however. His unimaginative handling of the Opposition parties' demand for direct elections was one of the causes of the riots in November 1952, and his resignation at the height of the disorders was almost criminally irresponsible. He speaks only a little English.

83. Muzahim Amin al Pachachi

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1888. Educated at the Law School in Bagdad and graduated in 1912. Before the 1914 war he was a strong Arab nationalist. He wrote for Arab nationalist papers and had to flee to Basra in 1913 to escape arrest. After the war he was employed as a magistrate by the occupation authorities in Basra and returned to Bagdad in 1922.

He joined Government service in March 1923 and became Minister of Communications and Works under Yasin al Hashimi in 1924. In 1927 he was sent to London as Iraqi Diplomatic Agent, returning in 1928. Minister of Economics and Communications under Nuri Pasha, January 1931, and almost immediately after Minister of Interior in the same Government. He resigned in October 1931 because of differences with his colleagues over his dismissal of the Amin al Asima, Mahmud Subhi Daftari. In May 1932 he was charged with complicity in the circulation of scurrilous letters about the King. He was tried and acquitted in October 1932.

Iraqi Minister at Rome and Permanent Iraqi delegate at Geneva, 1934; Minister at Paris, 1939; he remained there as Minister to the Vichy Government and did not return when Iraq broke off relations in November 1941 but went instead to Rome. In 1944 he went to Geneva and sought facilities to return to Iraq, which were refused. He eventually returned in November 1945.

Prime Minister, June 1948 to January 1949; deputy

Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs under Ali Jawdat, December 1949 to February 1950. He was appointed Senator in 1948 but the appointment was held to be constitutionally invalid by a High Court in 1950. He left Iraq for Egypt and Saudi Arabia just before the issue of this decision. He returned to Iraq in November 1950 and took a leading part in the formation of the United Popular Front in May 1951. Resigned from the Front in May 1952.

Muzahim's character presents some contradiction. He is a strong nationalist and resents "imperialism" deeply, but he has been much influenced by the Social Democratic ideas which he has encountered during his prolonged residence in Western Europe. He is often reasonable, but can be stupidly obstinate. Politically courageous at times, at others he gives up without a struggle. His ideas on general policy are sensible, but as a political tactician he is inept. He hates Nuri Pasha and strongly resents his influence with the Crown Prince. This has led him to criticise the latter indiscreetly on occasion. He is very deaf. He speaks English.

He has kept much in the background during the past year and is still not reconciled with the Crown Prince.

84. Nadhif Shawi

Sunni, originally of the Ubaid tribe. Born Bagdad 1887. Educated at the Military College, Istanbul, and gazetted an officer in the Turkish army in 1909. He served in Syria in the Turkish Coastal Defence forces throughout the first world war. Afterwards he joined King Faisal's army in Syria and fought against the French at Maisaloun in 1920.

After the expulsion of Faisal from Syria he returned to Bagdad and for some years was a secondary school teacher. During this period he graduated from the Bagdad Law School.

He joined the Iraqi army in 1927. In 1935 he attended army manoeuvres in England, and on his return was given command of the Iraqi Staff College. Brigadier and Assistant C.G.S., 1937; retired, 1939.

Minister of Defence under Jamil Madfai, June to October 1941. Deputy for Dulaim, 1943 to 1947. Founder member of Saleh Jabr's Popular Socialist Party, June 1951. He was described as a pleasant but colourless Minister.

85. Nadim Shakir al Pachachi

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1914. Nephew of the late Hamdi Pachachi and of Muzahim Pachachi (q.v.). Educated at Victoria College, Alexandria and London University.

Returned to Bagdad in 1938 and was appointed to the Ministry of Economics in which he rose to be Director-General by 1944.

He was a member of the Iraqi Delegation to the United Nations in 1946 and visited London and America in 1948 to try to obtain support for the proposed Iraqi Oil Refinery at Baiji. Early in 1950 he quarrelled with his Minister, Dhia Jaafar, and tendered his resignation. His resignation was not accepted and he was appointed Director-General of Oil Affairs in June 1950. In this capacity he was a member of the Iraqi Delegation to the negotiations with the Iraq Petroleum Company in the summer and autumn of 1950. In March 1951 he again became Director-General of Economics. He again visited the United Kingdom in connexion with tenders for the oil refinery and the Iraq Government's gold case against the Iraq Petroleum Company. Played a leading part in the negotiations of 1951.

In July 1952 he became Minister of Economics under Mustafa al Umari. Joined Nuruddin Mahmud's Cabinet in the same capacity in December 1952. Minister of State under Jamil Madfai in May 1953. Elected Deputy for Bagdad in January 1953.

Nadim has not a very strong personality but he is an exceptionally intelligent and competent official whose rapid rise was not entirely due to the influence of his family. He is friendly and co-operative. In addition to his official position he is a landowner and farmer on a large scale. He divorced his first wife (a Pachachi) in 1947 in order to marry a cabaret artiste. He divorced his second wife in 1950 and married an American girl in 1952. He speaks excellent English.

86. Dr. Naji al Asil

Bagdad Sunni, born about 1895. A graduate of the Constantinople Medical School in Ottoman times, he first became prominent in 1922 as semi-official Hashimite representative in London. After Ibn Saud's conquest of the Hejaz he became destitute and was deported to Iraq in 1925.

Employed in the Iraqi Military Medical Service from 1926, he was appointed Iraqi Consul-General and chargé d'affaires in Jidda in 1931 and transferred to Mohammerah in 1932. Acting Director-General of Foreign Affairs 1933-34; Counsellor in Tehran 1935; Master of Ceremonies at the Palace 1936.

Minister for Foreign Affairs under Hikmat Sulaiman 1936-37, he went into retirement after that Cabinet's resignation until 1944, when he was appointed Director-General of Antiquities. Appointed permanent Iraqi delegate to the United Nations Organisation by the Sadr Cabinet in February 1948, he was recalled in June 1948 and returned to the Antiquities Department. Appointed an Active Member of the Iraq Academy in November 1949. He organised the Avicenna Festival in Iraq in March 1952.

A polished and intelligent but ponderous man, he is a close friend of Hikmet Suleiman (q.v.) but is not now on close terms with the active politicians. He began well in the Antiquities Department but later his work was affected by his personal financial difficulties. He speaks English well.

87. Naji Shaukat

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1891, brother of Sami Shaukat (q.v.). Educated Istanbul and became a reserve officer in the Turkish Army. Joined the Arab revolt at Aqaba in 1916.

He returned to Bagdad in 1919 and from 1921 to 1928 was Mutasarrif of various southern liwas, ending with Bagdad 1924-28.

He first became a Deputy in 1929; Minister of Interior under Abdul Muhsin Saadun in 1928 and again in 1929; Iraqi Minister at Ankara 1930-31; Minister of Interior under Nuri Said 1931; Prime Minister 1932; Minister of Interior under Jamil Madfai 1933; again Iraqi Minister at Ankara 1934. In this capacity he accompanied Tawfiq Rustu Aras, the then Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, on an official visit to Iraq in 1937. He was then offered a portfolio in the Government of Hikmat Sulaiman, but declined because of his objection to Bekr Sidqi's influence. Minister of Interior under Nuri Said 1938, but resigned in April 1939. Minister of Justice under Rashid Ali March 1940.

After the collapse of France he became a strong advocate of reinsurance with the Axis and, with Rashid Ali's approval, he went to Istanbul in September 1940 to establish contact with the German Ambassador, Herr von Papen. He resigned from the Government in January 1941, but became Minister of Defence in the unconstitutional cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. During the Rashid Ali rebellion in May he went to Turkey to try to enlist Turkish support for Rashid Ali's cause, and remained in Turkey after the collapse of the rebellion. He was tried *in absentia* by court martial and sentenced to between Berlin and Rome, receiving a Minister's fifteen years imprisonment. He spent the war years between Berlin and Rome, receiving a Minister's

salary from the Reich Government. In the summer of 1945 he was arrested in Italy, sent back to Iraq and imprisoned.

He was pardoned by the Regent in May 1948, but rarely appears in public. He attended the memorial service for King George VI at the Anglican Church in Bagdad.

88. Najib al Rawi

Sunni of Bagdad, born about 1898; brother of Ahmed al Rawi (q.v.). Educated at the Bagdad Law School, he worked for a short time as a clerk in the Revenue Department under the British Administration. He has a large practice as a lawyer and was President of the Lawyers' Association in 1942 and again in 1947.

He entered politics as a protégé of Nuri Said in 1930 and was Deputy for Dulaim in the Parliaments of 1930, 1934, 1937, 1943, 1947 and 1948. He resigned his seat with the Opposition Deputies in March 1950.

Minister of Education under Tawfiq Suweidi 1946; Minister of Justice under Mohammed al Sadr in 1948; Minister of Education in the succeeding Governments of Muzahim al Pachachi, Nuri Said and Ali Jaudat, June 1948 to February 1950. He represented Iraq at the Paris Session of U.N.O. in September 1948. Appointed Iraqi Minister in Cairo in August 1950, and Ambassador in November 1952.

Politically he is a trimmer and has a foot in several camps, though he is generally regarded as primarily a Palace man. He is friendly to the British connexion but is not altogether trustworthy. He is married to one of the Daghestani sisters and speaks a little English.

Nuri Said is said to distrust his reports from Cairo.

89. Nasrat al Farisi

Sunni of Bagdad, born about 1890. Educated Bagdad Law School.

He was conscripted for the Turkish Army before he had graduated, and served as a warrant officer during the 1914-18 war in which he saw service against the Russians at Hamadan and against the British at Kut.

After the war he completed his legal studies in Istanbul and returned to Bagdad about 1922.

He served for several years in the twenties as legal draughtsman in the Ministry of Justice.

First Deputy for Bagdad in 1926 and again in 1932, and in most of the Iraqi Parliaments since then. He resigned his seat with the Opposition Deputies in March 1950.

Director-General of Foreign Affairs 1935. Iraqi delegate at Geneva 1937 to 1938. He was appointed Iraqi Minister at Ankara in April 1943 but did not proceed. In 1945 he was a member of the Iraqi delegation at San Francisco.

Minister of Finance under Naji Shaukat 1932 and again under Jamil Madfai 1933. Minister of Economics under Jamil Madfai, June to October 1941. Minister for Foreign Affairs under Nuri Said June to October 1943. In the Cabinet of Muhammad Sadr of 1948 he was first Minister without Portfolio, then Minister of Interior and finally Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was closely associated with the formation of the United Popular Front in May 1951. Resigned from the Front in May 1952. Appointed a Senator in April 1953.

After the elections in January 1953 he was asked to form a Cabinet. He first invited former members of the Istiqlal and National Democratic Parties to join but, when they refused, tried to form a coalition consisting of former members of the United Popular Front and the Constitutional Union Party and a few Independents. At the last moment Nuri's supporters withdrew and he abandoned his attempts to form a Government.

Nasrat is more of a Turk than an Arab, although he was known as an Arab nationalist in the twenties when he was a member of the Sha'ab party of Yasin al Hashimi. He is honest, intelligent and cautious. His approach to political questions is legalistic and theoretical. His friend Hikmat Sulaiman calls him "Confucius." When considering any course of action he sees the difficulties more clearly than the advantages and is inclined to be obstructive. This characteristic made him one of Iraq's worst Ministers of Interior. He is a sincere reformer who believes in parliamentary democracy and resents the abuses of it which are normal in Iraq. He resigned from Nuri's Cabinet in 1943 as a protest against the Regent's interference in the elections. The nationalist views of his younger days have been modified by experience, but he is still a firm opponent of what he regards as undue British influence exercised through Nuri and the Palace. His wife is prominent in Ladies' Red Crescent activities, and both speak good English. He is personally friendly to the British.

He and his wife speak English.

90. Nuri al Qadhi

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1893. Graduated from Bagdad Law School in Turkish times, and in 1914 was a judge in Basra. During the first world war he served as a reserve officer with the Turkish forces.

He joined Iraqi Government service in 1921 after serving as judge in the Muntafik under the Civil Administration. Vice-President of the Civil Courts in several provinces, including Bagdad, 1925, and Mosul, 1937. Director-General of Waqfs, 1931, Head of Legal Drafting Department, Ministry of Justice, 1936. Director-General Ministry of Justice, March 1940, Secretary-General to the Council of Ministers, December 1941 and Head of the Diwan of the Council of Ministers in May 1950.

He accompanied Nuri Said to Ankara for the negotiation of the Iraqi-Turkish Treaty of 1946. Minister of Education, 1946, under Arshad al Umari, he afterwards returned to his post with the Council of Ministers. Appointed a member of the Development Board in June 1952. Resigned in November 1952.

91. Nuri Sa'id

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1888, son of an accountant of Mosul descent. Educated at Military College, Istanbul and served in the Balkan war.

He was one of the founders of the Arab Nationalist Society, Al Ahd, in 1913 and joined the Arab army in the Hejaz in 1916. He served in this army as C.G.S. under his brother-in-law, Jafar al Askari. At that time he was described as a good strategist, clever and hard working, but rash and hot-headed under fire. He won the D.S.O. in 1917 and was appointed an honorary C.M.G. in 1919.

After the 1914 war he remained with Faisal in Syria and accompanied him to London and Paris in 1919 and 1920. He was opposed to Faisal's break with the French.

He returned to Bagdad in February 1921 and soon after became C.G.S. and Director-General of Police, retaining these appointments until 1922.

He has been eleven times Minister of Defence, in 1922 (Acting), 1923, 1925, 1926, 1928, 1929 (twice), 1933, 1941 (Acting) and 1953 (twice) in Cabinets headed by Jafar al Askari, Abdul Muhsin Sa'adun, Rashid Ali Gailani himself and Jamil Madfai. Nine times Minister for Foreign Affairs, in 1930, 1933 (twice), 1934, 1938 (Acting), 1940 (Acting), 1942 (Acting), in Cabinets headed by Rashid Ali Gailani, Jamil Madfai, Ali Jaudat and himself. He has also been Prime Minister in 1930, 1931, 1938, 1939, 1941-43, 1946, 1949, 1950 and 1951.

His achievements in diplomacy are also impressive. He negotiated and signed the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930; he negotiated the Bon Voisinage Agreement

with Nejd and the Hejaz, 1931. He signed the Extradition Treaty and a Treaty of Commerce with Turkey in 1932 and negotiated and signed the Economic and Commercial Treaty with Turkey in 1946. He represented Iraq at the London conversations in January 1939, which eventually resulted in the issue of the 1939 White Paper on Palestine, and he led the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations General Assembly which decided the partition of Palestine in 1947. He was a member of the Iraqi delegation which signed the unratified Portsmouth Treaty with the United Kingdom in 1948.

After the Bekr Sidqi military coup of October 1936, during which Jafar al Askari was murdered, Nuri retired with his family to Egypt. He returned a year later after Bekr Sidqi had been murdered and Hikmat Sulaiman's Government had fallen, but left again soon after and spent most of 1938 in Syria, Egypt and London, where he held a number of inconclusive conversations with politicians on the Palestine problem. In December 1938 he returned to Iraq and became Prime Minister as a result of a military demonstration organised on his behalf by Taha al Hashimi and Hussain Fawzi, against the Government of Jamil Madfai. In January 1941 he resigned from Rashid Ali's Government, in which he was Minister for Foreign Affairs, because of Rashid Ali's increasing inclination towards the Axis Powers. In April 1941, shortly before the army overthrew Taha al Hashimi and set up the unconstitutional Government of Rashid Ali, Nuri withdrew to Transjordan, where he remained until he was able to return with the Regent in June. He became Prime Minister in the autumn of the same year and remained in power until June 1944. During this period he collaborated closely with His Majesty's Ambassador in eradicating pro-Nazi propaganda in Iraq and it was due to his initiative that Iraq declared war on the Axis Powers in January 1943.

He accompanied the Regent on his travels to America and Europe during the summer of 1945, and to England in 1946. On his way home on the second occasion he had talks in Syria and Turkey in the hope of removing the difficulties between these countries.

He formed a Cabinet in November 1946 to carry out elections, and included in it some younger men and representatives of the newly formed National Democratic and Liberal Parties. Nuri's ideas about free elections did not agree with theirs, and they resigned after about a month protesting that Nuri and Saleh Jabr were preparing to exert undue Government influence on the elections.

Nuri collaborated with Saleh Jabr in the negotiation of the Portsmouth Treaty during 1947 and shared with him the nationalist resentment which was fermented against it in January 1948. Within a year, however, he demonstrated his mastery of the Iraqi political scene by returning to power as Prime Minister in January 1949. He succeeded in improving public security and in withdrawing the army from Palestine without incident. He took a very firm line with the organising committees of the Communist Party, five members of which were hanged. But he failed to do much to improve the financial position of the Government in spite of a personal visit to London. He was much disappointed by his failure to obtain an advance of royalties from the Iraq Petroleum Company. During the troubled period which followed Colonel Zaim's *coup d'Etat* in Syria in the spring of 1949, Nuri worked hard, but unsuccessfully, for Iraqi-Syrian union. He resigned in December 1949.

In the summer of 1950 he went to London where he negotiated a temporary increase in oil royalties with the Iraq Petroleum Company. In 1951 he visited Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan. Accompanied the Regent when the latter visited Kuwait and Bahrain in the spring of 1952 and Spain in May. He

attended the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth in June 1953.

Nuri dominates Iraqi politics. Death or exile have removed the few politicians of his generation such as Yasin al Hashimi and Rashid Ali Gailani who could hope to rival him, and of the younger men only Saleh Jabr offers any serious challenge to his supremacy. While it is true that an agreement between Nuri and Saleh Jabr would be in the best interests of Iraq, there are no signs of a rapprochement between the two and their political rivalry continues unabated. Nuri showed again in February 1952 how completely he still dominates the political scene by his masterly handling of the oil agreements in Parliament. Nuri's intelligence, vigour and courage have not yet begun to fail and he can still deal as unscrupulously and ruthlessly with his enemies as in the past. Nevertheless, his outstanding skill in political intrigue and his fearless advocacy of the British connexion have made him widely distrusted both inside and outside Iraq.

His talents are in negotiation and political manoeuvre and his interest in Arab and world politics. His dream is of an Arab Kingdom unified under a Hashimite monarch. This kingdom would exclude Egypt and Arabia and would be closely allied with Great Britain.

He is uninterested in the details of domestic administration and his long periods of power have contributed little to Iraqi social or economic progress. Not personally corrupt, he condones corruption in others (his son Subah is notorious in this respect) and his nephews and marriage connexions can usually count on obtaining Government employment.

He enjoys his food and drink, has a keen sense of humour and is excellent company. He speaks English, German, French and Turkish.

92. Nuruddin Mahmud

Kurd, born in Mosul in 1899. Educated in Ottoman military schools, he was commissioned in the Turkish army in 1917 and in the Iraqi army in 1921.

A graduate of Camberley and Quetta, he was Iraqi Military Attaché in London in 1935 and became Lieutenant-Colonel in 1937. Promoted Colonel in 1939, he was appointed Ministry of Defence member of the Iraqi State Railways Board, and in 1940 he became Director of Military Operations.

In 1941 he opposed Rashid Ali's rebellion and after its collapse he took over command and initiated the Anglo-Iraqi armistice. Commander 2nd Division (Kirkuk), 1941-43; Assistant C.G.S., 1943; promoted Major-General and appointed Commander 1st Division (Diwaniya), 1944. In 1943 he visited the Western Desert battlefields, and in 1946 he attended the victory celebrations in London. In 1948 he was promoted Lieutenant-General and commanded the Iraqi forces in Palestine, where he was involved in the inter-Arab jealousies which prevented the establishment of an effective Arab High Command. In 1949 he returned to command the 1st Division. Appointed C.G.S. in July 1951. In November 1952 the Regent called on him to form a Government at the height of the riots. He quickly restored order and made a sincere attempt to improve the conditions of the lower classes. He held the portfolios of Defence and Interior in his own Cabinet. He resigned after conducting the elections in January 1953 and, to the disappointment of many officers, was prevented by the Regent from returning to the army. Promoted general in November 1952 and appointed to the Senate in January 1953.

He was probably the best Iraqi general officer and the army misses him. Many Iraqis sympathise with him for the ungrateful treatment he received after saving the country. He speaks English and Turkish well and his sympathies are steadily pro-British.

93. Rafail Petros Butti

Christian of Mosul, born 1901. Educated at the Assyrian Orthodox School, Mosul, and at Secondary School, Baghdad. He later attended night classes and graduated from the Baghdad Law School, 1929.

Served in minor posts in the Ministry of Interior from 1925 to 1929. Contributed to the newspaper *Al Iraq* while still an official and after his resignation published *Al Bilad* in partnership with Jebran Malcon. As a journalist he was consistently anti-British, but in Iraqi politics he frequently changed sides. He supported Nuri Said from 1921 to 1929, with occasional lapses. He supported Yasin al Hashimi from 1930 to 1935, Bekr Sidqi 1936 to 1937, and Rashid Ali 1938 to 1942. He was interned in 1942 but released in 1943 and resumed publication of *Al Bilad*. He went to Egypt in 1944 and remained there until 1948.

He was Deputy for Mosul in 1935, for Basra in 1939 and for Baghdad in 1948, in which year he attended the inter-Parliamentary Conference at Rome. He joined the Istiqlal Party in 1948 and was considered as one of its leaders. He resigned from the Majlis with the other Opposition Deputies in March 1950 and from the Istiqlal Party in May, because of its decision to contest the by-elections occasioned by the resignations. Appointed Press Counsellor at the Iraqi Legation in Cairo in February 1951. Returned to Iraq in 1952. Elected Deputy for Baghdad in January 1953.

Butti is a capable and fearless journalist but he is unscrupulous, venal and quite unreliable.

94. Rashid Ali al Gailani

Bagdad Sunni, born 1892. A distant relation of the Naqib. A Waqf clerk in Ottoman times, he fled to Mosul with the Turks after the capture of Bagdad and practised as a lawyer after the fall of Mosul.

Appointed judge, 1921, he soon showed his ability. Minister of Justice under Yasin al Hashimi, 1924-25, he resigned over the signing of the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession. President of the Chamber of Deputies, 1925-26. Minister of Interior under Jafar al Askari, 1926-28.

Again elected Deputy in 1930, he resigned (with others) in 1931 in protest against the conduct of Nuri Said's Government, and became a prominent member of the nationalist Hizb al Ikha al Watani. Chief Private Secretary to the King 1932-33.

Prime Minister from March to October 1933 he was appointed Senator in 1934. He helped to organise the Euphrates disturbances which forced Ali Jaudat to resign in spring 1935, and became Minister of Interior in the Cabinet then formed by Yasin al Hashimi.

In 1936 he fled to Istanbul after Bekr Sidqi's *coup d'Etat*. Returning to Iraq in 1937, he opposed Jamil Madfai's Government and was deported to Anah for a short time in 1938.

Prime Minister from March 1940 to January 1941, he moved steadily towards a closer understanding with the Axis. He kept close contact with the Italian Legation in Bagdad, supported the intrigues of the Mufti of Jerusalem, sponsored the overtures made by Naji Shaukat (q.v.) to the German Minister in Turkey, and encouraged the pro-Nazi press. Forced to resign by British pressure in January 1941, he returned to office through a *coup d'Etat* in April, installed Sharif Sharaf in place of the Regent and, backed by the Iraqi Army, refused to allow more than one brigade of British troops in Iraq.

In May 1941, when hostilities broke out between the Iraqi Army and the British forces in Habbaniya, he tried to unite the country against Britain but failed to get substantial tribal support. After the defeat of the Iraqi forces he fled to Persia, Turkey, and finally to Germany.

He was tried *in absentia* by court martial and sentenced to death in 1942. Recognised by the Axis as legitimate Prime Minister of Iraq, he conducted an anti-British campaign by radio throughout the war.

In 1945 he escaped through the German lines to Prague and thence, with a false passport and the unwitting assistance of Allied military transport, to Marseilles, from where he sailed to Beirut. He arrived at Riyadh in September 1945, declared himself to Ibn Saud and was granted asylum.

He is still in Riyadh, an extra thorn in Saudi-Hashimite relations. His health is now said to be declining rapidly. Ibn Saud is said to be tired of him, but schemes to move him elsewhere have not so far been satisfactory, and seasonal rumours that the Regent had pardoned him have proved untrue. These rumours gained in strength after the accession of King Faisal II and, since many of his former associates have returned to positions of authority, it is possible that he will soon be allowed to return to Iraq. He still has admirers in Iraq, particularly in the Istiqlal Party.

95. Rauf al Bahrani

Bagdad Shia, born 1897. Educated at the Bagdad Law School, he was appointed to a clerical post in the Ministry of Finance in 1922 and rose—it is said not entirely by merit—to be Director-General of Customs and Excise in 1935.

Minister of Finance under Yasin al Hashimi 1935-36. Again Director General of Customs and Excise 1938-40. Minister of Finance under Nuri Said 1940; of Social Affairs under Rashid Ali 1940-41; and again of Social Affairs in Rashid Ali's rebel Government in April-May 1941.

After Rashid Ali's overthrow he fled to Persia, where he was arrested by British forces in autumn 1941 and sent for internment to Southern Rhodesia. Sent back to Iraq for trial in 1944, he was condemned to three years' hard labour and sequestration of his property.

After his release he engaged in business and gradually reinstated himself until in May 1950 he was appointed Director-General of Income Tax. In July 1952 he was appointed a member of the Government Oil Board.

Although he talks the conventional Arab nationalist language, he was a tool rather than an associate of Rashid Ali. Early in 1950 he made himself known to a member of this Embassy and since then has regained his position in Bagdad society.

He speaks no English.

96. Rauf al Chadirchi

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1884. Educated at Istanbul and at Berlin and Geneva Universities. Before the war he was successively a clerk in the legal drafting department of the Turkish Ministry of Justice, a professor of law at the Turkish Law College, Qaimmaqam of Diyala, and adviser on foreign affairs to the Turkish Governor of Bagdad. Immediately before its fall he was the Mayor of Bagdad. He went to Berlin shortly before the occupation, and later to Switzerland. He was not permitted to return to Bagdad until 1920.

In Bagdad he practised as a lawyer and took no part in Nationalist agitation, but was asked to go with his father when the latter was deported to Istanbul in August 1920. He returned in 1921 and took up his law practice, obtaining much of the business of foreign firms owing to his knowledge of languages. Professor at the Bagdad Law School 1922, Dean 1923.

Deputy for Hilla 1924, he opposed the 1922 Treaty. Minister of Finance under Abdul Muhsin al Sa'adun, Minister of Justice under Jafar al Askari 1926. Iraqi Minister to Ankara 1929. He resigned in 1930 and returned to Bagdad as legal adviser to the Iraqi Petroleum Company.

Iraqi Minister in London from 1936 to 1939 when he resigned. He generally spends the summer months in England.

Rauf has a charming and kindly personality and looks on the intrigues and enthusiasms of Iraqi politics with an indulgent contempt. He is universally popular and consequently well informed, but will not often talk about politics. He speaks English, French, German and Turkish. Is badly crippled with arthritis. In April 1952 he surprised Bagdad society by marrying Majda, the stepdaughter of Daud al Haidari (q.v.).

97. Rayih al Atiyah, Hajj

Shia. Sheikh of the Bani Hassan tribe of Diwaniya. Born about 1890. Deputy for Diwaniya five times between 1933 and 1939. At that time he was a fervent nationalist. A Senator from 1944 to June 1952. In November 1952 he became Minister of Agriculture in Nuruddin Mahmud's Cabinet. Re-appointed to the Senate in April 1953. He is not of much political importance. He speaks Arabic only.

98. Sa'ad Umar

Born in Kerbala in 1917. Shia. Son of Umar Haj Alwan, one of the Kerbala representatives on the Constituent Assembly. Educated at Kerbala and Bagdad. Graduated in the Law College about 1941. Thereafter he practised as a lawyer in Kerbala until 1947, when he became Deputy for Kerbala. He was not re-elected in 1948, but was put in in a bye-election later in the year. Minister for Social Affairs in Ali Jaudat's Government of December 1949, and of Education in Tawfik al Suweidi's Cabinet in February 1950. A member of Nuri Pasha's Constitutional Union Party November 1949.

In the Chamber of Deputies after he had failed to substantiate allegations of corruption which he had made against four Cabinet Ministers, he was suspended for the remainder of the parliamentary session.

A protégé of Saleh Jabr, who was a friend of his father. He owns a little property in Kerbala. He is full of large ideas but very inexperienced and unintelligent.

99. Sadiq al Bassam

Bagdad Shia, born about 1895. Educated at the Bagdad Law School, he practised as a lawyer for several years.

Elected Deputy for Kut in 1930, he supported Yasin al Hashimi and was a member of the Ikha al Watani Party. Minister of Education under Yasin al Hashimi 1935-36. Minister of Economics under Nuri Said 1939-40 and of Education under Rashid Ali in 1941.

Remaining inactive during the 1941 disturbances, he was Minister of Justice 1941-42 and of Communications and Works December 1943 to June 1944 under Nuri Said; of Finance under Muhammed as Sadr, January to June 1948; and of Defence under Muzahim Pachachi from June to October 1948. A Senator from 1941, his appointment was not renewed in 1949. A founder member of the United Popular Front, May 1951. He left the Front in June 1952 and was elected Deputy for Bagdad in January 1953. He owns and edits the influential newspaper *Al Difaa*.

Sadiq is a xenophobe with violent prejudices and ill-concealed fanaticism. As Minister of Defence in 1948 he was mainly responsible for the fierce sentences passed on Jews by the courts martial and for encouraging anti-Jewish feeling. He does not like the British, and his policy is often indistinguishable from that of the Istiqlal Party. He speaks Arabic only. His private life is disreputable.

100. Saleh Haidar

Shia of Bagdad born in 1914. After completing his secondary school education in Bagdad, he went for a year to the American University of Beirut and from 1933-36 to the London School of Economics where he took a degree in economics. Assistant Collector of Customs, 1936-37. In 1937 he returned for a year to the London School of Economics for further study. On his return to Iraq he studied land problems and went back again to his London School of Economics from 1939-42. Ph.D. of London University, 1942. In 1943-46 he held various appointments in the Ministry of Supply, and in 1946-48 in the Ministry of Finance.

Member of the Iraqi Delegation to the San Francisco Conference 1945. Acting Director-General of State Domains, 1948. In the same year he was seconded from the Ministry of Finance and made Deputy Governor of the National Bank of Iraq. In 1950 he went to Washington and London in connexion with the negotiations for the International Bank loan to Iraq and the Scarce Currency Agreements. His appointment as Deputy Governor of the National Bank was suddenly though not unexpectedly terminated in June 1952.

A supporter of Saleh Jabr, he is intelligent, but conceited, and he does not get on well with his colleagues. He also has the reputation of being untrustworthy. He was on very bad terms with the Governor of the National Bank, Abdul Ilah Hafiz (q.v.), who refused to deal with him or give him any work to do. He appears to suspect that British influence was to blame for this treatment, but he is on friendly terms with members of the embassy staff. He speaks excellent English. His wife is the sister of the wife of Abdul Karim al Uzri (q.v.).

101. Saleh Jabr, K.B.E.

Shia, born about 1897 in Nasiriya. His father was a carpenter, originally from the Beni Zaid tribe of Shatta. Educated in Nasiriya, he became a clerk in the Najaf court in 1919.

By 1924 he had risen to be head clerk in the Ministry of Justice. He entered the Bagdad Law College the same year, and after graduation in 1927-28 he was appointed as a judge and served for over two years in the Middle Euphrates.

Elected Deputy for the Muntafik in 1930 and 1934, he was Minister of Education under Jamil Madfai November 1933 to February 1934. Mutasarrif Kerbala 1935-36. Appointed Minister of Justice under Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1936, he resigned in June 1937 over the Euphrates disturbances and left the country. He returned after Hikmat's resignation and was appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise.

Minister of Education December 1938 to February 1940 and then of Social Affairs until March 1940 under Nuri Said. Mutasarrif of Basra from June 1940, he supported the Regent when his Royal Highness fled to Basra in April 1941 to escape from Rashid Ali. Arrested by Rashid Ali, he narrowly escaped a heavy sentence and was released on condition he left the country. He withdrew to Tehran and returned after Rashid Ali's fall.

Minister of Interior October 1941 to October 1942, of Finance until June 1943, and again of Interior until October 1943 under Nuri Said. Minister of Finance June 1944 to February 1946 and Acting Minister of Supply August to December 1944 under Hamdi Pachachi. During Pachachi's absences he acted as Prime Minister and was expected to form a Government when the Pachachi Cabinet resigned. He was not, however, chosen, and spent much of the summer of 1946 in England.

He was appointed honorary K.B.E. for war services in 1946.

After a short time as Minister of Finance under Nuri Said in November 1946 he became the first

Shia Prime Minister of Iraq after the elections of March 1947. Forced to resign in January 1948 by popular demonstrations against the Portsmouth Treaty, he spent much of 1948 abroad, but gradually recovered his position during 1949 and became Minister of Interior under Tawfiq Suweidi in February 1950. He was not invited to join Nuri Said's cabinet in September 1950 and he spent the winter months abroad. His relations with Nuri improved in the spring of 1951 but efforts to bring him into the cabinet did not succeed. In June he was granted permission to form the Popular Socialist Party. Saleh now seems determined to wrest the political leadership in Iraq from Nuri and the rift between the two has widened since 1951. This rivalry has been intensified by the supporters of both sides. Unfortunately Saleh is much under the influence of Saiyid Abdul Mahdi (q.v.) and as a result his party has become more and more identified with extremist Shia sectarianism. For purely political reasons he and his party opposed the oil agreements in Parliament in February 1952. For similar reasons they joined in the demand for direct elections which led to the riots in November 1952. Several party members were arrested after the disorders. Saleh called on his followers to boycott the elections of January 1953 on the grounds that they were being rigged. All except six of his followers withdrew.

Saleh's merit has justified his rise from obscurity to be the first Shia Prime Minister and most powerful Shia politician in Iraq. He has a strong personality and is capable, energetic and courageous. His influence in the Euphrates area is greater than any other man's and many of the better young officials are his admirers. On the other hand, as he showed when Prime Minister, he is dictatorial, secretive, pompous and vindictive; and thus he makes many bitter enemies.

As an administrator Saleh Jabr left a good name, though he was too aloof to make many personal friends. As Prime Minister he concerned himself too much with long-range economic planning and foreign policy, neglecting his colleagues and his enemies and the necessary short-term economic measures. This neglect was the ultimate cause of his fall.

His sympathies are with Britain, but he is a hard bargainer for the interests of his country. His great disappointment in foreign affairs was his failure in 1947 to persuade the Arab League to impose oil sanctions on the Americans as a reprisal for their pro-Zionist policy. He is an ardent advocate of Arab Unity and in particular of the Fertile Crescent Plan.

His first wife died in 1936 and in 1942 he married the strong-minded and meddlesome daughter of the late Addai al Jervan, chief of the influential Albu Sultan tribe of Hilla. During the war her interference lost him much support when the Albu Sultan were divided, but in recent years he has regained, and profited by, the full support of the Hilla district.

He speaks English.

102. Saleh Saib al Jubburi

Sunni of the Jubur tribe of Mosul, born in 1898. Commissioned in the Turkish army in 1916 and in the Iraqi army in 1921, he was appointed instructor in the newly formed Small Arms School in Bagdad. During this appointment he attended a small arms course at Hythe, and later attended courses at the Iraqi Staff College and the Staff College, Camberley. A personal friend of Bekr Sidqi and a supporter of the 1936 *coup d'Etat*, he was retired after the assassination of Bekr Sidqi and appointed Assistant Director-General of the Iraqi State Railways. In 1941, after Rashid Ali's flight, he was invited to rejoin the army and was appointed G.O.C. 3rd Division. In 1944 he succeeded Ismail Namiq (q.v.) as Chief of the General Staff. He still holds this

appointment. He was promoted lieutenant-general in 1945 and general in 1950. On handing over the office of the Chief of the General Staff in 1951 to General Nuruddin Mahmud (q.v.), he became a Senator. He was offered the Ministry of Defence by Nasrat al-Farisi during his abortive attempt to form a Cabinet in January 1953.

He neither drinks, smokes nor gambles, and is said to be just and honest; but he had neither the ability nor the personality to be a good C.G.S. and his impotence as a leader was displayed in the 1948 Palestine campaign. He speaks English.

103. Sami Fattah

A native of Mosul of Kurdish origin, born in 1905. Educated at the Teachers' Training College in Bagdad, he taught in Iraqi schools from 1922 to 1925.

In 1925 he joined the Iraqi Army and was sent to Sandhurst in 1926. Commissioned in the Iraqi Army in 1928, he was attached to the newly formed Royal Iraqi Air Force and returned to England for training with the R.A.F. When he came back to Iraq he was appointed to the Royal Iraqi Air Force, in which he has served ever since.

He graduated from the Iraqi Staff College in 1937 and in 1941, after the Rashid Ali rebellion, he was appointed Commander of the R.I.A.F. He has held this appointment ever since (with the rank of Brigadier until 1952 when he was made a Major-General), except for a short interlude in 1948 when he was sent to Europe on a secret arms purchasing mission which was a complete failure.

He is an energetic and jovial man, a good disciplinarian, and one of the Iraqi army's best leaders. He has made every effort to improve the training and equipment of the R.I.A.F. He speaks English well and his sympathies are pro-British.

104. Sami Shawkat

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1893. Brother of Naji Shawkat (q.v.). Graduated from Military College of Medicine, Istanbul, 1916. Joined the Arab army in Syria in 1919.

Appointed to Iraqi Health Service 1921; Director-General of Education 1937; Director-General of Public Health 1936; again Director-General of Education 1939.

Minister of Social Affairs 1939 and of Education 1940 under Nuri Said. He was re-appointed Director-General of Education in April 1940 and retained this position through the disturbances of 1941 until 1943, when he became Director-General of Social Affairs.

Resigned from Government service in 1945 and started the newspaper *Ba'th al Qawmi*, which was violently nationalist, anti-Communist and anti-British and was suppressed in 1946. In 1949 he started a political party named Islah, together with a few retired officials. Elected Deputy for Kut in the bye-elections of June 1950.

He is earnest, obtuse and fairly honest, with an exaggerated sense of his own importance. He speaks Arabic and Turkish only.

105. Shakir al Wadi, M.V.O.

Bagdad Sunni, born 1894. An officer in the Turkish army from 1915 to the Armistice, he joined the Iraqi army in 1921.

Promoted captain in 1928, he was attached for training to British units in the United Kingdom in 1929. In 1930 he was promoted major and made A.D.C. to King Faisal, on whose staff he served during His Majesty's State visit to Britain in 1933. He was promoted lieutenant-colonel and attended the Staff College, Camberley, in 1935.

Returning to Iraq in 1936, he was appointed G.S.O.I. in the Kirkuk Division, of which Bekr Sidqi was the G.O.C., and was the latter's right-hand man in the 1936 *coup d'Etat*. Appointed military attaché in London after the murder of Bekr Sidqi in 1937, he

was dismissed and placed on the retired list a few weeks later, and soon began to take part in political intrigue.

Appointed second secretary in the Iraqi Legation in Tehran in 1939, he later fell under the influence of the German Legation there and as chargé d'affaires in 1941 he dutifully carried out the instructions of Rashid Ali's rebel Government.

Consul at Jerusalem 1941-44. First secretary (and sometimes chargé d'affaires) in the Iraqi Legation in London 1944-46. Appointed Master of Ceremonies at the Palace 1946.

Minister of Defence under Nuri Said November 1946 to March 1947; under Saleh Jabr March 1947 to January 1948; under Muzahim Pachachi October 1948 to January 1949; under Nuri Said January 1949 to December 1949; and under Tawfiq Suweidi from February 1950 and under Nuri Said from September 1950. He acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs from September 1950 to February 1951, and acted in the same capacity in 1951. He became a member of the Central Committee of the Constitutional Union Party in November 1950. Appointed Senator March 1949.

Shakir used to enjoy the personal friendship and confidence of the Regent, to whose influence he owed his frequent ministerial appointments since 1946, but in 1952 he fell from favour. He is widely disliked in political circles, partly on account of his very disreputable private life. He speaks English well and supports Iraq's British connexion.

106. Shawkat al Zahawi, Dr.

Kurd, born about 1898, the son of a colonel in the Ottoman army. Educated in Bagdad and at the Military Medical College in Constantinople, he joined the Iraqi Health Service in 1922.

He has specialised in pathology, on which he has written a number of articles. He is now Director of the Central Pathological Institute and Professor of Pathology in the Royal Medical College.

He was Minister of Social Affairs under Tawfiq al Suweidi for a short time in 1946.

In the Royal Medical College he is an incompetent intriguer, but since he is married to a daughter of the late Mohammed Fadhil Pasha al Daghestani, and therefore has connexions with Najib al Rawi (q.v.) and Hikmat Sulaiman (q.v.), he cannot easily be unseated. He speaks English.

107. Taha al Hashemi

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1888. Educated at Istanbul and served in the Turkish army in Arabia and the Yemen during the First World War. Appointed to the Turkish General Staff 1920.

He returned to Bagdad in 1922, joined the Iraqi army and was given command of the troops in Mosul. C.G.S. 1923. He was on the staff of the High Commissioner for the frontier negotiations with Turkey after the Treaty of Lausanne 1924. When the post of C.G.S. was abolished he became tutor to the then Crown Prince Ghazi 1924; Chief of the Census Department 1926; and Director of Education 1928. In 1930 he again became C.G.S. In 1931 he visited the Imam Yahya and concluded the Iraq-Yemen Treaty of Friendship. He was in Turkey in October 1936 when the Bekr Sidqi *coup d'Etat* forced the resignation of the Prime Minister (Taha's brother, the late Yasin al Hashemi), and he did not return to Iraq until September 1937, after the murder of Bekr Sidqi.

Elected Deputy for Bagdad December 1937 and again in 1939. In December 1938, in collaboration with the C.G.S., Husain Fawzi (q.v.), he organised the military demonstration which caused the resignation of Jamil Madfai (q.v.) and replaced him as Prime Minister by Nuri Said. Taha became Minister of Defence in Nuri's Government and retained this portfolio in the succeeding Government of Rashid Ali

in 1940. He resigned in January 1941 and himself became Prime Minister in February. He failed to break the influence of the pro-Axis military clique, who overthrew him and set up the unconstitutional Government of Rashid Ali a month later. He then retired to Turkey, where he remained for the rest of the war, because Nuri Said was unwilling to allow him to return.

He spent much of the time after the war in Syria, but in May 1951 he played the leading part in the formation of the United Popular Front. He was elected President of the Front's Supreme Committee, but in the spring of 1953 showed signs of losing interest in domestic politics. He knows no English but speaks French, Turkish and Arabic.

He is no friend of the British, nor for that matter of the Crown Prince with whom he engaged in a slanging match in 1952 before a gathering of ex-Prime Ministers.

108. Tahsin Qadri, K.C.V.O.

Sunni of Damascus, born 1893. He was with King Faisal in Damascus and accompanied him to Europe in 1920. Came to Bagdad with the King and was appointed A.D.C. in 1921.

Master of Ceremonies at the Palace 1932, he accompanied King Faisal on his State visit to England in 1933. He resigned in 1936 owing to Princess Azza's scandalous marriage. Counsellor to Iraqi Legation, Tehran, 1936. Consul-General, Bombay, 1937. Director of Protocol in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in February and Consul-General, Beirut, in July 1939. He became, in addition, Chargé d'Affaires at Damascus when the Iraqi Government recognised the new Syrian Government in 1943. Accredited as Minister to Syria and the Lebanon in 1944. Acting Director-General, Foreign Affairs, 1945. Minister at Paris 1946. Master of Ceremonies at the Palace 1947. In June 1949 he was temporarily appointed Minister at Tehran when the Regent visited Persia in that year, but returned to his post at the Palace a few months later. In June 1952 he accompanied the Amir Abdul Ilah to Amman. He was responsible for arranging King Faisal II's Accession celebrations in May 1953 and was a member of the Iraqi delegation to the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth the following month.

Tahsin is sociable and clever and makes an efficient and agreeable Master of Ceremonies. He much enjoys his whisky and the company of European ladies. Politically he is a lightweight. He is married to the heiress of Abdul Wahhab Pasha Qartas of Basra. He speaks Turkish, French and English. His ambition is to succeed the Amir Zaid as ambassador in London.

109. Tariq al Askari

Sunni, born in Aleppo in 1914. Son of the late Jaafar Pasha al Askari. Nuri Said is his uncle. Educated at King's College, Cambridge, from 1932-35 and took a degree in engineering. In 1936-37 worked as engineer with the Grampian Electricity Supply Company in Scotland. Engineer in the Directorate-General of Irrigation, 1937-42. Deputy for Kut, 1943-48. From May to October 1948 served with the Arab Legion in Jerusalem and held the rank of captain. Appointed Director of the Agricultural Section of the Development Board in April 1952. He resigned in the autumn and was elected Deputy for Qal'at Salih in January 1953.

Tariq was a member of the Higher Committee of Nuri's Constitutional Union Party. Intelligent, wealthy, able and witty, he is one of the few younger Iraqis with a balanced judgment. Although a sincere Nationalist he regards the shortcomings of his own countrymen with amused cynicism. He is a genuine friend and admirer of Britain and a believer in the British connexion. He is also friendly with the United States Embassy. Tariq speaks excellent

English, Turkish and some French. His wife, a daughter of the late Jaafar al Pachachi, also speaks good English and appears in mixed society. They entertain frequently and well.

110. Tawfiq al Naib

Sunni, born about 1895. A student at the Law School in Bagdad at the outbreak of the First World War, he completed his studies after the British occupation and was appointed to a post in the Department of Justice in 1923.

From 1926 to 1943 he was a judge and served in many parts of the country, though the bulk of his service was in Bagdad. He gained the reputation of a strong and just judge without political ambitions.

Appointed Mutasarrif of Kut 1943, and transferred to Diwaniya 1944. Minister of Economics under Saleh Jabr from September 1947 to January 1948, and of Interior under Nuri Said from March to September 1949. Appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts in November 1949.

He is a quiet, retiring man who neither smokes nor drinks.

He was a good judge, but a poor administrator. He is impassive and unimaginative, and needs always the letter of the law to support a decision that others may enforce. Though not a member of Saleh Jabr's party, he is one of his principal supporters. He speaks no English.

111. Tawfiq Suweidi

Sunni, of a well-established Bagdad family, born about 1889. Educated at Bagdad, Istanbul and Paris, where he studied International Law, he was appointed interpreter to the Ministry of Education at Istanbul in 1913. In the same year he represented Iraq at the Arab Conference in Paris. During the First World War he was in Istanbul. After the armistice he joined the Arab Government in Syria and was appointed a judge at Damascus. He returned to Bagdad in 1921 and was appointed Assistant Government Counsellor and Director of the Law School.

Deputy from 1924. President of the Chamber 1929, he has held the following Cabinet posts: Education under Abdul Musin Sa'adun 1928; Foreign Affairs under Jamil Madfai in 1934; Justice in Jamil Madfai's twelve-day Cabinet of 1935; Foreign Affairs again under Madfai 1937; Foreign Affairs under Taha al Hashimi 1941. He was Deputy Prime Minister under Nuri Pasha for a short time in 1943 but resigned the following year when the constitutional validity of this office was called in question. He was Prime Minister in 1929, 1946 and 1950 and joined Nuri Said's Cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in February 1951. Resigned from the Cabinet in July 1951. Member of the Regency Council during the Regent's brief visit to Amman in June 1952. Foreign Minister under Jamil Madfai in January 1953.

Tawfiq was Iraqi Minister at Tehran in 1931 and has had considerable diplomatic experience. As Minister for Foreign Affairs he headed the Iraqi Delegation to Geneva in 1937, where he is said to have handled the Palestine and Assyrian questions with tact and moderation. He again represented Iraq at Geneva in 1938 and afterwards visited London to discuss the Palestine problem with the British Foreign and Colonial Secretaries. He was a member of the Iraqi Delegation to the San Francisco Conference in 1945, and in 1948 he was one of the signatories of the unratified Portsmouth Treaty. Attended meeting of the Arab League Political Committee in April 1953 at Cairo.

His elder brother, the late Naji Suweidi, was a prominent member of Rashid Ali's rebel Government but Tawfiq was not implicated in the movement. Nevertheless, he is not completely trusted by the Regent and was not appointed a Senator until 1947.

The Regent also vetoed Nuri's proposal to include him in his Cabinet in the autumn of 1949.

Tawfiq is intelligent, subtle and not altogether honest, either politically or financially. In Arab affairs he generally follows the Egyptian lead and in Iraqi politics he is normally opposed to Nuri Said but has co-operated with him on occasion. He is popularly supposed to be a Liberal. It was he who permitted the operation of political parties in 1946 after they had been banned for many years, and for a short time in 1946 he was president of the Liberal Party. He also has some reputation as a nationalist, but it is doubtful if any of his political convictions are strongly held. He is a rich man, a landed proprietor, who has also wide business interests, in many cases in partnership with Iraqi Jews. He is known to have used his political influence in favour of his business interests. He has a keen sense of humour, is excellent company and speaks French and English fluently but incorrectly.

112. Tawfiq Wahbi Ma'ruf, C.B.E.

Kurd of Sulaimaniya, born in 1887. Graduating from the Turkish Military College in 1904, he served in European Turkey and was a regimental commander and later a staff officer in the Ottoman army during the 1914-18 war.

After the war he joined the Iraqi army and was appointed Military Adviser to Sheikh Mahmud (q.v.) in 1923. Leaving Sheikh Mahmud when the latter's conduct became impossible, he was appointed Commandant of the Bagdad Military College with the rank of colonel. In 1929 he was sent on a course to the United Kingdom.

Mutasarrif of Sulaimaniya for a short time in 1930, he remained unemployed for several years afterwards but was ultimately appointed Director-General of Surveys. He resigned from Government service in 1941 and made a comfortable fortune as a contractor.

Minister of Economics under Hamdi Pachachi 1944-46, of Education under Saleh Jabr in 1947, and of Social Affairs under Tawfiq al Suweidi in 1950. Made a Senator in 1948.

Appointed Honorary C.B.E. for war services in 1946. Elected second vice-president of Saleh Jabr's Popular Socialist Party in July 1951. Although at first an enthusiastic supporter of Saleh Jabr his faith in the party weakened and he was not upset when all political parties were abolished in November 1952.

Tawfiq is keenly interested in Kurdish culture and has spent much time compiling Kurdish dictionaries and writing Kurdish grammars. To young Kurdish nationalists he pleads moderation, but he is not influential with them.

He is a kind man, frank, affable and an Anglophile being honorary vice-president of the British Institute Club and chairman of the Board of Governors of the British Council-sponsored Preparatory School in Bagdad. His achievements in office fall short of his excellent intentions, and he is not a man to sway his colleagues. He speaks English, Persian and Turkish as well as Kurdish and Arabic.

113. Umar Nadhmi

Kurd, born Kifri 1893. Educated at the Bagdad Law School, he was a civil judge before the 1914-18 war and Public Prosecutor to the Bagdad Military Court during the war.

He served as a judge again from 1921 to 1927, and from then to 1937 he was Mutasarrif in a number of provinces. Director-General of Revenues 1937-38.

Minister of Economics and Communications and later of Interior under Nuri Said 1939-40; of Communications and Works under Rashid Ali in 1940; of Interior under Taha al Hashimi in 1941 and under Nuri Said 1943-44; of Justice under Tawfiq al Suweidi in 1946, under Nuri Said November 1946 to March 1947 and under Mohammed al Sadr January to March 1948; and of Interior under

Muzahim Pachachi 1948-49. Deputy Prime Minister under Nuri Said 1949. Again Minister of Interior under Ali Jaudat December 1949 to February 1950 and again in February 1951 under Nuri Said, whose cabinet he joined as Minister without Portfolio in December 1950. He has been a Senator since 1939.

He probably owes his rise to eminence to the friends he made in the provinces (especially in the North) where he served as Mutasarrif, to the support of Nuri Said, and to a cautious and dignified demeanour. He is detested by Saleh Jabr's party. He speaks no English. He enjoys the Regent's confidence. He is disillusioned and in poor health and says he will take no further part in politics.

114. Yahya Qassim

Sunni of Mosul, born 1913. Educated Bagdad Law College.

He joined Government service in 1936. Was appointed Superintendent in the Council of Ministers' Office in 1937 and later transferred to the Iraqi State Railways.

He was at that time an active Left-winger, and was reported to have a hand in the publication of the clandestine newspaper *Al Sharara*. In 1943 he was arrested for the distribution of Leftist literature and was discharged from the Iraqi State Railways. In 1944 he started the newspaper *Al Sha'ab* as the organ of the now defunct Leftist party of that name. He now owns and edits this paper himself, and it is no longer connected with any party. By the middle of 1953 it had become the best and most popular newspaper in Bagdad. He visited England with a party of journalists in 1945 and became a convinced and outspoken admirer of the British people. In 1946 he joined the National Democratic Party but soon resigned owing to personal differences. He was taken up by Saleh Jabr in 1947 and accompanied him to London in January 1948 for the signature of the unratified Portsmouth Treaty. He again visited England in the summer of 1949 and 1952. In addition to journalism he practises as a lawyer and is paid a retainer by the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Yahya is a clever young man with a frank and friendly manner and a pronounced stammer. His newspaper is above the low level of the Bagdad press, and he has the courage on occasion to express unpopular opinions. He regards Saleh Jabr as Iraq's main hope for the future, but he is also on close terms with Nuri. He has not abandoned his Socialist leanings and is a sincere advocate of reforms, but he is now no revolutionary. He is married to a niece of the late Amin Zaki Suleiman and speaks good English.

115. Yusuf Abdullah al Gailani (Saiyid)

Sunni, born 1907 of the family of the Naqibs of Bagdad. Educated at Bagdad and Balliol College, Oxford.

He returned to Iraq in 1934 and was appointed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in which he became Director of the Political Section in 1945. Director-General in 1949, Acting Under-Secretary in January 1951 and Under-Secretary in 1952. He became a Minister Plenipotentiary in the Iraqi Foreign Service in November 1950. He was a member of the Iraqi Delegations to Arab League meetings in 1949 and 1950. Member of the Iraqi Delegation to the United Nations Assembly, 1951.

Yusuf is intelligent and friendly, cautious and a little shy. He takes no part in politics and is well informed only on those questions of Iraqi foreign policy on which he is employed. He complains of the amateurish and emotional conduct of Iraq's foreign relations by his successive political chiefs, and is occasionally critical of the intervention of the Regent in the detailed conduct of foreign affairs. He is, however, a loyal, discreet and competent official. He speaks excellent English, and his wife, who is also a Gailani, appears in mixed society.

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No. 15

IRAQ: HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS

Sir J. Troutbeck to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received July 6)

(No. 113. Confidential) *Bagdad,*
Sir, *June 29, 1953.*

With reference to my despatch No. 129 (1902/59/52) of the 17th of September, 1952, I have the honour to transmit to you the accompanying report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Bagdad.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

Enclosure in No. 15

Report on the Heads of Foreign Missions
in Bagdad, 1953

(Passages marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports)

Afghanistan

Abdul Samad Khan, Minister. (29th May, 1952.)
*Abdul Samad Khan has served in London, Paris and Rome. Before coming to Bagdad was Permanent Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Written in 1952.)

He speaks English and is friendly. But he does not play a very prominent part in Bagdad life. He is unmarried.

Belgium

There is at present no Belgian Minister accredited to the Iraq Government.

*M. Laurent Janssen resides here as Chargé d'Affaires. He is a quiet but friendly and charming person, with a pleasant wife. They speak little English. (Written in 1952.)

One can count on him to be sound on the subject of communism as he spent a year in a Russian prison during the war.

China

Shen Yueh, Chargé d'Affaires.
*Shen Yueh represents the Formosa régime. Consequently I have no relations with him. (Written in 1952.)

He came to the embassy to a party I had, as Dean, to give to all heads of missions here. He is a friendly little South Chinese who was head of the South-East Asia Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the last days of the Nanking régime. He is married but both he and his wife are not of much significance.

Egypt

Abdul Kerim Safwat, Ambassador. (26th April, 1953.)

A career diplomat, Mr. Safwat began as Vice-Consul in Liverpool in 1928-29 and subsequently went to London (where he has served in all three times), Rome, Tehran, Rome, Vienna and Bucharest where he was Chargé d'Affaires. During the war he was in charge of Italian sequestered property in Egypt and afterwards went as Minister to Kabul. He then spent four years in Berne and from there went to Vienna for which he longs nostalgically. He makes no secret of his distaste for Bagdad and,

if it is suggested to him that he has on the whole been fortunate in his posts, is apt to remark ruefully "Yes, until now."

He is intelligent, civilised and appears to be genuinely Anglophil. He is married but his wife has not yet come to Bagdad, having been delayed for family reasons.

France

Ludovic Chancel, Minister. (2nd April, 1953.)
Before he came here M. Chancel was Ambassador in Haiti. He entered the French Consular Service in 1928 and served in London, Shanghai, Tallin and Bucharest. He joined the Free French in 1941 and was Free French delegate in Addis Ababa during the war. Was Consul-General in New York before going to Haiti.

The status of the French Mission has now been raised to an Embassy, and M. Chancel will shortly present his letters as Ambassador.

I have not yet seen very much of M. Chancel as he only arrived in April and has not spent the whole of the subsequent months in Bagdad. Though somewhat more protocolaire than his predecessor, he makes a good first impression, as does his wife. He speaks English.

Holy See

Mgr. Armand Etienne Blanquet Du Chayla, Apostolic Delegate. (20th November, 1948.)

*Mgr. Du Chayla, the Latin Archbishop of Bagdad, was appointed Apostolic Delegate on 20th November, 1948. He is a Frenchman and a member of the Carmelite Order. His appointment represents a departure from the stand hitherto taken by the Iraqi Government that the Apostolic Delegate in Iraq should not be the national of a major Power. He is an agreeable and cultivated man, and it is always a pleasure to meet him. He has spent ten years in Bagdad.

Mgr. Du Chayla's diplomatic position is still not regularised. (Written in 1949.)

*Mgr. Du Chayla is a sick man. He has returned to France in order to have an operation. (Written in 1950.)

*He has returned to Bagdad but makes no secret of his opinion that twelve years' residence here is enough. Aristocratic and fastidious, he does not seem to have taken very kindly to Iraqis, whether of the Muslim or Christian persuasion. (Written in 1951.)

Indonesia

Burhanuddin Saehu, Chargé d'Affaires a.i. (28th April, 1952.)

Before he left for Karachi Dr. Tirtawinata told me that he would be replaced by the Indonesian Chargé d'Affaires there. He has not, however, yet arrived.

Italy

Guelfo Zamboni, Minister. (3rd November, 1951.)

*M. Zamboni, who came here from Moscow, was regarded by my late American colleague as both intelligent and charming. I have not yet discovered any great qualities in M. Zamboni myself, perhaps because I am so little of a bridge player. (Written in 1952.)

Jordan

Abdullah Al-Zereykat has been Chargé d'Affaires since the 1st of January, 1952.

*He goes out of his way to show courtesy to this embassy. (Written in 1952.)

Lebanon

Kazem al Solh, Minister. (9th August, 1947.)

*Kazem al Solh is a cousin of Riad al Solh, Prime Minister of the Lebanon. Aged about 45, and a Sunni Muslim of Beirut, he is a graduate of the Damascus Law School. He started life as a journalist, until his paper was suspended by the French. Subsequently he organised a small but influential nationalist (but not anti-British) political party, the Nida al Qammi. He speaks good French and some English. (Written in 1948.)

His wife is Purdah.

*Kadhim al Solh does not seem to have acquired any influence with the Iraqis and I have seldom met him in Iraqi houses. (Written in 1950.)

*He circulates in society more than he used to, but his personality does not become more impressive on closer acquaintance. I constantly find myself in the embarrassing position of forgetting who he is. (Written in 1952.)

I can now recognise Mr. Solh when I meet him.

Netherlands

*W. A. A. M. Daniels, who had been Minister since 1947, and who resided in Beirut, has been transferred to Stockholm, and M. B. A. Piets, who had been serving as First Secretary resident in Bagdad since July 1949, presented a letter on the 3rd of June, 1951, as Chargé d'Affaires *en pied*.

M. Piets with his wife, is a considerable asset to Bagdad society, though his official duties cannot be very overwhelming. (Written in 1951.)

*He is now also accredited to Amman. (Written in 1952.)

M. Piets has worked hard and successfully to put the Netherlands on the map in Iraq.

Persia

Hussein Nawab, Ambassador. (20th January, 1953.)

I have not met him officially as he was appointed after the rupture of diplomatic relations. He has at times caused considerable offence to the Iraqis, who complain of his lack of tact and manners. He has done nothing to improve Perso-Iraqi relations. On the contrary.

Saudi Arabia

Abdullah Al Khaiyal, Minister. (9th February, 1947.)

*After a period in the legation as a Secretary and then as Chargé d'Affaires, Abdullah Al Khaiyal was appointed Minister in February 1947. He is friendly and intelligent, a genuine Saudi from Riyadh, but is disliked by the Iraqis, who suspect the legation of acting as an intermediary between Rashid Ali and his friends in Iraq. I would not trust him far. He has taken lessons in English from the British Council staff and has made considerable progress.

Last year he surprised Bagdad society by giving the first Saudi party to which ladies were invited. He went home for a month on leave in April for the first time in many years. (Written in 1950.)

*He is a regular visitor to the British Institute and circulates a good deal in society. (Written in 1952.)

Is not now very popular with the Iraq Government on account of his intrigues here, and he particularly infuriated the Palace during the preparations for the Accession ceremonies by making outrageous requests, which they attribute to the Minister himself, on behalf of the Amir Saud, the chief Saudi delegate.

Soviet Union

There is still no Soviet Minister accredited to Iraq. M. Nemchinov was replaced in February by M. Ivan Iakoushin as Chargé d'Affaires. His first post was Tehran, where he was from 1947 to 1951. Immediately before coming here he had been in Moscow.

The Soviet representatives only appear at official parties, but M. Iakoushin, like his predecessor, maintains contact with a good number of Iraqis whom one seldom sees except on the Soviet national day. M. Iakoushin has a not unattractive personality. He speaks some English and is always ready to discuss Russian literature and theatre both old and new. His wife who was (and looks like) a schoolteacher speaks excellent English considering she learnt it only in Moscow where both she and her husband were born. They have the haziest ideas about England and life in the United Kingdom. He hazarded a tentative but correct guess as to which King George had recently died when he called to condole on the death of Queen Mary.

He appears to have received instructions to make an outward show of friendliness. He and his staff turned up in force at the embassy on the Queen's Birthday, and he has taken the unprecedented step of inviting me to a cocktail party.

Spain

Pedro E. Schwartz Diaz-Flores, Minister. (26th April, 1953.)

Joined the Spanish Diplomatic Service in 1912, and served as Consul at Genoa, Quito and Bayonne. He was made Consul-General in Montreal in 1939 and later took charge of consulates in Caracas and Ciudad Trujillo. Before he came here he was Consul-General in Antwerp.

Sr. Schwartz is a little difficult to converse with as both his English and his French are poor. But his gaiety and affability are an asset to Bagdad society. He is married. Though his wife speaks no English and only a little French, she makes an agreeable impression.

Turkey

Nedim Veysel Ilkin, Ambassador. (27th April, 1953.)

M. Ilkin was for many years at the Consulate in Geneva and was closely associated with the permanent Turkish Delegation. From 1939 to 1944, private secretary to M. Saracoglu. Had a brief spell as Minister in The Hague and before coming here was Minister in Brussels.

An interval of nine months intervened between his predecessor's departure and his arrival, while the Turkish Government were apparently labouring over the administrative problems involved in raising the status of the post to an embassy.

M. Ilkin seems on first acquaintance to be a pleasant and friendly colleague. He speaks French but no English. He is married but his wife, who came to Bagdad for the King's accession, retired immediately afterwards to Turkey.

United States

The Hon. Burton Yost Berry, Ambassador. (5th August, 1952.)

Mr. Berry came to Bagdad after holding the post of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African affairs at the State Department. He is therefore well acquainted with the problems of the area. He is a career diplomat and served previously in Istanbul, Tehran, Athens and Bucharest.

I have found Mr. Berry an excellent colleague—frank, witty and intelligent. A rich bachelor, he is also something of a character. Nothing is too much trouble for him in matters that interest him.

Among these are travelling. He is continually out of Bagdad and often out of Iraq, and he will undertake the most fatiguing journeys in all weathers. Another of his hobbies is collecting. He is something of an expert on coins and embroideries. But he is blandly indifferent to the chores of diplomatic life. He caused much offence after his arrival by failing for months to return the calls of his diplomatic colleagues, or to do what is customary in calling upon leading Iraqis. He entertains very little and I have never yet sat down to a meal in his house. But he is most attentive in discussing current problems with me. I could not wish for a better American colleague.

Representatives Resident Elsewhere**Austria**

Dr. Robert Friedinger Pranter, Minister. (27th December, 1951.)

Resident in Cairo.

He visited Bagdad for the Accession of King Feisal.

Chile

Marcial Rivera Marambio.

His appointment as Minister here was announced in Santiago in March but he has not presented his letters or called on me.

Denmark

Axel Caspar Frederik Sporon-Fiedler, Minister. (7th April, 1949.)

*M. Sporon-Fiedler, who was formerly Danish Consul-General in San Francisco, is also accredited to Tehran, where he normally resides. He paid a short visit to Bagdad in April 1951, accompanied by his wife, and another one in the summer of 1951, accompanied by a Secretary. (Written in 1952.)

Visited Bagdad for the Accession ceremonies, at which his scarlet uniform made a pleasant splash of colour.

Ethiopia

*There is at present no Ethiopian Minister accredited to the Iraq Government. Petros Sahlou,

Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*, is resident in Cairo. (Written in 1952.)

Greece

George Seferiades, Minister. (27th April, 1953.) He is resident in Beirut and visited Bagdad for the Accession of King Feisal. He and his wife seemed a friendly couple.

Mexico

José C. Valadés, Minister. (27th November, 1952.)

Resident in Beirut. He visited Bagdad during the riots in November and remarked that he felt at home at last.

Norway

Ernest Krogh-Hansen, Minister. (14th April, 1949.)

*M. Krogh-Hansen is accredited also to Turkey, Pakistan and Persia and is resident in Ankara. He spent two weeks here after presenting his credentials in the (vain) hope of concluding an Air Agreement rapidly. (Written in 1949.)

*He has not been here since. (Written in 1950.)

*He spent a day or so in Bagdad in May 1951 and seems a friendly person. (Written in 1952.)

He came to Bagdad for the Accession.

Sweden

Ragnvald Bagge, Minister. (2nd April, 1953.)

Also accredited to Tehran (where he resides) and Karachi. He and his Finnish wife make a handsome couple. Friendly but not, I think, very intelligent. Never stops talking. He left for Karachi after presenting his letters but returned for the Accession.

Switzerland

Franz Kappeler, Minister. (24th February, 1951.)

M. Kappeler, who resides in Beirut, was formerly Chargé d'Affaires *en pied*. The only resident member of his staff is M. Jacques Mallet. Neither he nor his wife appears to be very interesting. Unattractive, pompous and apt to stand on what he believes to be his dignity. They speak English.